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In 2018, the Nationwide Foundation funded the Centre for Housing Policy at the 
University of York to deliver a review of the private rented sector in England and create 
an accompanying report into vulnerability in the private rented sector. Coming out 
strongly from this seminal work was evidence about how precarious the lowest end of 
the private rented sector is, both in terms of how it operates as a market, and the 
experiences of renters living there.    
 
Critical questions that emerged from the 2018 review remain: what role is the private 
rented sector expected and willing to play in the wider housing system? And how 
sustainable is it? For the Nationwide Foundation, sustainable means that landlords are 
able to operate their business, and renters are able to live in decent and affordable 
homes.  
 
This new research by the Centre for Housing Policy looks to start answering those 
questions with a particular focus on the part of the private rented sector that is typically 
occupied by renters in poverty, in receipt of housing benefit, on the lowest incomes or 
paying the lowest rent.   
 
What is clear to us from this research is that this lower end of the private rented sector 
is not sustainable. In most of England, housing is simply unaffordable for private renters 
on low incomes. Even in more affordable areas, the decisions being made by landlords, 
letting agents and intermediaries about who they let to and how they operate their 
businesses, are skewing the market, often disadvantaging renters on low incomes. 
 
We know that many of these renters are particularly vulnerable to harm in the private 
rented sector, yet there is simply nowhere else for them to turn. Until there are more 
social rented homes, reform of the welfare system and changes to the private rented 
sector, this problem will only get worse. We can no longer accept that the private rented 
sector in its current form will continue to be able to deliver housing to renters on low 
incomes. 
 
Our thanks go to Dr Julie Rugg and Dr Alison Wallace for carrying out this thorough and 
insightful research that can inform thinking and decisions relating to the private rented 
sector. We hope stakeholders will find this new evidence about the characteristics of the 
lower end of the private rented sector and its landlords, as interesting as we have. 
 
Bridget Young, Programme Manager 
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As an independent charity, the Nationwide Foundation influences changes to improve 
circumstances for those people in the UK who most need help. Its vision is for everyone in 
the UK to have access to a decent home that they can afford, and its strategy seeks to 
improve the lives of people who are disadvantaged because of their housing circumstances. 
To do this, it aims to increase the availability of decent affordable homes. The Decent 
Affordable Homes strategy began in 2013 and the Nationwide Foundation is committed to 
this strategy until 2031. 
 
Funding for this work, totaling £199,434, has been given as part of the Nationwide 
Foundation’s Transforming the Private Rented Sector programme. The Nationwide 
Foundation has a commitment to transforming the private rented sector so that it provides 
homes for people in need that are more affordable, secure, accessible and are better 
quality. 
 
The Nationwide Foundation was established by Nationwide Building Society in 1997 as a 
fully independent foundation. It is a registered charity (no. 1065552) and a company limited 










Key messages are summarised in the boxes. 
1. Introduction 
 
• This report assesses the sustainability of property supply to the bottom end of the 
private rented sector in England. The report defines ‘sustainability’ in terms of 
property coming to the market at sufficient scale to replace properties that have 
been withdrawn, supplied by landlords with stable business models and where 
income is sufficient to undertake necessary repairs and maintenance.  
• A great deal of research has considered the impact of austerity measures on tenants 
living in the PRS. Little attention has been paid to the characteristics and behaviour 
of landlords meeting the need for lower-rent housing. This report explores why 
some landlords might express a ‘No DSS’ preference whilst others actively target 
that market. A sustainable supply of affordable rental properties depends on 
continued landlord engagement with this part of the sector, and the research also 
examines letting intentions amongst this landlord group.  
• In the absence of substantial investment in social housing, there is an expectation 
that the PRS will continue to meet lower-income household need. This report 
explores how far it is viable for private landlords to play that role, and whether 
future supply will be robust and sustainable. 
• This research is taking place at a time when PRS growth has faltered nationally 
although there is substantial regional variation in terms of increase and contraction 
in this part of the market. Sectoral reconfiguration has led to a refinement of 
supply-side characteristics. There is increasing investment – including large-scale 
institutional investment – in the ‘mediated’ market which secures access to PRS 
properties for households in acute housing need. This interest reflects higher levels 
of housing benefit that are often payable, for example, for temporary or exempt 
accommodation. 
• At the same time, the regulatory context for landlords has altered the complexion of 
a market that has hitherto been regarded as relatively benign for small investors.  
• The research is based on multiple methods and data sources including secondary 
analysis of existing datasets, qualitative interviews with professional informants, a 




A number of policy changes have impacted on the PRS since 2012, and each 
change has had the potential impact of reducing landlord willingness to supply 







2. Characteristics of tenant demand 
 
• There are a number of ways in which it might be possible to define the ‘lower end’ of 
the private rented sector. Definition can rest on any of the following terms:  the 
household living in poverty, being in receipt of housing benefit, being on the lowest 
incomes or paying the lowest rent. Taken together, all those features cover well 
over half the rental market. However, lower-end demand is generally expressed by 
one or two of these elements: private rented households in poverty are obviously in 
the bottom third of households, but do not all claim housing benefit or have the 
lowest rents. For the purposes of this report, it is important to note the lower end of 
the PRS is not coterminous with all households receiving housing benefit. 
• Landlords do not regard the bottom end of the market – however defined – as a 
single market. Some landlords are willing to accept working tenants on lower 
incomes but not in receipt of housing benefit. However, the introduction of 
Universal Credit means that it is increasingly difficult to draw binary distinctions 
between working/not working tenants since many tenants receive some benefit to 
augment lower wages, and many landlords do let to ‘benefit-supported’ tenants.  
• Tenants wholly dependent on housing benefit are more likely to have financial 
problems than working lower-income tenants assessed in terms of – for example – 
keeping up with bills. However, less than five per cent of tenants in receipt of 
housing benefit were currently behind with their rent payment. Notwithstanding 
these difficulties, across all economic and demographic types at the lower end of 
the market, there tended to be similar proportions of households having stayed in 
the same property for five years or more.  
 
 
‘Lower end’ has multiple definitions and tenants have different characteristics 
depending on those definitions. Working, ‘benefit-supported’ tenants are less 
likely to be in financial difficulties than fully ‘benefit-dependent’ tenants who are 
not in work because of their health, age or caring responsibilities.  
  
 
3. Landlord characteristics 
 
• For the purposes of this report, definition of landlord types is essential in order to 
establish trends in decision making and in longer-term letting strategies. Landlords 
are not a homogenous group. Further, classification has to be dynamic: landlords 
move into, through and out of the market. A total of 55 landlord interviews, 
analyzed in detail, indicates the ways in which the classification and the dynamics 
played out at the bottom end of the market. 
• Landlord classifications included accidental, investment, portfolio and business 
landlords. None of the landlords who were interviewed were ‘accidental’ landlords in 
the sense that their letting was short-term, but a number had not set out to be 
landlords and so moved from that category to a more active engagement with the 
market. ‘Investment’ landlords were defined principally in terms of whether or not 
their income was derived from working for an employer or from pensions or similar 
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kinds of investment. ‘Portfolio’ landlords were working as landlords full-time, and 
were generally hands-on, often with a background in building-related trade. 
‘Business’ landlords were letting property and running ancillary property-related 
businesses including letting agencies or property development. They often owned 
more than one type of business. They were more likely to act in a ‘CEO’ capacity and 
have staff to deal with property management and maintenance.  
 
 
Landlordism is a dynamic state and includes accidental, investment, portfolio 




• Landlords often moved from one category to another, and the number of lettings 
they had was a poor indicator of the kind of landlord they were. This is because 
holdings were dynamic: some landlords were actively growing their portfolios; 
others had reached a species of more or less welcome plateau; and some were 
selling down. The landlords who were interviewed varied in terms of age: some had 
been letting property since the 1980s, and had built up their holdings following the 
introduction of readily-available buy-to-let mortgages and low interest rates 
following the Global Financial Crisis.  
• A number of respondent landlords were very unwilling to let to tenants in receipt of 
housing benefit, reflecting the wider sectoral preferences. The qualitative 
respondents indicated that their preference reflected the fact that their rents were 
set at some way above the LHA rates and were not affordable to tenants who 
needed help to pay the rent. Other landlords viewed this kind of tenant as 
problematic in relation to benefit bureaucracy, or as having personal characteristics 
that were in some way undesirable.  
• The majority of landlords in the qualitative sample - and a quarter of respondents in 
the quantitative sample – were not averse to letting to tenants receiving LHA and/or 
Universal Credit – but did not change their letting practices to accommodate the 
benefit. For qualitative respondents, provided the rent was paid in full and on time, 
the source of their tenants’ income was of no concern. This group included a large 
number of landlords with ‘legacy lettings’: very long-standing tenancies which in 
some cases had been inherited with the property, and where the landlord’s historic 
commitment to the tenant extended to forbearance during times of financial 
difficulty.  
• The majority of landlords who were interviewed qualitatively were rather more 
firmly in the housing benefit market: this was a target market, landlords were fully 
aware of the LHA rates and set their rents in reference to those rates. Landlords had 
preferences within the housing benefit market. These preferences might include: 
 
Working tenants who were lower income and benefit-supported rather than 
wholly benefit dependent. 
Single parents or pensioner households who were wholly reliant on benefit, 




Single older individuals who were likely to be seeking accommodation in 
shared properties, and at the higher ‘over-35s’ LHA which is paid irrespective 
of whether the property is shared or a studio; and 
Vulnerable people with long-term health issues including drug and alcohol 
dependencies, where it was possible to for the landlord to secure direct 
payment of housing benefit via an Alternative Payment Arrangement. 
 
 
The ‘housing benefit market’ is not one market. Some landlords tolerate tenants 
receiving housing benefit but do not set their rent through reference to the Local 
Housing Allowance rates or charge or their management practices. Landlords 
who actively target tenants in receipt of housing benefit do both of those things, 




4. Financial decision-making 
 
• Landlords had two principal strategies in building their portfolios. Many used a 
‘tumble-through’ model, whereby properties available at below-market value, often 
because of condition, were purchased and refurbished. These properties were then 
remortgaged to release the additional equity, with that money then used as a 
deposit on another property. This model depended on locating properties at the 
right price. The availability interest-only mortgages contributed substantially to the 
attraction and profitability of this model, and landlords in this group tolerated a high 
loan-to-value ratio on their properties. 
• Other landlords were more likely to expand steadily, looked to repay their 
mortgages and sought to achieve a debt-free portfolio certainly by retirement age. 
The difference in approaches generally reflected personal attitudes towards debt. 
• A small number of landlords had built up their holdings using alternative strategies 
which included operating ‘sale and rent back’ schemes in the 2000’s. Recourse to 
this strategy had led to rapid growth of holdings for a handful of respondent 
landlords. 
• It is notable that some landlords were mortgage free either because they had, over 
time, succeeded in paying down their debt or because properties were inherited or 
paid for in cash from rental income or other business dealings.  
• Recent taxation changes had variable impact on landlords depending on their 
financial strategies. Many landlords were unmortgaged, had small portfolios or 
shared their tax liability with their partner to keep them below the relevant tax 
threshold. Some landlords had transferred their properties into company ownership 
which meant that the tax change did not apply. Landlords who had seen an impact 
were considering their ongoing letting strategy (see Chapter 9). 
• The majority of respondents had a robust financial strategy and had built sufficient 
contingency to deal with external shocks. Many brought additional competencies to 
their lettings which minimized financial risks, including trade skills, property 
knowledge or general business, finance or legal acumen. Landlords who were less 
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stable were often at an early stage in their letting experience, and had insufficient 
contingency funds to deal with unanticipated repairs.  
• Landlords who were letting at the bottom of the market tended to pursue a strategy 
of cost minimization rather than rent maximization. The most common tactic for 
reducing costs was minimizing turnover and voids which meant attracting and 
retaining good tenants through charging a lower-than-market rent, infrequent rent 
increases and prompt attention to repairs and maintenance. Indeed, expenditure on 
property condition was regarded as an essential element of a good business model. 
However, the relationship between longer-term tenancies at the bottom of the 
market and higher incidence of non-decency remains unexplained.  
 
 
Landlords who were targeting the bottom end of the PRS focussed on cost 
minimisation rather than rental maximisation, with strategies aimed at reducing 
voids and tenancy turnover.  
 
 
• Arguably, much of the current supply of property to the lower end of the market is 
not commercially replicable: investor landlords were generally happy to accept a 
lower rent because they had taken out interest-only mortgages and current interest 
rates are low; similarly, many landlords with long-term, ‘low-income’ tenancies 
tolerated a lower rent because the properties were not mortgaged. Furthermore, 
much of the sector is reliant on a cohort of landlords who accrued substantial 
holdings during a distinctive period of more flexible finance and benign taxation 
which is unlikely to return.  
 
 
A great deal of current supply to the bottom end of the market is being let in 
circumstances that are not easy to replicate: in particular, there is an aging cohort of 
landlords with portfolios that were built at a time of flexible financing and benign 
tax treatment. New entrants to the market will not be able to build their holdings in 
the same way. 
 
 
5. The role of place 
 
• There is substantial regional difference in the proportion of lettings to tenants in 
receipt of housing benefit, and geographic variation in the principal reasons why 
tenants need to apply for assistance. There were seventeen local authorities where 
tenants receiving benefits comprised over 50 per cent of all households in the PRS. 
Nine per cent of all HB tenants were in a ‘HB-dominated’ market.  Using a threshold 
of 40 per cent as the definition, 28 per cent of all HB tenants were in a HB-dominant 
market. 
• Landlords who were actively engaged in letting to HB tenants were often 
responding to spatial opportunities created by the LHA rates themselves. Landlords 
bought properties where yield was calculated using the LHA rates. In some 
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locations, the very slight increases to LHA rates since 2012 took place against 
stagnation in market rents. These circumstances created pockets of low house 
prices but LHA rates offering more satisfactory yields.  Almost all the larger business 
landlords had identified these opportunities and were operating in this type of 
location, using their own paid staff to manage properties. 
• Other landlords targeting the HB market had properties in their ‘home’ location, 
and were more likely to rely on a combination of highly localized knowledge – for 
example, to identify purchase opportunities – and cost minimization strategies. 
These landlords were, more often, portfolio landlords who were actively managing 
their own stock and themselves working on property renovation and maintenance.  
 
 
There are areas of the country where the LHA rates are higher than market rents, 
and larger business landlord activity was targeted at those areas. 
 
 
6. Management practices in the housing benefit market 
 
• Landlords who targeted the bottom end of the market tended to be the more 
experienced portfolio and business landlords, and each had their own preferences 
within the housing benefit market. Tenants who received some benefit support but 
were in work were favoured by some landlords as being a group least in need of 
active management, but some landlords were not happy with the fluctuations in 
income and benefit entitlement that employed tenants could experience. ‘Steady’ 
tenants included young families and older households who were not seeking work 
and whose income did not change. Some landlords regarded more vulnerable 
tenants as being preferable, since it might be possible to apply for an Alternative 
Payment Arrangement  (APA) and so have rent paid directly. There were landlords 
whose management plans were geared towards taking tenants who were 
nominated by the local authority’s homelessness team, where an APA was 
guaranteed and the local authority offered some level of tenant support.  
• Landlords letting at the bottom of the market were generally of the view that 
setting the rent at the LHA rate was easiest to manage least likely to result in rent 
arrears. There was little point in setting up tenancies to fail. Large business 
landlords employed staff to manage rent collection proactively and deal with arrears 
quickly before they accrued. Landlords who knew their tenants well, tended to be 
flexible about missed payments where they knew that tenants would resolve the 
debt over time.  
• A common risk-mitigation strategy was to require tenants to provide details of a 
home-owning guarantor who would make good any arrears, and some landlords 
indicated that they had pursued those guarantors where tenants left owing 








Landlords requiring the tenant to provide a home-owning guarantor was a 
common risk-mitigating strategy. 
 
 
• Many HB landlords were actively involved in their tenants’ HB claims. A number of 
landlords had experience in working with the LHA system and were dismayed by 
their early experiences under Universal Credit (UC). In particular, landlords were 
unhappy with the fact that their communication with benefit staff had been 
curtailed. This limited landlords’ ability to help tenants when problems arose with 
their benefit. There were particular problems when more vulnerable tenants were 
transferred onto UC and received their HB payment themselves.  
• Some landlords saw arranging APAs as central to their business strategy, and only 
took nominations where the nominating agency could guarantee that an APA would 
be put in place. 
• Landlords in the HB market regarded tenant support as part of good management, 
and likened their role to social workers. This was particularly the case where 
landlords had more vulnerable tenants. One larger business landlord employed a 
tenancy manager who had previously worked in social housing.  
• It was notable that, for many landlords, early experiences with UC were provoking a 
change in their target client group. In some instances, this mean a move towards 
more independent, working ‘benefit-supported’ tenants. Landlords cited problems 
with securing direct payments and tenants moving themselves off APAs, but were 
also clearly unhappy with the fact that they no longer had a working relationship 
with the local authority HB department.  
 
 
Landlords in the HB market judged tenant groups in terms of the level of risk and 
options for risk mitigation. Alternative Payment Arrangements (APAs) could 
offset the risks of letting to more vulnerable tenants. Where landlords had poor 
experiences with APAs they were likely to change their target market. 
 
 
7. Letting agents and other risk-absorbing intermediaries 
 
• The Private Landlord Survey 2018 indicated that letting agents were much more 
willing than landlords to let to tenants in receipt of housing benefit, in being more 
likely to have some knowledge of the benefit system and less likely to indicate that 
mortgage or insurance companies had restrictive policies in this regard.  
• Respondent landlords indicated that letting agents were often involved in housing 
benefit letting, for example if the property was located at some distance from the 
landlord’s home, or if the landlord had a background in trades or felt they did not 
have the skills or aptitude for the tenancy paperwork.  
• An estimated 10 per cent of the HB market is ‘mediated’ and involves statutory or 
third sector agencies procuring properties under contract to local authorities. 
Interviews took place with large-scale mediating agencies operating in the private 
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sector and in the third sector, and these indicated that property procurement to 




Mediating agencies are playing an increasing role in the housing benefit market, 
and are becoming oriented towards large-scale procurement and management of 
rental property backed by investment capital. 
 
 
• Landlords also dealt with more traditional ‘help to rent schemes’, which absorbed 
some of the risks involved in letting to a tenant on lower income by offering 
assistance with setting up the benefit claim or – if required – a APA, and giving 
support to ensure that the tenancy continues. 
• Landlords had variable experiences of these schemes. Accounts were coloured by 
‘horror stories’ which were evidently common currency amongst landlords. 
Landlords who were happy with the arrangements they had made included a 
London landlord who was receiving incentive payments to take tenants; and a 
landlord dealing with a homelessness charity, where the level of tenancy support 
had reduced risk and his own burden of management.   
• An equal number of landlords had less positive experiences and were, as a 
consequence, stepping away from the housing benefit market. Poor experiences 
included the mediating agency failing to give the promised support to a problematic 
tenant, which in some instances left the landlord accruing rent arrears, dealing with 
anti-social behavior or having to evict the tenant. 
 
 
Landlord experiences of poorly-supported ‘help to rent’ schemes often led to 
their stepping away from the HB market. 
 
 
• It was notable that some landlords were using rent insurance products to mitigate 
the risk of rent arrears. Some landlords who no longer accepted tenants in receipt of 
benefit cited higher insurance premiums as the principal reason. 
 
8. The impact of Covid 
 
• The government introduced a number of measures to support the PRS in response 
to the pandemic. The two measures of principal concern to landlords at the lower 
end of the market were changes in LHA rates and changes to possession 
proceedings. Note that fieldwork with landlords took place during the summer 
months of 2020, between the first and second lockdowns.  
• Few landlords reported that they were having serious problems with rent arrears as 
a consequence of the pandemic. Landlords who had tenants who were wholly 
reliant on benefits saw no change, and indeed some increased their rents to take 
advantage of the uplift in LHA rates.  
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• Recourse to mortgage deferral was low, and many landlords resisted this measure 
given possible impact on their ability to remortgage in the future.  
• Landlords were most concerned about changes to possession proceedings, which 
they generally referred to as a ‘suspension’ of s21 which allows landlords to evict 
without specifying a reason. Landlords reported difficulties with some tenants who 
had stopped paying the rent or whose anti-social behavior was causing difficulties, 
or cases where proceedings against a tenant had been halted.   
• Landlords were generally of the view that the suspension had left them vulnerable 
to criminal tenants who entered into tenancies with no intention of paying the rent, 
and who sought to use the property as a base for illegal activity. This aspect of Covid 
fed most strongly into decisions framing landlord letting intentions.  
• Some landlords had paid problematic tenants so they would leave. This measure 
reduced the amount of arrears that would have accrued and immediately brought to 
an end problematic anti-social behaviour that was often affecting neighbours. 
• Landlords also tended to tighten up their vetting procedures, and no longer ‘took 
risks’ with tenants they felt might fall into difficulties with paying the rent. Risk 
mitigation measures included more routinely requiring tenants to provide home-
owner guarantors.  
 
 
The Covid impact felt most strongly by landlords was limitation in the ability to 
use s21 as a means of evicting highly problematic tenants. Some landlords had 
simply paid those tenants to leave principally as a means of reducing the 
accumulation of unrecoverable arrears.  
 
 
9. Landlord intent 
 
• Data from the Private Landlord Survey 2018 indicates that the intention to sell 
property and/or leave the market was more marked amongst larger landlords and 
landlords agreeing that housing benefit tenants were a group they would let to.  
• Amongst the respondent landlords, almost all the business landlords and handful of 
investment and portfolio landlords were planning to expand their holdings (n=15). 
Of the remaining 40 landlords, 22 were not intending to make any change to their 
holdings in the short or medium term, and eighteen were selling down. 
• Landlord intent was reviewed in terms of their continuing letting generally, and 
their continuing to let in the housing benefit market. The landlords who were 
expanding their lettings included larger business landlords who were letting in 
locations where the LHA rate was higher than the market rent; landlords who had 
secured nomination agreements with guaranteed APAs; and landlords who were 
taking nominations with attached incentive payments. Other landlords who were 
expanding indicated that none of their new properties would be let to people 
receiving UC. 
• Landlords with no immediate plans to buy or to sell included those who were happy 
with the size of their holdings: they had reached a ‘sweet spot’ in terms of tax 
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liability and a manageable portfolio. Other landlords had reached a point where 
regulatory and tax changes had reduced their willingness to increase their holdings.  
• Seventeen landlords were selling property. The process of disinvestment was slow, 
and sale generally took place when the property became vacant. None of the 
landlords sold tenanted properties. Landlords were most likely to sell the properties 
they regarded as problematic, and that generally included properties they had let at 
the bottom of the market.  
 
 
There were multiple reasons why landlords were choosing to exit the market, 
which often worked in combination. Taxation changes, introduction of UC and a 
swathe of new regulations had increased the risks attached to letting whilst at 
the same time reducing profitability. 
 
 
• There were six factors underlying a landlord selling down or exiting the market: 
Demography: many landlords were ‘baby boomer’ landlords who had built 
their holdings during the prime ‘by-to-let’ years and were now beyond 
retirement age. These landlords were often selling properties at the rate of 
one a year, and using the released equity to improve their quality of life. 
Finance: the taxation change had impacted on some landlords, who saw the 
profitability of their lettings reduce substantially. In these circumstances one 
common strategy was to sell down to a smaller number of unmortgaged 
properties. 
Universal Credit: many landlords with extended experience of Local Housing 
Allowance were extremely unhappy with the operation of UC and looking to 
reduce their HB lettings. The direct payment of rent to tenants was a key 
issue for landlords dealing with tenants they regarded as being incapable of 
managing their own finances.  
‘Regulatory burden’: the increased burden of regulation was felt to be 
problematic for some landlords. None had issues relating to the need to 
regulate property quality and management, but some felt that compliance 
timescales – for example, for energy efficiency – could be unrealistic, and 
penalties for non-compliance were excessive. Investor landlords were 
particularly wary of inadvertent non-compliance. 
Hassle: for a number of respondents, the financial returns from letting 
property were not commensurate with the level of ‘hassle’. Portfolio and 
investor landlords who were actively managing their own properties were 
working long hours and effectively on-call 24/7. Investor landlords in 
particular were beginning to view more passive investment options as 
preferable, given similar levels of return. 
Risk: landlords were of the view that the market now presented a harsh 
environment for small landlords. The previously listed factors were felt in 
combination, and the prospective abolition of s21 signaled a substantial 
increase in the risks attached to letting property.   
• There is evidence of a slow-down in new entrants to the market. The PLS 2010 
indicated that 22 per cent of landlords had been letting for three years or less; in 
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2018 the comparable figure was 9.5 per cent. Willingness to let to housing benefit 
claimants was lower amongst those newer landlords. 
• Amongst the respondent landlords, the newer entrants to the market were much 
more likely to have set up their businesses to be tax-efficient under the new regime 
and establishing frameworks to accommodate UC regulations. However, there was 
general agreement across landlords that although the market presented the 
opportunities to make good returns, the risks attached to letting had multiplied. 
 
 
Larger landlords who were seeking to expand in the HB market were more likely 
to be targeting localities where LHA rates were above market rates, and let to 





• This report has focused on property supply to the lower end of the PRS and included 
a detailed exploration of demand-side characteristics, market geography and 
landlords’ financial decision making, management practices and portfolio 
intentions. The conclusion indicates a number of new developments in the market 
which are concerning, including market reconfiguration and landlord use of  
risk-mitigation strategies which are likely to exacerbate the exclusion of tenants 
who are already disadvantaged in the market. There is evidence of a lowering in the 
scale of supply to replace properties being withdrawn from the market in areas 
outside HB-dominant markets. Growth is evident within the HB-dominant markets. 
Outside these locations, response to the increase in risk attached to letting has led 
to a reduced willingness to let to people in receipt of benefit. Landlords are much 
less willing to take chances. This trend is being amplified by a mismatch between 
the number of landlords exiting the market and those entering: taxation, financial 
and regulatory change has resulted in a less amenable context for small 










The private rented sector (PRS) is a part of the housing market that meets multiple 
purposes. Reduced investment in social housing and the sale of social housing stock via 
right to buy have led to an increased reliance on the PRS by low-income households. The 
PRS expanded steadily from the turn of the 21st century, but growth has stalled in recent 
years. A wide range of policy changes has created new contexts for landlords letting to low-
income households. Housing Benefit payments under the Universal Credit system and a 
freeze in Local Housing Allowance rates have not been welcomed by landlords, who are 
also accommodating taxation changes and an increase in operation costs following a 
number of regulatory interventions. It is generally understood that landlords are 
withdrawing from the market. If landlords are withdrawing from letting or more specifically 
from letting at the bottom end of the market, and with no corresponding increase in social 
housing supply, one likely consequence will be an increase in levels of homelessness.  
 
This report assesses the sustainability of property supply to tenants at the bottom end of 
the PRS. Here, ‘sustainability’ is viewed in terms of properties coming to this part of the 
market at sufficient scale to replace properties that have been withdrawn, and supplied by 
landlords with stable business models. In undertaking this assessment, the research has 
focussed on the characteristics of landlords operating in this part of the market and 
explored their financial and management strategies. The report – based on detailed 
analysis of qualitative interviews and supported by secondary data analysis – presents 
substantial new data on the behaviours, attitudes and future intentions of landlords letting 
to tenants on lower incomes.  
 
 
Background to the study 
 
In the last twenty years, the PRS has expanded to house lower-income households whose 
needs might, in earlier decades, have been met in social housing. Landlords will generally 
have a target tenant group, and some aim to meet demand from lower-income tenants. 
Indeed, there is a ‘housing benefit (HB) market’, with landlords operating management 
practices that take benefit receipt into account. These landlords will tolerate a delay in the 
first rental payment to allow for the time for the initial application, accept on-going rental 
payments in arrears and set their rents at or close to the Local Housing Allowance (LHA) 
rates.1  
 
When they were introduced in 2003, LHA rates were originally set at the 50th percentile of 
rents for a range of household sizes. The rates were adjusted to the 30th percentile in 2011. 
Since that time, the LHA rates have become increasingly disconnected from any 
 
1 J. Rugg (2007) ‘Housing benefit and the private rented sector: a case study of variance in rental niche 
markets’, in D. Hughes and S. Lowe (eds.) The Private Rented Housing Market: Regulation or Deregulation? 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 51-68. 
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relationship between the bottom 30th percentile of rents, as a consequence of capped 
increases and a four-year freeze from 2016/17.2 These restrictions were part of austerity 
measures designed to reduce welfare expenditure. The regulations have restricted the pool 
of affordable properties, since possible landlord responses to the measure include requiring 
tenants to make an additional payment to meet a shortfall between the LHA rate and the 
market rent, and refusing to let to tenants who rely on benefits.3  
 
A note on terminology 
In this report, ‘Housing Benefit’ or HB will comprise a generic reference for benefit 
support with housing costs; Local Housing Allowance (LHA) refers to the system of 
assistance for private renters in operation between 2003 and the introduction of 
Universal Credit (UC) in 2013. Housing assistance within UC is still paid according to LHA 
rates defined for different household sizes; the rates are set for each of the 152 Broad 
Rental Market Areas in England. 
 
 
Reports have highlighted the impact on tenants of affordability issues in the PRS and of the 
increasing incidence of homelessness as a consequence of landlords deciding not to renew 
assured shorthold tenancies often as a consequence of rent arrears and benefit-related 
problems.4 Little attention has been paid to the characteristics and behaviours of landlords 
meeting the need for lower-rent housing. Moral judgement of landlord unwillingness to 
accommodate ‘DSS’ tenants has overshadowed the need to understand why landlords 
might express that preference, the circumstances in which landlords do let to lower-income 
tenants, and intentions with regard to continuing to supply that market. In the absence of 
substantial investment in housing available at social rent levels, there is an expectation that 
the PRS will continue to meet lower-income household need. This report explores how far it 
is viable for private landlords to play that role, and whether supply will be robust and 





There are three major contexts defining the operation of the bottom end of the PRS: 
substantial regional variation in patterns of growth and stagnation; broad sectoral 
reconfiguration; and an increased flow of policy intervention that has introduced 
regulations impacting on landlord finances, costs and management practices.  
Regional variation in PRS growth 
According to the English Housing Survey, the proportion of households in the PRS grew by 
around one percentage point between 2013/14 and 2018/19. In understanding supply-side 
 
2 CIH (2018) Missing the Target, Coventry: CIH.  
3 Shelter (2020) Stop DSS Discrimination: Ending Prejudices against Renters on Housing Benefit, London: 
Shelter. 
4 S. Fitzpatrick, H. Pawson and G. Bramley et al. (2018) The Homeless Monitor: England 2018, Edinburgh: 
Heriot-Watt University; K. Reeve, I. Cole and E. Batty (2016) Home: No Less Will Do. Homeless People’s Access 
to the PRS. Sheffield: Sheffield Hallam University. 
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characteristics, relative tenure proportions are less relevant than absolute growth. The 
number of households in the PRS nationally has increased roughly in line with population 
growth, but there has been substantial regional difference. Table 1.1 indicates that, 
between 2013/14 and 2018/19, the number of households in the PRS has grown markedly in 
some regions, whilst falling in others. The North East region has seen a particularly high 
level of increase – by 22.4 per cent – compared with an absolute drop in numbers in both 
the Yorkshire & Humberside and the East Midlands region.  
 
 
Table 1.1:  All PRS households: growth in number by region (000’s) 
 2013/14 2018/19 Percentage growth, 2013/14-2018/19 
North East 165 202 +22.4 
North West 547 571 +4.4 
Yorkshire & Humberside 445 427 -4.0 
East Midlands 368 359 -2.4 
West Midlands 347 405 +16.7 
East 423 437 +3.3 
London 1,014 964 -4.9 
South East 651 713 +9.5 
South West 418 474 13.4 
Total 4,377 4,552 +3.9 




PRS growth has slowed down nationally, but the market is reconfiguring. Stakeholder 
interviews indicated a number of key trends that will have a direct impact on the lower end 
of the market. These include change in the nature of supply-side characteristics and the 
identification of large-scale investment opportunities in meeting the needs of lower-
income renters. The interest of larger players in this market is challenging presumptions 
that landlordism is or will continue to be a ‘cottage industry’. Major trends identified in the 
contextual stakeholder interviews include: 
 
• Growing institutional investment in properties meeting the needs of low-income 
households, where it is possible to build a substantial portfolio under single 
management. There was evidence of institutional purchase of properties for 
‘squeezed middle’ renters at below market rates.5  
• A number of firms specializing in managing rental portfolios on behalf of 
institutional investors with ‘patient capital’ that are satisfied with low dividends 
secured over the long term, particularly where there is evidence that investment 
meets social need.  
• The expansion of build-to-let into regional cities and increasingly focused on the 
creation of competitively priced rental family homes in private ‘estates’.  
 
5 Also see e.g. L. Heath (2021) ‘Investment firm acquires 95 homes from house builder’, Inside Housing, 3 Mar. 
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• The general expansion of affordable rental products supplied by housing 
associations and local authorities which will draw demand from the middle of the 
private rental market. 
• Reconfiguration of ‘student’ cities, as large-scale investment in purpose-built 
student accommodation absorbs demand previously met by landlords offering 
‘street’ properties: these landlords are exiting the market or letting to lower-income 
tenants. 
• Financialisation of the Temporary Accommodation (TA)/mediated market: including 
third sector and local authority investment in TA. This includes the emergence of 
large-scale commissioning of rental property procurement either to confederations 
of charities or to commercial providers. 
• Expansion of the exempt accommodation model which offers intensive housing 
management funding to HMO providers who include support with accommodation. 
This funding is not subject to LHA caps. 
 
All these factors will impact on the opportunities available to landlords seeking to meet 
demand at the bottom of the market. These trends will be revisited in Chapter 11.  
Policy intervention  
The sector has been subject to a succession of policy interventions that have included tax 
changes, regulatory change relating to property quality and management, and radical 
alteration in the delivery of assistance with housing costs. These interventions are briefly 
summarised below, with an emphasis on the element of change carrying major importance 
from a private landlord perspective. 
Finance Act 2015 
S24 of the Finance Act 2015 introduced a tax change aimed at landlords who personally 
held buy-to-let mortgages, loans and overdrafts relating to property: tax calculations would 
be based on rental income with no adjustment made to accommodate finance costs. 
Essentially, landlords would no longer be able to offset mortgage interest costs against tax 
liability. The change was introduced in tranches of 25 per cent over four years. In some 
instances, the adjustment pushed some landlords into a higher tax bracket. Landlords 
holding their property in a property company were not affected.  
Housing and Planning Act 2016 
Regulatory changes in force from April 2017 have introduced a range of civil penalties for 
non-compliance with offences under the Housing Act 2004. As an alternative to 
prosecution, local authorities can apply a maximum civil penalty of £30,000. All landlords 
are required to meet licensing requirements as they relate to houses in multiple occupation 
(HMOs), but some local authorities have introduced additional and selective licensing 
schemes that extend the reach of that licensing. In 2019, 44 local authorities were 
operating some kind of selective licensing scheme which included all rental property within 
a defined boundary and required landlords to pay a licence fee for each of their properties 
within that boundary.6   
 




Minimum Energy Efficiency Standards  
From April 2019 it was no longer permissible to let or renew tenancies on property rated F 
or G in terms of energy efficiency. Landlords with properties rated at this level are required 
to spend up to £3,500 to bring those properties to at least an E rating. The Government has 
expressed the intention to implement an incremental increase to bring all let properties up 
to band C by 2030.7 
 
Electrical Safety standards 
The Electrical Standards in the Private Rented Sector (England) Regulations 2020, in force 
from 1 July 2020, requires all landlords to arrange electrical safety inspections every five 
years. This measure applies to all tenancies created on or after 1 July 2020. 
 
Immigration Act 2014 
From February 2016, landlords and letting agents are obliged to determine the immigration 
status of prospective tenants to ensure that they have leave to remain in the UK. Under 
what is generally known as the ‘right to rent’ legislation, landlords letting to someone who 
they had reason to believe did not have a right to stay in the UK may be subject to 
imprisonment or an unlimited fine.  
Tenant Fees Act 2019 
The Tenant Fees Act 2019 applies to all tenancies created or renewed on or after 1st June 
2019, and severely curtails the fees that might be chargeable to the tenant by either the 
landlord or the letting agent. Landlords will be required to bear the cost of any tenant 
referencing.  
 
Welfare Act 2012 
The Welfare Act 2012 introduced Universal Credit (UC) which combines six working-age 
benefits into one single payment, paid to the applicant monthly. The payment includes a 
housing allowance based on the LHA rate for the household. Roll-out of UC has been 
gradual, and it has recently been reported that 100 per cent coverage of all households 
eligible for UC is unlikely to be achieved before 2022. There are two principal changes 
brought by UC, compared with the earlier LHA system. All payments are made directly to 
the tenant unless an ‘Alternative Payment Arrangement’ (APA) is made to transfer the 
rental element directly to the landlord. APAs can be arranged at the outset if a tenant is 
deemed to be in a ‘Tier 1’ category which includes the tenant being homeless or in 
temporary accommodation or having addiction problems. Once a tenancy has started, 
APAs can also be arranged if a tenant falls eight weeks behind with their rent. A second 
major change is that UC is administered through job centres rather than by local 
authorities. Landlords will no longer have access to a local authority HB officer to assist 
with problems relating to a particular claim. Queries are dealt with centrally, or via job 
coaches at job centres.  
Covid-19 interventions 
One final set of interventions has been introduced in response to the Covid pandemic. The 






seek possession. In addition, there has been a moratorium on s21 ‘no fault’ evictions: this 
measure was introduced in March 2020 and at the time of writing had been extended until 
the end of May 2021. It is permissible for landlords to bring possession orders against 
renters in cases of severe rent arrears or anti-social behaviour. Courts are still hearing cases, 
but bailiff actions have been paused aside from some exceptional circumstances. 
 
In addition, and of particular importance to landlords letting to tenants in receipt of HB, 
there has been a temporary readjustment of LHA rates to the 30th percentile of local rents. 
This measure was intended to improve affordability at the lower end of the market and 
reduce the incidence of rent arrears. These measures were in place during the fieldwork 
period for this project.   
 
 
Objectives, aims and methods 
 
This report is based on a study which was funded under the Nationwide Foundation 
Transforming the Private Rented Sector programme. The objectives for the research were 
broad and highly exploratory, and included:  
 
• definition of demand and supply-side characteristics of the lower end of the PRS, 
including mapping its geography; and  
• assessing whether and how far the bottom end of the PRS constitutes a sustainable 
part of the wider private rental market.  
 
The study comprised a mixed-methods research programme including:  
 
• secondary analysis of existing datasets relating to demand for rental 
accommodation from low-income tenants; 
• secondary analysis of the MHCLG Private Landlord Survey (PLS); 
• analysis of a small suite of questions added to Q1 of the BVA BDRC Landlord Panel 
survey;   
• interviews with nineteen national, regional and local professional informants with 
expertise in supply at the bottom end of the market; and 
• detailed qualitative interviews with 55 landlords.  
 
Covid restrictions meant that it was difficult to secure a sufficient numbers interviews with 
letting agents to allow for detailed analysis of this issue from a letting agent perspective.  
 
Secondary data analysis: tenants  
Secondary analysis relating to tenants included the Family Resources Survey (FRS) and 
DWP administrative data relating to housing allowances accessed through the Stat X_Plore 
site. The FRS is a continuous survey of 19,000 households per annum providing information 
about household finances and circumstances for the DWP. The data were used to explore a 
number of ways of defining the lower end of the market by using the bottom third of 
regional household incomes (equivalised); the bottom third of regional private rents that 
were adjusted to reflect the property size; poverty before housing costs (using household 




This project used FRS to establish who lived in the lower end of the private rented sector, 
what resources they brought to the market and their geography, in comparison to the 
wider rental sector. The analysis was undertaken using the 2017/18 data, which was the 
latest available at the outset of the project. All household incomes were equivalised using 
the OECD equivalence scales.8  
 
DWP Stat X_Plore data was extracted to provide administrative data about housing 
allowance claims made under the local authority-administered HB system and the 
jobcentre-processed UC system. The data related to August 2019, the latest data available 
at the outset of the project. These data provided counts at the local authority level. In 
places these DWP data were used in conjunction with ONS estimates of the size of the 
private rented sector. The ONS used the Annual Population Survey to update counts of the 
private rented sector provided in the 2011 Census.  
 
Secondary data analysis: landlords 
The report also includes findings from secondary analysis of the Private Landlord Survey 
(PLS) 2018. The PLS is based on findings from 7,823 landlords and letting agents who were 
registered with one of the three Tenancy Deposit Schemes. The survey covered between 56 
and 71 per cent of the market, based on calculations derived from EHS data on tenants’ 
reporting whether their deposit had been lodged with a scheme.9   
 
Qualitative professional informant interviews 
Nineteen qualitative interviews took place with a range of professional informants with 
working knowledge of the lower end of the private rented sector. These included: 
 
• three landlord representatives, working at national and regional level;  
• three letting agents, including two large chain agencies and one local agent; 
• three mortgage providers specializing in buy-to-let mortgages and an institutional 
investor in the PRS; 
• five local authority representatives, working in local authorities in the North East, 
Yorkshire & Humberside, East and South East regions and including environmental 
health professionals and housing options officers; 
• two social lettings agencies; and 
• one national and one local charity with expertise in help-to-rent schemes. 
 
The interviews took place using a topic guides that were adjusted according to expertise 
area, and which included issues such as financial contexts; the characteristics of supply at 
the bottom end of the market; reflections on their particular local area, where appropriate; 
and market responses to a range of recent policy interventions including licensing and the 
introduction of Universal Credit. These interviews were analyzed together, and these 
respondents will be referred to in the report as ‘professional informants’. 
 
 
8 http://www.oecd.org/economy/growth/OECD-Note-EquivalenceScales.pdf  
9 MHCLG (2019) English Private Landlord Survey 2018 Main Report, London: MHCLG, 5, fn. 8.  
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Quantitative landlord data 
The project added a small group of questions to Q1 2021 Landlord Panel survey 
administered by BVA BDRC. The 985 respondents were current members of the National 
Residential Landlords Association (NRLA) who had opted in to marketing and research 
exercises via the Association. These questions were framed to examine the characteristics 
and letting intentions of individuals who were routinely letting at the bottom end of the 
market. These landlords were defined by their assenting to the question: ‘my tenants 
included people in receipt of Universal Credit and I have changed my management 
practices for those tenants (e.g. accept delayed payments, rent in arrears etc.)’. A total of 
92 respondents responded positively to the question. This low figure has restricted the 
undertaking of detailed statistical analysis, but the data have been used to quantify some 
highline characteristics. 
 
Qualitative landlord interviews 
Detailed qualitative face-to-face interviews also took place with 55 private landlords. These 
landlords were recruited through some localised snowballing via local authorities and local 
access schemes, and through a call-out issued on the Property II8 website.   
 
The interviews took place with individuals who – for the most part – took a highly 
professional approach to letting and were fully conversant with their legal obligations. The 
mode of recruitment stressed that the research intent was to focus on the bottom of the 
market, and so the respondents discussed here have experience in that part of the sector. 
As might be anticipated, the research did not engage with individuals whose activities 
could be judged as being criminally exploitative or negligent. However, the group does 
represent a fair spread of landlord types, covering all English regions. Further information 
on the respondents is given in Appendix 1. 
 
The landlords were interviewed as individuals or – occasionally – as couples, and used a 
detailed topic guide which explored: 
 
• how the respondent came to be a landlord; 
• their first purchasing decision and ongoing business model; 
• rent setting strategies and experience of arrears; 
• financing and the inter-relationship with personal finances; 
• repairs and maintenance; 
• letting preferences, experience of letting in the HB market including views on the 
operation of UC; 
• intentions in the market; 
• response to a range of policy interventions including taxation change, regulations 
impacting on management including the right to rent regulations, and the tenant 
fee ban, and regulations relating to property quality including selective licensing, 
electrical safety and energy efficiency; and 
• experiences under Covid. 
 
The recorded and transcribed interviews were subject to detailed subject and theme 
analysis in context, ensuring that all the topics explored in this report were entirely 
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grounded. Analysis placed particular emphasis on understanding differences between 
landlord types, business models and markets.  
 
As will be seen, this report presents a great deal of verbatim quotation from professional 
informants and particularly from landlords. All respondents have been given anonymised 
codes. Quotations have been chosen to represent what is typical rather than what is 
atypical amongst the respondents. The landlord commentary is challenging at times and is 





The project’s aims and method were reviewed by the University of York’s Social Policy and 
Social Work Ethics Committee. In conducting the research, due regard was paid to securing 
fully informed consent and to respondent confidentiality. This report will make no 
reference to any individuals or agencies that were interviewed, and all quotations are 
anonymised. Each respondent is given a unique code and, in reporting, details were 
omitted that might enable the respondent to be identified. Fieldwork was undertaken 





This report considers landlord supply of property to the lower end of the market and the 
prospects for continuation of that supply. This issue has been addressed largely through 
qualitative exploration of landlord behaviour, supplemented by secondary analysis of 
quantitative datasets. Chapter two begins with a definition of ‘lower end’ of the PRS, 
considered in terms of tenant income, poverty, HB receipt and rent levels. Landlords do not 
regard the bottom end of the sector as a homogenous market, and this chapter also 
considers certain elements of demand-side characteristics that contribute to landlords 
regarding this market favourably.  
 
The remainder of the report reflects on detailed analysis of behaviours at the bottom end of 
the market, from the perspective of landlords. Chapter 3 begins with a dynamic typology of 
landlords, which provides the principal analytical frame for the following chapters. Chapter 
4 outlines the main financial models used by landlords in funding their portfolio 
development, and indicates the nature of on-going business models. Chapter 5 considers 
the impact of place and property type on landlord letting decisions. Chapter 6 focuses on 
landlord management of tenancies that are supported by or dependent on HB and again 
highlights the variation in approaches to different parts of the HB market. Chapter 7 
addresses the role of letting agents and other ‘risk absorbing’ intermediaries in the market, 
including local authorities and third sector access schemes. Chapter 8 considers the impact 
of Covid particularly in relation to rent arrears, the LHA increase and the moratorium on 
evictions. Chapter 9 reviews landlord portfolio intentions. The concluding chapter 
addresses the core question of the research, and considers the degree to which property 







This introductory chapter has set out some key contextual elements for understanding 
property supply to the bottom end of the market. PRS growth has slowed, and even 
reversed, but there is substantial variation across regions: opportunities available with 
regard to investment in the PRS are localised. Any attempt to review landlord sentiment is 
problematic given the range of landlord types in the market. Gauging sentiment is 
particularly problematic at present, not only because of the Covid pandemic, but also 
because a large swathe of policy interventions is currently working its way through the 
sector, impacting on landlord behaviours, finances and business models.  
 
Landlord willingness to be in the market is often assessed in terms of rental yield 
and capital gain. The majority of respondent landlords were generally happy with the 
profits they derived from their holdings, and were in financial circumstances that could be 
regarded as stable. However, many viewed letting as an increasingly risky endeavour which 
threatened major losses through irrecoverable rent arrears and substantial damage to 
property. After some decades of relatively benign treatment in terms of taxation and 
regulation, many landlords perceived themselves to be in a much more challenging 
environment and were revising their letting behaviours accordingly.  
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This chapter looks at the tenant demand currently being met at the lower end of the 
market. Demand that is not being met is not identified by this analysis. The chapter first 
considers how it might be possible to define the ‘lower end’ of the private rental market and 
looks at the intersections between private tenant households in poverty, in receipt of HB, 
paying the lowest third of rents and those on the lowest third of household incomes. The 
chapter then moves on to consider household composition. Landlords do not view the 
lower end of the PRS as one homogenous whole, and so here demand is analysed in terms 
of distinguishable target markets. As will be seen in the following chapters, landlords at the 
bottom of the market are looking to achieve long-term, stable tenancies and often favour 
tenant types where stability is most likely. The chapter ends by reviewing data on tenancy 
length.  
 
Defining ‘the lower end’ of the market 
 
Households in the lowest income deciles tend to live in social housing and homeownership 
comprises more higher-income households but the private rented sector accommodates 
people across the income spectrum, especially those on middle incomes and a sizeable 




Source: Family Resources Survey 2017/18 
 
 
The ‘lower end’ of the PRS can be defined in a number of different ways: it could mean the 





















with the lowest incomes; or rentals to households receiving assistance with housing costs.  
‘Lower end’ could also refer simply to private renters who are in poverty. There are 
intersections between all these definitions: those in poverty may also claim housing 
benefit, have the lowest incomes and/or pay the lowest rents, but this does not always hold 
true, not least as various households may move between different categories relatively 
frequently.  
 
Around a third of PRS households (31.6 per cent) have incomes in the lowest third of 
regional equivalised household earnings, and around a third of PRS households have rents 
in the bottom third of regional rents (34.5 per cent). Around a fifth of private tenant 
households receive housing benefit (19.3 per cent), and a similar proportion is in before 
housing costs poverty (18.8 per cent).10  
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the connections between these possible competing definitions of the 
lower end of the PRS across England.11 Taken together, definitions of the lower end could 
encompass over half of the market (54.9 per cent) and illustrate that the attributes 
commonly used to define aspects of the PRS are not coterminous.12 Many renting 
households are captured by only one element, notably the 14.7 per cent of PRS households 
whose rents are in the lowest third of rents in their region, but who are neither in the 
bottom third of incomes, on housing benefit or in poverty before housing costs 
(BHC).  Similarly, 7.9 percent of PRS households claim housing benefit, but are not in 
poverty, in the bottom third lowest regional incomes or rents.  Private rented households in 
poverty (BHC) are obviously in the bottom third of households, but not all claim housing 
benefit (13.1 per cent) or have the lowest rents (8.9 per cent).  If these elements define the 
‘lower end’, this part of the market comprises around a fifth of all PRS households on 
housing benefit (22.5 per cent unweighted) and a further third of all PRS households (32.4 
per cent unweighted) of households that have low rents, fragile and/or low incomes but do 
not receive help with their housing costs. Excluding low rents, a quarter of PRS households 






10 Poverty is defined as households below 60 per cent of household median incomes. Estimating poverty after 
housing costs (AHC) increases the rates of poverty in the sector much further, especially in high value areas. 
11 The Venn diagram was constructed using raw counts of the survey data and as such is unweighted and the 
percentages vary slightly to the reported weighted proportions. For example, the FRS 2017/18 suggests that 
19.3 per cent of PRS households claim housing benefit when the survey is weighted but 22.6 per cent when 
unweighted (the latter of which is reflected in the diagram). This is satisfactory for the purposes of depicting 
proportionate intersections between competing definitions of the ‘lower end’.  BioVinci software was used to 
generate the Venn diagram. 
12 Here lowest incomes have been defined as those in the bottom third of household incomes, adjusting for 
the size of the household to create equivalised incomes. An indicator was created for households within the 
bottom third of equivalised household incomes in each region. Similarly, household rents were calculated 
using the bottom third of regional rental values per the bedroom size of the home. Poverty rates before 





These findings reflect the choices that households make or rather may be compelled to 
make in terms of securing an affordable, decent and secure home, possibly opting for lower 
rents to avoid engagement with the social security system or claiming housing benefit in 
higher value areas because of moderate incomes, or to gain a better-quality property or 
location. Few households are covered by all these possible definitions of the ‘lower end’ of 
the private rented sector. An important point in terms of policy debate is that around of a 
fifth of the private rental market is occupied by tenants who receive housing benefit, but 
another quarter of private rented households may be considered ‘at the lower end’ because 
they are paying a low rent or are on a low income but are not claiming housing benefit.  
 
For the purposes of this report, it is important to note the lower end of the PRS is not 
coterminous with all households receiving housing benefit. This report will distinguish 
between landlords’ ‘lower end’ letting practices and ‘HB market’ practices. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Intersection of households in the lower end of the PRS (% of all households) 
 
 





It is rarely the case that the demographic characteristics of tenants at the bottom end of 
the market are analysed with the objective of quantifying target rental markets. Many of 
the characteristics comprise elements of vulnerability and precarity which provoke 
questions on the degree to which these tenants should be reliant on private sector 
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provision.13 However, landlords seeking to meet need at the bottom of the market often 
view particular characteristics as being more or less desirable.  
 
 
Table 2.1:  Household (HRP) characteristics of all private rented tenants by market 
 subgroup, 2017/18 (%)   








16-34 years 27.9 47.2 52.2 45.6 
35-54 years 48.8 32.1 38.8 38.2 
55 years or more 23.4 20.7 9.0 16.2 
Gender 
Male 42.5 65.7 65.9 61.3 
Female 57.5 34.3 34.1 38.7 
Ethnicity 
BAME 19.0 18.6 14.3 16.8 
Disability 
Disabled or life-limiting illness 52.2 26.6 18.5 28.1 
Marital status 
Married/cohabiting/civil partnership 28.6 47.1 62.8 50.2 
Single never married 43.0 35.6 28.2 33.8 
Widowed/divorced/separated 28.4 17.3 9.1 16.0 
Household composition 
Single over pension age 9.0 5.9 0.8 4.3 
Single under pension age 22.1 33.8 21.4 26.2 
Couple, one over pension age 5.6 5.6 2.3 4.2 
Couple  5.8 21.9 33.7 23.8 
Multiple adults 2.5 7.0 10.8 7.8 
Lone parent 31.4 3.5 3.5 8.9 
Couple, at least one child 20.2 20.0 22.4 21.1 
Multi adults at least one child 3.4 2.2 5.0 3.7 
Total 19.4 37.9 42.7 100.0 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2017/18. Figures may not add to 100 due to rounding. 
 
 
Table 2.1 indicates the percentage of tenants in defined demographic categories, 
comparing tenants receiving HB and tenants also at the lower end of the market but not 
receiving HB. This table, essentially, compares low-income working tenant households with 
HB-supported households. For further comparative purposes, the table also indicates the 
proportion of these characteristics for tenants not at the lower end of the market, and all 
PRS tenants.  
 
The table indicates a number of distinctive features of demand at the bottom end of the 
market.  
 
13 D. Rhodes and J. Rugg (2018) Vulnerability amongst Low-Income Tenants in the PRS in England, 
York: Centre for Housing Policy.  
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• A total of 27.9 per cent of households receiving benefit were aged 35 and under; this 
figure rose to 47.2 per cent for non-HB lower-end households. The under-
representation of younger people in the lower-end HB group reflects the lower 
levels of LHA payable to under-35s, who – with some defined exceptions – are only 
eligible for the Shared Room Rate.  
• Women are over-represented amongst HB households in the PRS, as are people 
who are widowed, divorced or separated. Single mothers are a principal demand 
group amongst lower-end HB renters. The dominance of this group can be 
explained by homelessness prevention practices which have focused on use of the 
PRS to relieve homelessness. In 2019/20, around a fifth of households presenting as 
homeless cite relationship breakdown or domestic violence as a reasons for the loss 
of their last settled home.14 However, single mothers are also regarded as a 
desirable group by many landlords: where children are at pre-school age and there is 
no expectation that the mother will be seeking work opportunities, benefit 
payments tend not to fluctuate. More importantly to landlords, single parents 
generally seek long-term, settled tenancies.  
• Similarly, households where the HRP has a disability or a limiting long-term illness 
are also over-represented amongst HB-recipient households at the bottom end of 
the market. This group can include individuals whose income is not likely to 
fluctuate because the tenant is in and out of work, and whose benefit receipt is 
augmented by additional disability-related payments. This group also includes 
individuals whose long-term sickness comprises mental health problems leading to 
drug and alcohol addictions and challenging behaviour. This category is a group 
where landlords are more likely to secure Alternative Payment Arrangements 
(APAs).  
• Pensioner households are also over-represented amongst the lower-end HB 
households. Again, single older people are often a target group for many landlords, 
in being eligible for the over-35s LHA but also comprising a ‘steadier’ group whose 
benefit receipt is unlikely to change.  
• Households not in receipt of HB, but at the lower end of the market, are more likely 
to be households who are single and able to engage fully with the labour market, or 
who are in couples or multi-adult households and so possibly receiving more than 
one earned income.  
 
Landlords were generally attuned to this market segmentation as reflected in the specific 




Employment income is important to the lower end of the market, whether people receive 
housing benefit or not (Table 2.2). Almost half of private tenant households receiving some 
housing benefit have HRPs who were working in some capacity (45.2 per cent). There was 
comparable median household income between private tenant households receiving 
housing benefit (£334) and those at the lower end but not claiming (£326).  
 















Median weekly household income £334 £326 £584 £454 
Income-related benefit or tax credits 97.2 12.1 6.3 26.2 
Economic Status 
Full-time employed 13.7 48.0 76.3 53.4 
Part-time employed 24.7 9.5 4.2 10.2 
Full-time self-employed 3.9 12.4 9.4 9.4 
Part-time self-employed 2.9 4.0 1.5 2.7 
Any employed 45.2 73.9 91.4 75.7 
Unemployed 4.7 3.0 0.8 2.4 
Retired 12.4 9.5 2.1 6.9 
Student 0.8 6.9 3.5 4.3 
Looking after the family/home 6.7 1.9 0.5 2.3 
Sick/disabled 21.5 1.4 0.5 4.9 
Other 8.6 3.4 1.3 3.5 
Temporary work 
Work through an employment agency 20.4 24.1 14.3 19.2 
Casual type of work 14.0 25.3 2.9 13.5 
Seasonal work 20.5 4.1 1.9 6.4 
Contract for fixed period or task 28.5 46.6 79.1 57.0 
Other temporary way 16.6 0.0 1.7 4.0 
Contract type 
Permanent job 83.9 83.2 90.9 86.8 
Fixed term or temporary job 5.0 6.1 5.8 5.8 
Working without contract 4.4 6.6 1.5 3.9 
Other 6.7 4.1 1.7 3.5 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2017/18 
 
 
For renters not at the bottom end of the PRS, 90.9 per cent were in a permanent job. For 
renters at the bottom end, compared with all renters, there was a similar level of likelihood 
that they would be in a permanent job (c.83 per cent). As might be anticipated, the non-HB 
group derived a much smaller proportion of income from benefit or tax  credits (12.1 per 
cent) since this group was much more likely to be in work, and in full-time work. Some 
factors point towards a degree of precarity for the lower-end non-HB private renters 
compared with non-HB households not at the lower end. Lower-end non-HB households 
were more likely to be in part-time work and in full-or part-time self-employment. If in 
temporary work, that work was more likely to be casual and seasonal, with fluctuating 
income.  
 
In addition, it was notable that one sixth of all households at the lower end but not 
receiving HB were unemployed, retired, looking after the family home or were sick or 
disabled. All these categories point towards eligibility for housing assistance.  
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For landlords making choices amongst tenants at the lower end of the market, it is 
increasingly difficult to define a prospective tenant’s economic precarity by making a 
simple binary distinction between working/not working or benefit/no benefit. Furthermore, 
it is becoming increasingly difficult to define which households are supported by housing 
benefit specifically. The introduction of Universal Credit has bound up several income 
supplements into one single payment, which makes it difficult for landlords to identify 
exactly how much assistance with the rent a tenant may be receiving.   
 
 
Tenants in financial difficulties 
 
The fact that landlords make distinctions at the lower end of the market reflects their 
uncertainty about a tenants’ ability to sustain the tenancy financially. Tenants in receipt of 
HB were much more likely to be in rent arrears, and to have difficulties in keeping up with 
other bills (Table 2.3).  
 
 








Keeping up with bills and regular 
debt repayments  
77.3 90.9 96.6 91.0 
Not keeping up with bills and 
regular debt repayments  
22.7 9.1 3.4 9.0 
Behind with the gas bill 7.7 2.1 1.9 3.1 
Behind with council tax 14.6 4.8 2.9 5.9 
Behind with rent 4.8 1.5 0.3 1.6 
Behind with rent in last 12 months 7.5 2.6 0.6 2.7 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2017/18  
 
 
Table 2.3 indicates that 22.7 per cent of lower-end HB tenants were not keeping up with 
bills and regular debt repayments, which was more than twice the proportion for lower-end 
non-HB tenants. Tenants receiving HB were also much more likely to be behind with their 
council tax and the gas bill. Just under five per cent said that they were behind with their 
rent, and a slightly higher figure – 7.5 per cent – said that they had been behind with the 
rent at some time in the past 12 months.  
 
Landlords distinguishing between households receiving HB and those not receiving HB are 
likely to be reflecting on those tenants falling into problems with paying the rent. However, 
it is notable that the low proportion of HB tenants behind with their rent compared with 
tenants having problems with other routine bills indicates that tenants may well be 
prioritising the rent over other bills or have been able to access APAs to ensure direct 





Length of tenancy 
 
The lower end of the PRS is often defined in terms of precarity, but it remains the case that 
this part of the private rented market is more stable in terms of tenant turnover. For all 
tenants not at the lower end of the market, 19.7 per cent had been in the same property for 
five years or more. At the lower end of the market, this figure was 34.6 per cent for non-HB 
claimant and 41 per cent for HB claimants. 
 
This figure could be high for some groups. For example, 70.5 per cent of retired households 
receiving HB at the lower end of the market will have been in their tenancies for five years 
or more, compared with 27.2 per cent of retirees in the non-lower end PRS.  
 
Table 2.4:  Proportion of households in the same property for five years or more by 









Full-time employee 35.0 30.0 19.1 23.6 
Part-time employee 32.1 32.8 34.6 32.8 
Full-time self-employed 42.9 41.6 19.6 32.4 
Part-time self-employed 45.1 32.7 32.3 35.2 
Unemployed 30.7 30.2 23.8 29.5 
Retired 70.5 68.1 27.2 63.6 
Student 19.2 1.6 3.6 2.9 
Looking after family/home 24.6 54.5 48.7 36.7 
Permanently sick/disabled 48.1 51.9 0.0 46.9 
Other Inactive 34.5 39.3 16.3 33.4 
Total 41.0 34.6 19.7 29.5 
Source: Family Resources Survey 2017/18 
 
 
One major exception to this general characterisation were households where the HRP was 
looking after the family home. In both categories of lower-end demand, the increased 
likelihood of that a move had taken place within the last five years reflects the probability 
that a move into the PRS had been provoked by a change of relationship status. This is 
particularly the case for households containing single parents, where there will be a longer-
term trajectory into full- or part-time work as children move into school.  
 
As will be seen in forthcoming chapters, landlords generally offset some of the financial 
risks at the bottom of the market through the cost savings of reduced tenancy turnover, 
often achieved through limiting the incidence of rent increases.  This strategy carries the 
risk of tenants becoming ‘trapped’ in lower-rent properties, unable to afford movement to 







This chapter has introduced some competing definitions of ‘lower end’ of the PRS and 
underlined the complexity of this part of the market. The lower end of the PRS can be 
distinguished by a number of demographic and economic groupings that can be regarded 
as more or less desirable from the perspective of private landlords. The characteristics of 
lower-income tenants in receipt of benefit differ from lower-income tenants not receiving 
help with housing costs. The differences do not necessarily make the HB group less 
desirable as tenants: as will be seen in forthcoming chapters, landlords operating at the 
bottom of the market tend to favour more settled household types and types where it 
might be possible to make arrangements for direct payments of benefit to the landlord. 
However, some landlords also favour lower-income working tenants, in comprising a group 
less likely to develop problems with paying the rent. Length of tenancy is a primary 
attraction for landlords meeting need at the bottom of the market and – as will be seen – 









The following chapters will draw on interviews with 55 landlords which took place over the 
summer of 2020. This and the following two chapters will define landlord characteristics 
and their attitude to housing benefit lettings, their financial models, and the role of place in 
defining letting practice. All these elements need to be taken into account in order to 
assess the characteristics and robustness of supply.  
 
Landlords are by no means a homogenous group. This chapter will introduce a refined 
landlord classification and discuss the dynamics of letting practice. This process of 
categorisation is an important precursor to understanding the circumstances in which 
property is supplied to the lower end of the market, the degree of an individual landlords’ 
exposure to the market, and the reasons why that supply might be changing. The chapter 
will then consider landlords’ target markets. There are landlords whose principal target 
group are households supported by some form of housing benefit. However, lettings to 
lower-income households take place across all landlord types. Indeed, it is likely that the 
majority of housing benefit lettings take place in circumstances or where the landlord has 
chosen to tolerate benefit dependence without necessarily supporting it. 
 
 
‘Lower end’ supply 
 
This chapter reflects findings from interviews with landlords who actively opted in to the 
research, and so it is unlikely to be representative of all landlords currently letting in the 
market. Very large-scale institutional landlords were not contacted, although – as will be 
seen – the research does include a handful of business landlords operating at far above-
average scale. In addition, this research has not captured letting behaviours of criminal 
landlords operating in the ‘shadow’ rental market.15 A couple of landlords mentioned 
practices that could be defined as coercive or were less forthcoming about some aspects of 
their lettings but these were an exception. For the most part, the interviews took place with 
landlords who were fully-engaged professionally in the business of letting and 
demonstrated a good understanding of the appropriate legislation. Landlords who were 
less confident in their understanding of the law were generally using letting agents who 
they felt delivered the appropriate level of expertise. 
 
Only a small number of the landlords who were interviewed could be defined as ‘housing 
benefit landlords’ with a strategic intention to meet need in that market. Universal Credit 
and an increase in the proportion of working benefit recipients has created a blurred line 
how exactly a ‘benefit tenant’ might be defined: 
There’s a lot more people now on Universal Credit than there would be before 
because they’re getting this top-up. Where before you were either on benefit or you 
 
15 R. Spencer, B. Reeve-Lewis, J. Rugg and E. Barata (2020) Journeys in the Shadow Private Rented Sector, 
London: Cambridge House. 
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weren’t, now you dip in and out of it. You might get a benefit of £10 a week to top 
up your wages as opposed to getting full benefit. Landlords can’t make blanket 
choices of saying “I’m not having anyone on Universal Credit”, not only because it’s 
now illegal but also because a lot more people are on Universal Credit’ [Regional 
landlord representative]. 
 
Many of the respondents had a mixed portfolio of properties with lettings in different parts 
of the market. Some properties were purchased on the understanding that their location 
dictated that they could only achieve a lower rent but others were purchased in more 
desirable areas and refurbished to a higher specification to attract and justify a middle-
market rent. Landlords also often had, in their portfolios, properties they themselves had 
lived in at some juncture or inherited properties that could attract higher rents. Thus, 
landlords might have a ‘mixed portfolio’ and not necessarily be fully exposed to the risks 
associated with letting at the bottom of the market.  
 
Landlords offering properties at lower-end rents did not always stay in that part of the 
market. As will be seen in chapter 9, some landlords were investing in refurbishment or 




Landlord typology  
 
There are no straightforward routes to landlord classification. The number of properties 
held is not a reliable indicator of intent, landlord type or robustness. A landlord holding two 
or three properties might easily be regarded in some way amateur or sideline but in 
actuality they may have been a landlord for decades and have, at retirement, divested 
down to a small core of unmortgaged properties. Similarly, a landlord with – say – twenty 
properties may have accelerated through a rapid programme of tumble-through 
remortgaging and might carry a precarious level of debt without necessarily having accrued 
property management experience. The landlord respondents included examples of both 
these types. 
 
This report uses a classification system which combines letting motivation and dynamic 
intent. The qualitative interviews asked landlords how they came to be letting, and analysis 
of the data indicated that there were four core landlord types. These will be defined as: 
 
• accidental  
• investment  
• portfolio and 
• business landlords.  
 
Note that this landlord classification presents idealised types and some landlords may not 
fit exactly in a single category. This is particularly the case where letting activity is being 
undertaken by a couple, where one partner might be in work and the other manage a 




‘Accidental landlords’ are individuals who are letting property with no intention of being in 
the market over the medium or longer term. This category includes individuals who, for 
example, have chosen to let out a property which has proved to be difficult to sell or sell at 
the desired price, or who may have inherited property and be letting until a decision is 
made about sale. None of the landlords in the survey were accidental landlords at the time 
of the interview, but some began their lettings ‘accidentally’ and then had gone on to 
extend their lettings often because they enjoyed being a landlord.  
 
Some landlords did describe less formal letting arrangements. A small number of landlords 
– each with only two or three properties – included lettings to family members amongst 
their holdings. These were lettings where the family member paid rent, but where it was 
uncertain whether the landlord would continue to hold on to that property once it became 
untenanted. For example, one respondent had purchased a property and was letting it to a 
niece who had fallen into difficulties, and another had inherited the property in which 
another family member was living. Neither landlord wanted to continue letting those 
particular properties after the current tenancies ended.  
Investment landlords 
The largest group of landlords (25) were ‘investment’ landlords. All these landlords had 
earnings in addition to rental income and these earnings tended to cross-subsidise their 
letting activity: for example, savings accrued from earnings were used as deposits, and 
landlords might pay for major repairs from their ‘personal’ rather than rental income. In 
many cases, the rental income was low relative to the mortgage and maintenance costs of 
the property: it was sufficient for a property to ‘wash its face’ so that rental income 
matched mortgage and other outgoings. These landlords had invested in property for three 
principal reasons.  
 
First, some viewed letting as a means of augmenting the pension they were likely to receive 
on retirement from paid work. Others were investing because they were in work that had 
accrued no pension or had a partner who had no pension. The respondents included 
investment landlords throughout the age range, from the 30s through to the 70s and this 
spread of ages meant that it was possible to understand how ‘investing for a pension’ 
played out over time. The investment landlords were roughly split 50/50 in terms of those 
who were still in employment and those who were at or close to retirement.  
 
On retirement, landlords took a number of different routes. Some had succeeded in paying 
down outstanding mortgages on their property and were indeed using their rental income 
to supplement a work pension. Older landlords – in their seventies and above – were giving 
active consideration as to how best to enjoy their equity and some were selling down to 
secure a better quality of life. Other landlords approaching retirement had decided, 
instead, to sell their holdings and purchase an annuity, which offered the advantage of their 
stepping back from active landlordism and its associated risks. Landlords who regarded 
their holdings ‘as’ their pension and had no other retirement income, might take a different 
route on retirement. Some took the opportunity to remortgage and augment their holdings 
and become full-time portfolio landlords. This was particularly the case where landlords 




For a second group of landlords, investing in property was not tied to a pension specifically. 
Landlords in this group were often in well-paid employment which generated income 
beyond immediate household requirements. It was simply convenient to invest spare 
capital in property, which offered a better rate of return over the long term. Some 
respondents put all their capital in property, sometimes after adverse experiences in the 
stock market. Others sought to spread their investment risk, and put money in property, 
stocks and shares and other savings vehicles. One individual who had purchased two 
properties also regularly saved in stocks and shares. In his view, ‘if you are looking for a 
diversified investment you have to go for property’, and preferably rental property: ‘buying a 
room in a hotel and stuff like that. These all sound very dodgy to me’ [LL24].  
 
There was third group in the ‘investment’ category. A number of landlords said they had 
invested in property in order to accrue equity they would pass on to their children, to help 
them onto the property ladder at some time in the future. One respondent explained his 
rationale:  ‘I never set out to be a landlord or anything like that. I know there are people 
who…that is an ambition. Me and my husband have got fairly decent jobs. The main reason, 
really, was to try and help our kids. That’s the main reason’ [LL22]. This strategy might mean 
intending for adult children to move into those properties at some stage or – more likely – 
that those properties would be sold to finance other property purchase. Some of the 
landlords who were interviewed had small children and were nowhere near executing this 
plan. Others had adult children and were finding that it was not necessarily straightforward 
to disinvest. One woman had a house that she part owned with her son, who wanted to 
withdraw his equity share to buy a home for himself. The tenant did not want to leave, 
largely because the rent had been set at a level some way below the LHA rate. The landlord 
was pursuing possession through the courts. 
 
These three motivations could be rather fluid. One respondent – in full-time work and with 
two properties – had purchased his first property in 2005 with the intention of augmenting 
his pension:  
I thought, right, well looking at the way things are in terms of general interest rates, 
investments. Property, it’s solid. I know it sounds a cliché, but it really is. It’s not 
going to go anywhere. I mean, yes, the values might go up and down over time, but 
over the long, long term, they only ever go one way and they always go up [LL25]. 
 
However, at the time of the interview his plan was to pass the properties to his children.  
 
For this and for other landlords in the investment grouping, putting money into property 
was not regarded as a short-term undertaking. It was generally expected that, as the rental 
income paid the mortgage, equity would build and gradual gains would be realised over 
decades through uplift. The gains were not necessarily spectacular. For example, one 
couple mentioned that they had purchased a property in Lincolnshire in 1985 for £18,000 
and this was now worth around £60,000, which was a rise in line with inflation. One woman 
who had retired with four properties indicated: ‘When you look at what we’ve gained in the 
properties, the actual rent isn’t critical, because if it was invested in the banks we would have 




It was clear that, for all these landlords, low interest rates were a primary reason for finding 
property investment more attractive. 
Portfolio landlords 
Sixteen of the respondents were ‘portfolio’ landlords. For the purposes of this research, a 
distinguishing feature of portfolio landlords is the absence of earnings from an employer. A 
small handful in this group was self-employed – often freelance or as a consultant – and 
able to use the flexibility in their working hours to manage their holdings. Where self-
employment accrued occasional capital gains, the money was invested into property. 
Conversely, where self-employment income fell, then it was possible to draw on rental 
income to meet personal outgoings.  
 
For the remainder of landlords in this grouping, the principal income came solely from 
letting property. These landlords were actively involved in managing their properties and 
tended not to use letting agents. Many of them had experience across the building-related 
trades and minimised expenditure by themselves undertaking refurbishment and non-
specialist repairs and maintenance.  
 
Routes into full-time landlordism could be varied. Some landlords simply inherited a 
portfolio of properties that they continued to manage and others benefitted from 
inheritance which augmented the capital available to them for property investment. For 
example, one landlord had a fairly rocky start, purchasing his first property pre-Global 
Financial Crash and ending up in negative equity. He only regained equilibrium when he 
inherited around £100,000 and was able to purchase two further properties and ‘restart’ his 
expansion. Other landlords began by using capital accrued from the sale of businesses. 
 
A number of landlords began with ‘spare’ property as they moved from one job to another, 
and over time decided that they enjoyed letting property and moved into that activity full-
time. Others were propelled into full-time letting through the loss of paid employment 
which meant that it made sense to invest redundancy cash into holdings that had initially 
been purchased as a pension investment. These landlords moved from being ‘investment’ 
landlords to full-time portfolio landlords and often substantially increased their lettings 
activity.  Indeed, at the time of interview one or two landlords were in the process of slowly 
transitioning from one state to the other, gradually reducing their working hours and 
increasing the resources they were dedicating to letting. 
 
Other portfolio landlords had simply taken the decision to start investing in property and 
rode the waves of opportunity that have flowed with the housing market. This group 
included one early entrant to the market who had invested in the purchase of ‘Tyneside 
flats’ in the early 1980s, let at regulated rents. There was a period in the mid-2000s when 
property investment and buy-to-let mortgages were regarded as an easy-access, high-
return endeavour: ‘We had ‘House Doctor’ and all these programmes, and everybody was into 
property, and I could just see which way it was going, and I was like, I need to go get in on this 
and buy as many as I can as fast as I can’ [LL29].  
 
Others simply took the lead of a friend: ‘I saw somebody else who was doing it and it seemed 
like quite a nice way of making extra money’ [LL1]. More recent entrants to the market noted 
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using property firms that specialised in locating buy-to-let opportunities although 
experience of these was not always positive.  
 
As with the investment landlords, all the portfolio landlords in the sample were at different 
stages in their landlord career: some were in their 30s and looking to expand, and others 
were in their 60s or 70s and winding down or consolidating a large portfolio. Nevertheless, a 
key characteristic of all the portfolio landlords was the absence of earned income. They 
were all fully exposed to the rental market. In the majority of cases, lettings had to function 
as an enterprise that stacked up financially and created sufficient profit to constitute a 
liveable salary.  
Business landlords 
One final category that was evident in the interview selection was ‘business landlords’ (14 
respondents). This type of landlord fell into one of two broad categories. First, there were 
property business landlords who had expanded their property dealings to develop ancillary 
companies that had full or part-time employees. Typical ancillary companies included:  
 
• A separate letting agency to manage their own holdings and make money through 
offering tenant finding and management services to other landlords;   
• property development companies which purchased, renovated and ‘flipped’ 
properties back into the market; and  
• companies that sold property maintenance services to other landlords.  
 
For example, one landlord specializing in HMOs managed his properties through his 
separate letting agency which employed his maintenance company. He had recently 
branched out into property development and purchased a country pub which he was going 
to refurbish into flats and sell the car park with planning permission for new housing. In 
expanding their dealings, these property business landlords aimed to reduce management 
and maintenance costs, increase tax efficiencies and bring additional income to the 
business. These enterprises were often ‘family businesses’, involving partners and adult 
children. Indeed, one business landlord who was interviewed was working for his father, 
who had begun to establish a portfolio in the 1980s.  
 
Second, there were high net-worth business landlords whose property ownership was one 
element in a range of commercial and investment activities that in combination might have 
a turnover of millions of p0unds. These landlords may have developed ancillary property 
businesses including letting agents, property development and maintenance companies 
and property consultancy. However, their other interests included business ventures 
entirely unrelated to property, but where profits from those operations could be diverted 
into portfolio expansion.  
 
Business landlords were more likely than other landlords to act in a ‘CEO’ capacity and 
attend to strategic decision-making whilst leaving day-to-day management to other staff: 
‘my day involves sitting in front of a laptop staring at spreadsheets, working on the business 
rather than in it’ [LL31]. For both types of business landlords, it was common for property to 
have been accrued over a long period of time, in particular during a ‘boom’ period of 
intensive tumble-through remortgage activity. A couple of respondents had built portfolios 
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through operating sale and rent back schemes, offering cash for properties far below their 
market value, realising the gain through immediate remortgaging. The operation of these 
schemes was paused after the financial crisis and they are now stringently regulated by the 
Financial Conduct Authority.   
 
Again, all these landlords were at different life stages. Some were still expanding their 
holdings and balancing out the separate parts of their business to create tax efficiencies. 
Others were heading towards retirement and considering how best to consolidate or sell 





This classification indicates that landlords may well move from one type to another as their 
circumstances and intentions change (see Figure 3.1). A couple of landlords were, at the 
time of the interview, transitioning from one state to another: they had been investor 
landlords, but were increasing their holdings and withdrawing from paid employment in 
order to become portfolio landlords. 
 
 






























 NOTE: This figure demonstrates landlords’ dynamic movement from one category to 
another as their intent changes.  
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Exit Investment landlords 
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Exit Business landlords 
Static                     Growing 
Accidental landlords 
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Landlord classification also needs to integrate dynamic decision-making with regard to 
holdings. Landlords will be selling down, ‘paused’ or static, or seeking to expand. Landlords 
might also buy and sell to consolidate their portfolio, for example, to concentrate holdings 
geographically or move into or out of different markets. Disentangling typologies and 
dynamics is an important step in understanding the flow of property into and out of the 
PRS generally, and into and out of the lower end of the market more particularly. 
Landlord’s future letting plans will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 9. This chapter 
will now consider current housing benefit lettings. 
 
 
Tenant preferences  
 
It was not the case that some categories of landlord were more likely than others to let to 
tenants in receipt of housing benefit. As will be seen in Chapter 5, geography played a 
greater role in determining whether the majority of a landlord’s lettings were to tenants 
needing support with housing costs. In asking landlords about their target markets, many 
commented more often on a tenant’s personal attributes than on their source of income. 
The strongest preference was for long-term tenants willing to settle and make the property 
their home. To this end, there could be a preference for families with children of school age. 
In instances where landlords had HMOs, there was – again – a tendency to let to more 
settled individuals: for example, retired single professionals or men who needed 
accommodation following relationship breakdown.  
 
The nature of respondent recruitment meant that the landlords who were interviewed were 
more likely to be letting lower-value property. However, that did not mean that they were 
all willing to take tenants in receipt of housing benefit. Tolerance of this type of tenant was 
variable, and only a handful of landlords amongst the respondents set out deliberately to 
target the housing benefit market.  
Landlords averse to letting to tenants receiving housing benefit  
The English Private Landlord Survey (2018) found that 52 per cent of respondents were 
unwilling to let to people in receipt of housing benefit. Ten of the 55 respondents in the 
study also expressed this preference. Some landlords offered explanation by commenting 
that their properties were not affordable to lower-income families. There was an 
unwillingness to reduce their rent: one investment landlord letting in Leeds said: ‘we’d have 
to look at taking a big hit’, given their typical rent of £750, compared with a LHA of £550 
[LL5]. Indeed, there could be a degree of exasperation that landlords should be expected to 
drop their rents to accomm0date lower-income need: ‘local authorities want to get landlords 
to charge a lower rent when as a business no-one else would charge anything but the market 
value’ [Regional Landlord Rep #3]. Another landlord, also operating largely in Leeds, was of 
the view that people in receipt of benefit carried too many disadvantages compared with 
other tenants: ‘If I can get somebody who can pay on the day he walks into the house, pay a 
month in advance plus a month deposit, why would I bother taking someone who can’t pay for 
five weeks and I can’t get insurance on? It really doesn’t make any sense’ [LL1].  
 
In a couple of instances, landlords insisted that they had ‘historic’ mortgages which 
precluded their letting to people receiving benefits: ‘My mortgages say I’m not allowed to an 
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actually so does my insurance. I have to take working people because people who are not 
working, people who are supported by benefits, are deemed at greater risk of not paying their 
rent’ [LL19].  
 
In addition to the heightened risk of rent arrears, there were deemed to be problems in 
reconciling rent accounts where there was more than one tenant on HB, and other 
additional management tasks. Some landlords said that they regarded HB tenants as 
personally problematic. A local authority homelessness officer mentioned that local 
landlords could be very resistant to taking referrals: ‘instantly there's barriers placed because 
the general consensus across the country is if you're homeless, there's something wrong with 
you’ [Local statutory #4]. The landlords sometimes found it difficult to articulate their view 
on the matter, given recent judgments on a ‘no DSS’ policy: an investment landlord with 
three properties was adamant: ‘I keep away from trouble, that’s all. That’s the bottom line. 
It’s not…I didn’t have anything… I keep away because I don’t want in the end, these people 
will, you know that kind of people who…I don’t want trouble’ [LL32]. For these landlords, 
receiving housing benefit translated to enhanced risk, and intolerance of risk was marked 
particularly amongst investment landlords with smaller portfolios who simply did not want 
gamble on their future pension income.  
 
Within this group of landlords averse to housing benefit lettings there were a number who 
had let to benefit recipients in the past but had changed their letting practices. These will 
be discussed in further detail in Chapter 9. 
Landlords tolerating tenants receiving housing benefit 
The majority of landlords in the study – 45 out of 55 – were currently letting to tenants in 
receipt of either Local Housing Allowance or Universal Credit. The English Private Landlord 
Survey found that 48 per cent of landlords were not unwilling to let to benefit claimants. 
The respondent interviews indicate the many circumstances in which this kind of letting 
takes place. Across all categories there could be some appreciation that tenants in receipt 
of benefit were more likely to be settled households seeking a long-term tenancy. Further, 
it was thought to be more likely that a settled tenant in receipt of HB would deliver a 
steadier rental payment than someone in work. In the view of one small business landlord 
on Teesside:  
I won’t discriminate. I’m from a pretty poor background myself. We always lived in 
rented accommodation when we were kids. If people aren’t working it doesn’t 
necessarily make them a bad person. […] In my mind, it’s almost safer than letting 
to somebody who’s employed [LL13]. 
 
Working investor landlords could be satisfied with a steady lower-than-market rent in 
return for a lower tenancy turnover. One woman, who worked as a front-line health 
provider and had four properties in and around an East Midlands city, said that if she 
operated in a more business-like way she would ‘probably be looking at putting rents up more 
aggressively, in line with the current market of the area’. However, she thought that might 
lead to higher tenant turnover and her preference was to achieve long-term stability [LL75]. 
Similarly, unmortgaged investor and portfolio landlords were also happier to accept a lower 




Many landlords had ‘legacy’ tenants where the length of the tenancy conferred special 
treatment. Landlords often mentioned tenants they had let to for ten years or more: the 
individual was well-known and trusted by the landlord and that could engender a degree of 
loyalty. The nature of this relationship meant that the landlord was quite willing to support 
the tenant through changes in circumstances including loss of work and relationship 
breakdown. In some instances the landlord was not necessarily aware of their tenants’ 
benefit status and indeed did not feel that it was their business provided the rent was paid. 
One portfolio landlord, who had inherited a small number of properties from her father, still 
had some of the same tenants:  
What I don’t know is those tenants who are paying me direct. I don’t pry. So they 
might be on benefits and just paying me directly. They’ve been with me so long that 
it’s predated a lot of the reference checking and all that sort of stuff…They pay their 
rent every month, so I’ve never asked, they’ve never said and it doesn’t really matter 
[LL47]. 
 
Another retired portfolio landlord said that he, simply, did not ask about his tenants’ 
finances: ‘I’ve tried not to pry because I think it’s a bit intrusive’ [LL74].  
 
This kind of attitude was also typical of landlords who were – again – unconcerned with how 
the tenant paid the rent, providing the tenant passed the relevant reference checks and 
providing the tenant continued to pay the rent on time. Indeed, under Universal Credit it 
might not be clear that a working tenant was receiving the payment: ‘I wouldn’t be averse to 
taking somebody on Universal Credit but they might not tell us that they’re on it anyway’ 
[LL84]. 
Landlords targeting tenants receiving housing benefit 
The majority of landlords in the study were rather more firmly in the housing benefit 
market either intentionally or because of the location of their property. Here, being ‘in the 
market’ is defined in terms of letting at a rent below, at or slightly above the LHA rates, and 
operating with a good working knowledge of Local Housing Allowance and Universal 
Credit. The geography of the market will be discussed in chapter 5 and letting practices in 
chapter 6. But here it is worth noting that all landlord types were in the housing benefit 
market, which split roughly a third each between investor, portfolio and business landlords. 
However, even within the benefit market, landlord portfolios, preferences and tolerances 
were variable. 
 
Many of the landlords had decided to target families since they had spotted this need was 
not being met locally and purchased two- or three-bedroomed properties. The purchases 
were often ex-council properties in established neighbourhoods, let to households with a 
local link. Some larger landlords who were targeting family lettings mentioned that they 
often offered tenants the option to move from a smaller to bigger property as their 
household changed in size, or conversely to downsize as appropriate.  
 
Another group was specialising in single, self-contained lettings which were either one-
beds or studios. This part of the market was deemed to be preferable to HMOs, which were 
thought to carry a heavier management burden. It was also possible to take advantage of 
the studio LHA rate which is generally higher than the shared room rate. However, some 
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landlords were of the view that smaller flatted properties still turned over too frequently 
and one landlord was selling her flats to invest more in houses for that reason.  
 
A small number of landlords were dealing exclusively with the lower and less stable end of 
the HMO market, often with highly vulnerable tenants. Portfolio and business landlords 
were more likely to be involved in HMO lettings, although one small investor landlord had 
successfully managed a ‘professional share’ for some years. However, for the most part 
dealing with HMOs generally meant dealing with the more vulnerable and economically 
excluded tenants. One landlord had over 30 rooms in a handful of HMOs, let to men who 
were – in his view – ‘down on their uppers, to be honest’ [LL52]. Having HMO lettings did not 
preclude turnover being relatively steady. This particular landlord was managing his wife’s 
inherited portfolio, and his longest-standing tenant had lived in the same room for over 40 
years. Another property business landlord also specialised in this market: his combined 
personal holdings and managed properties amounted to hundreds of separate let rooms. 
He had developed this portfolio over many decades, working with a sleeping business 





Further data on landlord preferences were secured from the BDRC survey. Respondents 
were asked about their current practices in letting to people in receipt of Universal Credit. 
Table 3.1 indicates that a large minority of landlords – close to a half – had never knowingly 
let to anyone in receipt of Universal Credit. A quarter had let to this group, but without 
changing their management practices to take benefit receipt into account. The figures 
indicate that the majority of tenants receiving Universal Credit will be renting from 
landlords who are likely to regard tenants as being wholly responsible for their housing 
benefit payment. These landlords would not necessarily be in a position to offer assistance 
if problems arose with a claim.  
 
Ten per cent of landlords had tenants including people in receipt of UC, and where 
management practices has been changed to accommodate those tenants receiving benefit.  
 
 
Table 3.1:  Which of these statements best describes your current practice in letting  
 to people in receipt of Universal Credit? 
 Number Percentage 
My tenants include people in receipt of Universal Credit and I 
have changed my management practices for those tenants 
(e.g. accept delayed payments, rent in arrears etc.) 
92 10.3 
My tenants include people in receipt of Universal Credit, but I 
have not changed my management practices for those tenants 
218 24.4 
I have never knowingly let to anyone in receipt of Universal Credit 395 44.3 
It varies 141 15.8 
I don’t know 46 5.2 






There is a high degree of variation in landlord motivations and personal dynamics which 
means that generalisation can be problematic. A static measure such as portfolio size is an 
extremely weak indicator of where a landlord ‘sits’ in the market: a more dynamic approach 
to motivation and trajectory is required. Amongst the respondent landlords, all categories 
routinely let to people in receipt of housing benefit but the circumstances of that letting 
varied. There were landlords who actively targeted different parts of the housing benefit 
market, and it is notable that, irrespective of that target, landlords were generally looking 
to secure a long-term tenant. Data from the respondent landlords indicates that it is likely 
that the lower end of the PRS contains a great deal of ‘legacy’ letting, with landlords 
continuing to honour long-standing benefit-supported tenancies irrespective of changes in 









The sustainability of supply to the bottom end of the PRS depends very much on landlords’ 
financial capabilities and their ability to secure satisfactory returns. High levels of mortgage 
default and instability contribute to precarity for tenants. Very little research has been 
undertaken on landlords’ financial decision-making, and as a consequence the first part of 
this chapter explores in detail the most common financial strategies for property purchase.  
The chapter indicates a generally thoughtful approach to portfolio development. The 
majority of landlords had holdings where the rental income was more than adequate to 
meet mortgage or loan commitments and other costs of doing business. The chapter 
considers the impact of the taxation changes introduced by the Finance Act 2015, and 
reviews landlord characteristics which contributed to stability and instability in financial 
terms.  
 
The chapter then goes on to consider landlords’ on-going business models. Landlords 
operating at the bottom of the market do not seek to maximise rent payments. The 
preferred approach is to minimise cost through driving down voids and tenancy turnover 
and securing tenant satisfaction through brisk response to repairs. The chapter concludes 
by asking whether supply of property to the bottom of the market is sustainable financially. 
The majority of landlords who were operating strategically were satisfied with their returns. 
However, a large minority of landlords who were inadvertently letting to HB tenants were 
not seeking to maximise their returns, and questions remain on the degree to which new 
entrants to the market might be satisfied with this approach.  
 
 
The purchase status of rental properties 
 
Rental properties are acquired in several ways, and one straightforward classification frame 
assesses the existence of outstanding debt on the property. A total of 895 landlords 
responded to the BDRC survey, and between them owned 1,635 properties. Table A4.1 
indicates the purchase status of those properties. Forty per cent of properties were owned 
outright. Of the remainder, the majority – 35 per cent – were being purchased with a 
mortgage, and 13 per cent were being purchased using a commercial loan. This particular 
strategy was more prevalent amongst landlords with larger holdings.  Amongst the 
landlords, 38 per cent had entirely unmortgaged holdings, and in 31 per cent of cases all 
their holdings had outstanding mortgages. A further 29 per cent held a mixture of 
mortgaged and unmortgaged properties.  
 
Table 4.1 indicates purchase status according to landlord type. Landlords who were willing 
to accommodate tenants receiving UC were less likely to have entirely unmortgaged 
holdings, and a higher proportion had a property mix including mortgaged and 





Table 4.1:  Purchase status and landlord type (%) 
 All respondents ‘UC landlords’‡ 
All property owned outright 38.2 25.0 
All property being purchased with a 
mortgage 
31.2 26.1 
All property owned fractionally * 3.3 
All property being purchased with a 
commercial loan 
* 0 
Property is mixed in terms of purchase 
status 
29.1 45.7 
May not total 100 due to rounding   
 n=891 n=92 
*Less than 1 per cent. 
‡Landlords indicating: ‘My tenants include people in receipt of Universal Credit and I have changed my 
management practices for those tenants (e.g. accept delayed payments, rent in arrears etc.)’ 
Source: BDRC Q1 2020 
 
 
Landlord finance strategies 
 
Landlords were asked about how they came to be a landlord, about their earliest 
purchasing decisions and how their portfolios developed. The interviews did not collate 
forensically detailed financial accounts but aimed at defining landlords’ overarching 
financial strategies. As indicated in the previous chapter, landlords’ portfolios are dynamic, 
and some of the accounts comprised a historic narrative that covered decades of operation. 
This means that it is possible to add time depth to the analysis and examine the impact of 
wider economic trends on landlord portfolio development. As might be expected in this 
part of the market, the majority of landlords were taking a high yield/low value approach 
with a focus on rental income. Given the nature of the locations in which they were 
operating, few anticipated substantial capital uplift.  
 
Most landlords, irrespective of their type as defined in the previous chapter, took one of 
two main approaches to financing their property purchase. A small handful adopted 
alternative financial models, and these are also discussed below. 
 
The highly geared, ‘tumble through’ model 
Landlords’ financial strategies very much reflected their tolerance for debt. The most 
common financial model depended on landlords being highly geared and increasing their 
holdings through a process of remortgaging. Landlords often began portfolio development 
by remortgaging their own property: this was made possible where the landlord had paid 
down the mortgage substantially or house prices inflation had increased the equity. The 
property was remortgaged to release equity, and this equity would then be used as 
deposits on one or more additional properties.  
 
It was also common that landlords sold existing businesses or used redundancy cash to 
enter the lettings market and – again – used that capital as deposits on multiple properties. 
Some landlords, simply, saved over a number of years and/or used their credit cards but 
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purchased in low-value areas. One landlord said that his earliest purchase cost just £7,000, 
and he paid no more than £15,000 for subsequent properties. A handful of landlords had 
built their portfolios in the 1980s before the availability of BTL mortgages and using 
standard mortgage finance. When the new style of mortgages became available, many 
such landlords refinanced their holdings. 
 
For many of the larger portfolio and investment landlords, initial investments happened 
during the ‘buy-to-let boom’ in the late 1990s/early 2000s, when deposit requirements 
could be relatively low. Indeed, there was a sense in which some landlords were urged to 
invest. One working investor landlord had approached her bank to ask whether she could 
borrow money for a kitchen extension. She was told that she could, instead, remortgage 
and purchase another property with a buy-to-let mortgage. Using the ‘tumble through’ 
model she quickly acquired four properties. Landlords also took the opportunities provided 
by a fall in house prices following the Global Financial Crisis. 
 
A key element in this business model is the type of property that landlords targeted. 
Landlords who were operating to a highly-geared model tended to focus on below-market-
value properties where it might be possible to bring the loan to value (LTV) ratio down by 
adding value through refurbishment, and then remortgaging back up to the maximum LTV. 
In the view of one retired portfolio landlord: ‘I can’t afford to buy a house at market value 
and rent it out because the figures don’t stack up. It’s got to be a house that leaves me with 
some margin by spending, by investing in it, otherwise the figures won’t stack up for me’ 
[LL11].  
 
Landlords tended to purchase at auction, look for properties that had been repossessed, 
were ‘tired’ or had been on the market for some time. One property business landlord, 
operating in the North East mentioned a recent purchase: he had bought a house for 
£15,000, in a near-derelict state with an unsound roof and smashed windows. His team 
worked on the refurbishment, which cost him £9,000, and the property was remortgaged 
for £55,000. Many landlords invested considerable time in locating this kind of opportunity 
property. 
 
Smaller portfolio landlords often invested ‘sweat equity’, in terms of skilled or unskilled 
labour, and this was often crucial in minimising refurbishment costs. Many of these kinds of 
landlords had a background in trades. Refurbishment took place quickly, in a matter of two 
or three weeks, at which stage the property was remortgaged to release its additional 
value. This value was then used as a deposit payment on another property. Several 
landlords had built their portfolios by ‘tumbling through’ mortgage finance from one 
property to another. Landlords who were reliant on the ‘tumble through’ method tended to 
view capital sitting in properties as a wasted opportunity: ‘if you’re not borrowing money 
against the property, then what’s the point?’ [LL58]. 
 
A small group of portfolio landlords in the study were continuing their expansion at the 
time of interview. There was heavy reliance on interest-only mortgages since repayments 
were lower, which would increase profit margins and more quickly accrue capital for further 
reinvestment. There were examples amongst the respondents of portfolio landlords who 
had, over a relatively short period of time, accumulated 30 or more properties using this 
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method. Many of the longer-term landlords had gained substantially from a drop in interest 
rate after the financial crisis, since this reduced their mortgage costs, increased profitability 
and sped up the rate of expansion.  
 
Working investor landlords sometimes used a similar model, but also drew on earned 
income, bonuses and promotions to provide mortgage deposits and fund refurbishment. 
One investor landlord, who worked in IT, had purchased 13 properties. He and his wife 
directing all their spare capital to the venture: they were, in his words ‘quite frugal’ in their 
personal expenditure [LL5]. At the time of interview they had started the process of paying 
down the mortgages since they had arrived at portfolio size they were still able to self-
manage. 
 
Older landlords who had built their portfolios using this model were, in some instances, 
switching their financial model and had started to sell properties to recalibrate their 
holdings into a smaller number of unmortgaged properties. Where equity was released, this 
was used to augment their pension income or was simply spent. Business landlords were 
more likely to continue investing if they had structures in place to relieve them of the 
burden of day-to-day management. 
 
Again it should be noted that geography played an essential role: the rapid acquisition of 
properties tended to be concentrated in specific locations where house prices made it 
feasible to purchase at a sufficiently low price to achieve additional value through 
refurbishment. Long-term capital uplift was not always factored into this model, since 
purchase tended to take place in more stagnant housing markets that had seen little in the 
way of house price increase. 
 
Many of the smaller portfolio and investment landlords in this grouping had arrived at a 
number close to their ideal portfolio size – which generally related to a number they felt 
comfortably able to manage personally – and were in a process of consolidation. This 
meant selling off ‘outlier’ properties that were too far away to manage, or properties that 
had proved difficult to let or more problematic to manage. The funding was then directed 
towards paying down the existing mortgages.  
  
The debt-averse, ‘pay down’ model 
Another group of landlords had built their holdings using a slightly different model. These 
landlords also targeted properties that were available at a price significantly below market 
value. However, the finance model differed: the intention was to aim for a low and rapidly-
diminishing LTV ratio with the objective of securing an unmortgaged portfolio prior to 
retirement. In part, an unwillingness to use interest-only mortgage finance was equated 
with a distrust of this type of product: ‘I would never do an interest-only mortgage. That 
construction strikes me as odd, because in the end you’re just betting on property prices going 
up’ [LL24]. Landlords in this group tended to expand more slowly and use their own capital 
to cover deposit costs although they did periodically remortgage to secure the best deals. 
This kind of approach was also more likely to be taken by some working investor landlords 
who generated savings from their employment income and did not need the rental income 




One working investor landlord had four properties, bought over 20 years ago and one of 
which was now mortgage-free. He had used repayment mortgages, and admitted that, 
financially, he could have been more ‘aggressive…but then I would have been panicking that 
I’d got millions of pounds of mortgage there and if something went wrong  I wouldn’t be able 
to deal with that out of my day-to-day salary’. However, in paying down the mortgages he 
felt that the taxation change had less of an impact since the taxable interest portion of his 
mortgage payment was continually reducing [LL16]. Another investor landlord with 14 
properties in Yorkshire & Humberside also preferred to pay down her mortgage debt and at 
the time of the interview was unmortgaged: ‘I just dislike debt, so it was the goal to pay off 
as soon as I can. I know I’d probably have got loads more if I’d gone for interest-only, and I 
could leverage, when we were buying when they were a lot cheaper’ [LL26]. 
Use of commercial loans 
A small number of landlords had pursued or were pursuing a quite aggressive programme 
of expansion that had not relied on mortgage finance. One landlord who had built 
substantial holdings in the South West indicated that he and his partner had accessed 
commercial loans: ‘that’s for the average man in the street, isn’t it, buy-to-let mortgages’ 
[LL94]. Another landlord had grown dissatisfied with his high-street mortgage provider and 
had transferred his business dealings to a European bank. This managed all his loans, and 
alerted him when he had built sufficient equity to expand. Another rapidly-expanding 
landlord had also found difficulties in securing high-street BTL finance. He had found an 
alternative lender willing to accept his model of bundling several low-cost house purchases 
into a single loan.  
 
Alternative portfolio-building strategies 
A small group of business landlords had rapidly grown their portfolios by operating sale and 
rent back schemes in the 2000s. In some instances, growth had been pursued quite 
aggressively through leafleting particular types of area. This scheme often added ex-right-
to-buy council properties to landlord holdings.16 One landlord who had expanded rapidly 
using this model said that, at the peak of operation between 2005 and 2008, his business 
was purchasing two properties a month. They would buy a property for £75,000, but the 
real value was nearer to £100,000. They would borrow money to purchase, and two weeks’ 
later would remortgage it to full value, recovering £85,000 against the value of £100,000. 
That would release around £5 or £6k per house which was then funnelled back into property 
purchase. He had access to easy mortgage terms: ‘it seems like if you had a good credit file 
and you had a pulse and you could sign your name, you could get a mortgage basically’ [LL95]. 
In his case, this plan collapsed during the Global Financial Crisis when Mortgage Express 
was bought by the government and he was unable to meet his mortgage debt [LL95]. 
Another landlord built his portfolio in a similar way, also working with Mortgage Express 
and using a sale and rent back model. He had built his portfolio to a peak of 100+ properties 
before the Crisis.  
 
Another alternative strategy was being pursued by a landlord specialising in HMOs. She 
was using an ‘exchange with delayed completion’ approach since she was unable to access 
 
16 In 2010-12, this kind of scheme came under the scrutiny of the Financial Services Authority (then the 




standard mortgage finance because she had only just moved to the UK. She initially built 
her portfolio by talking to small landlords who she knew had problematic tenants in rent 
arrears, and who were finding it difficult to meet their mortgage commitments. She agreed 
a sale price with the seller and paid an advance but deferred purchasing the property for 
three years. In the meantime, she received the rental income and paid the mortgage. The 
purchaser met with the tenant, sorted out their benefit claim, arranged a repayment plan 
and put an Alternative Payment Arrangement in place. This model proved to be successful, 
and she was able to secure similar deals on four further properties. When she was able to 
secure standard BTL mortgage finance, she purchased and remortgaged all the properties 
and since that time has been gradually growing her portfolio through a cycle of purchase, 
pay-down and consolidation.  
 
Inheritance  
It is worth noting that some landlords were in the market largely as a consequence of 
inheritance. Some respondents had learned about lettings from a parent who had 
developed a portfolio and then handed it on. Indeed, one very elderly landlord couple were 
managing a small row of terraces that had been owned by their family since the 1930s. One 
landlord was married to a woman who had inherited her parents’ holdings, which 
comprised several HMOs in a South Eastern seaside town. He had given up work to manage 
the portfolio and was clearly finding it problematic. Landlords working with inherited 
properties were often also ‘gifted’ sitting tenants who continued to live in those properties 
often at a rent well below market value.  
 
A couple of landlords had been given or loaned deposits by family members or had invested 
large inherited sums in property. One man who let in the North East recalled that his first 
property had been purchased with cash in 1996, with a loan of £7,000 from his parents.  
 
Mortgage-free portfolios 
Seven of the landlords had holdings with no mortgage debt. This does not necessarily 
constitute a financial ‘model’ but is an important financial characteristic of an increasing 
proportion of properties in the sector. Table 4.1 indicates a high proportion of 
‘unmortgaged’ landlords, and this figure is supported by PLS 2018 findings that 39 per cent 
of landlords had no debt or borrowings against their let properties, which this comprised an 
estimated 30 per cent of all tenancies. Landlords being mortgage free reduces their 
exposure to financial shocks that might include an increase in interest rates.  
 
A landlord being mortgage-free sometimes reflected the successful pursuit of a debt-
averse ‘pay down’ model. However, some mortgage-free landlords had never had a 
mortgage. There were instances of landlords inheriting sometimes substantial portfolios, 
and expanding their holdings via cash purchases using rental income. Some landlords also 
built their portfolios without recourse to mortgage finance, by investing profits from their 
other businesses.  
 
One couple had had a business in a small Lincolnshire town, and had used earnings from 
the business to pay cash for houses let to the people who worked for them. When they 
retired from the business, the properties were gradually transferred to open market letting. 
The man who had started his portfolio with a loan from his parents made a second cash 
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purchase of £43,000 by – in his words – ‘squirrelling away’ – all his spare income, 
augmented by a mortgage mis-selling compensation sum [LL74]. As might be anticipated, 






The Finance Act 2015 introduced a tax change which directly affected landlords with buy-
to-let mortgages and other types of loans and overdrafts relating to property. Under s24 of 
the Act, tax calculations were based on rental income which was not adjusted to take into 
account loan interest costs. Landlords whose principal costs had been interest-only 
mortgages were no longer able to offset those payments against their tax liability.  
    
Changes in the ability to offset mortgage interest payment against tax had a range of 
impacts depending on landlords’ financial strategies. A small number of newer business 
landlords had, from the outset, developed their portfolio within a company structure. Most 
of the older landlords were not so placed. The ability to offset interest against tax liability 
had proved to be highly attractive to many early investors. The s24 tax changes had a range 
of impacts across the landlord types, depending on their personal circumstances and 
business models. In many cases, the tax changes had no impact at all. This was the case 
where the landlord was unmortgaged, had their holdings in a company or had spread 
property ownership between themselves and their partner so that each had an income 
which kept them below the base tax rate. Many landlords used accountants to complete 
their year-end tax return so their affairs could be ordered to minimise tax liability. 
 
Some landlords could be satisfied with a limited income from a small portfolio, which kept 
them sufficiently busy and in the right tax bracket. One landlord had calculated that he 
needed two further properties to reach that position: at the time of the interview he had 
seven. In a higher bracket, his portfolio would have to be substantially larger to see the 
difference: ‘I don’t need it, I’d just be earning money to put numbers on a bank statement’ 
[LL13].  
 
Few landlords had taken the step of transferring their holdings into a company structure. 
Many had considered their options on this front. There was an unwillingness to incur capital 
gains tax and sales tax, and some mentioned tax consultants able to sidestep these 
requirements: ‘I’m always sceptical of sexy schemes because Inland Revenue will put a stop to 
them if they feel they’re not getting their due’ [LL4]. One large business landlord had indeed 
used a consultant to transfer his holdings but had carefully checked that the consultant had 
indemnity insurance in case his advice was flawed. 
 
For many landlords, the tax changes were leading to disinvestment or contributed to an 
unwillingness to expand holdings. These landlords will be discussed in more detail in 




Stability and instability 
 
Landlords were asked questions about the way they managed their rent account and how 
they funded repairs and maintenance. Most landlords were in a reasonably stable financial 
position: they had set aside contingency funds, had planned programmes of repairs and 
maintenance, had access to capital for larger-scale refurbishment and repair, and could 
absorb a degree of rent loss through arrears. However, a small number were in a more 
precarious position.  
 
Landlords facing acute financial problems were often facing multiple issues. For example, 
one investor had purchased a property and was unable to pay renovation bills far above 
what they had originally anticipated. He was unable to sell and was meeting mortgage 
payments from fluctuating earned income. Another small investor landlord had two 
properties: one property had been let to an individual who was no longer paying the rent 
but could not be evicted and this was destabilising the landlords’ personal finances. This 
group also contained an elderly couple unable to divest themselves of inherited properties 
they could not afford to bring up to required standard; and a larger HMO landlord who had 
also inherited a portfolio of highly problematic properties and was dealing with a cycle of 
problem tenants, criminal damage and rent arrears.  
 
These stories often reflected very particular personal circumstances. However, it was clear 
that the more stable landlords:  
 
• Brought additional capabilities to letting from other parts of their business/working 
careers including financial acumen, awareness of the legalities of housing and 
knowledge of the property market, familiarity with IT systems and working 
familiarity with the benefit system; 
• Were able to fall back on building and trades skills to offset refurbish and 
maintenance costs; 
• Had additional income streams to meet their own household expenses or have a 
portfolio of sufficient maturity to have built up a strong contingency fund; 
• Had a portfolio mix with properties tending to longer-term tenancies (family houses 
rather than smaller flats); 
• Had strong risk-mitigation strategies in place (see Chapter 9);  
• Were spreading portfolio management and maintenance costs by setting up 
associated businesses; 
• Had properties purchased at the right time and the right price and with appropriate 
rents for their target tenant (see Chapter 5); and 
• Had unmortgaged properties with substantial accrued savings. 
 
Less stable landlords tended to be: 
 
• Reliant on third-party ‘property investor’ advice which might well prove to be 
flawed, leading them to make poor business decisions for example, on where to 
purchase and at what price; 
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• Letting a small portfolio of one or two properties with limited equity and insufficient 
contingency funds to cover loss through rent arrears, an unexpected high-cost 
repair or an anti-social tenant causing excess damage; 
• Cross-subsidizing a small portfolio from fluctuating self-employment income. 
• Extending too rapidly, paying greater attention to property acquisition rather than 
managing the accrued portfolio;  
• Managing a small, still-mortgaged portfolio into retirement with insufficient funds 
to meet major repairs or accommodate voids/arrears.  
 
 
Rent setting and minimising expenditure 
 
For many landlords who were very firmly in the housing benefit market, rent-setting was 
closely tied to LHA rates, and these cases will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter. Other landlords operating largely without reference to LHA had a variety of 
approaches to setting the rent. Many simply set the rent through reference to locally 
advertised rents, or were guided by agent advice if they used agents for tenant finds or 
were not self-managing. In some instances, it was clear that the particular property or its 
location meant that the rent was perforce at or around the LHA rate. The landlords who 
were looking to achieve a slightly higher rent were generally following a strategy of up-
marketing through higher specification refurbishment.  
 
Many landlords were well aware of the market rents and set a rent slightly below that level. 
For most working investor landlords, yield was less important than the property simply 
washing its face. One such landlord, with two properties in Greater Manchester, had set his 
rents at £50 a month below the market price, despite a high level of investment in 
refurbishment. For him: ‘As long as it pays off the mortgage, I’m not bothered’ [LL25]. 
Landlords in this group were not necessarily pursuing a profit-maximisation strategy, and – 
rather – wanted to seem ethical. One landlord stressed that he liked to be fair in setting the 
rent. He was self-managing and had decided to deduct from his rent the money he would 
have paid to the letting agent. His rents were around £200 a month below the market rate.  
 
Portfolio and business landlords at the bottom end of the market generally sought to 
maximise profitability by minimising expenditure. Paradoxically, they often aimed to do 
this by setting a rent that was lower than the market rate. Many landlords saw voids and 
tenant turnover as a major expense. Tenancy turnover brought a period without rent plus 
the additional cost of advertising and re-letting. It also meant that property had to be 
refurbished to a standard that would attract a good tenant. Tenancy turnover could easily 
cost the equivalent of two months’ rent, and this was regarded as an unwelcome expense 
where profit margins were tight.  
 
It was preferable, then, to create tenancies and choose tenants who wanted a longer term 
tenancy. Setting a lower rent contributed to that strategy in two ways. First, most landlords 
recognised what they regarded as a downward spiral: poor-quality property that was priced 
above the market rent was more likely to limit the number of applicants, which decreased 
the prospective tenant pool and increase their risk of taking a poor-quality tenant. A better 
strategy was to offer property at a slightly higher specification than might be expected for a 
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price slightly below the market rate. This would create stronger demand and so allow the 
landlord to cherry-pick amongst the applicants with a view to securing a more settled 
tenant.  
 
Second, most landlords sought to retain tenants by simply not increasing the rent. 
Landlords were particularly unwilling to increase the rent where they had a long-standing 
tenant who paid the rent regularly and took care of the property. Tenants were more likely 
to stay in below-market value rental properties which they could more easily afford. One 
working investor landlord, letting in a depressed coastal resort, was satisfied with a 
relatively low rent:  ‘I was quite happy to make sure that people were happy with the rent, or 
that they could afford the rent, because again, that normally means they stay longer than if 
they pay the very upper limit of what they can afford’ [LL24]. In some instances, landlords 
admitted that setting a low rent meant that tenants simply could not afford to move: ‘I’ve 
sort of imprisoned them because they’re used to such a low rent’ [LL27]. 
 
Other strategies to minimise expenditure meant that landlords again contributed their 
‘sweat equity’ to on-going repairs and maintenance. Portfolio landlords commonly 
themselves undertook the work required to refresh a property between lettings, including 
fitting kitchens, carpets, and decorating. One landlord highlighted the saving: ‘I can paint a 
whole house, coat of magnolia, in two days. If I’ve got to pay a painter to do that it’s 
potentially costing me £600 to £1,000’ [LL19]. This strategy limited labour costs to the 
targeted use of essential trades such as electricians and gas engineers. Indeed, the property 
business landlords tended to undertake property purchase, refurbishment and sale projects 
as a way of keeping busy if they were not working directly on a refurbishment to let. One 
retired portfolio landlord joked: ‘I’m Mr Silicon, I’m Mr Toilet Cistern, I am. I have at home a 
garage full of them, because I’m always going round doing something like that’ [LL81]. A 
couple who had built up a portfolio on Blackpool were typical in their approach. He had 
worked in the family plastering business before the couple became full-time landlords and 
picked up skills ‘across everything really’. He had retained local builder contacts and was 
able to source materials at the right price, and his wife spent a lot of time on the internet 
searching for deals on tiles and end-of-line kitchens [LL72].  
 
Finally, many landlords sought to maximise profitability by not using a letting agent. This 
was particularly the case with business and portfolio landlords and the more experienced 
investor landlords who were conversant with tenancy law. As will be seen in Chapter 7, 
letting agents were not always viewed favourably. Many landlords mentioned web-based 
letting and rent-collection services which they regarded as more efficient and cost-effective 





Landlords were asked about how they funded repairs and maintenance, but no direct 
questions were asked about the quality of their properties. It would have been difficult to 
establish an objective measure against which to judge landlords’ own assessments.  
However, comments made by landlords about their refurbishment, maintenance and repair 
strategies were enlightening. 
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It has been noted that landlord investment in refurbishment reflected their target market. 
A greater attention to finish and the use of higher-quality fixtures and fittings justified a 
higher rental. Lettings lower down the market were not refurbished to that standard, but 
for a ‘tumble through’ model to work, the renovation still had to be of sufficient standard to 
add substantial value to the property. In addition, it was necessary for the property to suit 
the market: ‘I wasn’t looking for top-notch properties because people don’t generally want to 
be paying top-notch prices for renting’ [LL77].  
 
In seeking to secure long-term tenancies, the respondent landlords tended to be of the 
view that keeping a property up to standard was essential:  
I try not to have a high turnover of tenants. The way we control that, or at least try 
to, is by having good quality properties, maintained to a ridiculously high standard 
[…]. Decent kitchens, decent bathrooms, good boilers. Everything works. They’re 
clean, they’re tidy, they’re fresh [LL31].  
 
One regional letting agent stressed that landlords who saw their portfolio as a business 
would be unlikely to have ‘cold, draughty unmaintained properties, because the tenant are 
going to want to move out, and that’s not what the landlord wants. A well-maintained 
property means you’ve got a consistent tenant, which is consistent income’ [Regional Letting 
Agent#1]. Indeed, landlords commented on the reciprocal nature of the relationship: 
Personally, I'll take a good-as-gold tenant on benefits over probably like a normal 
tenant, because if you treat them right and make sure the house is all looked after 
and stuff, they stay a long time. They're happy. I've got plenty of DSS tenants that 
take pride in their houses and they're always asking me, 'Can I paint? I can do this? 
Can I change the carpet? [LL95]. 
 
Offering property of a slightly better quality was particularly important in areas where the 
rent was pegged at the LHA rate, since good tenants in some areas might well have a 
degree of choice amongst competing landlords. Overspending on refurbishment and 
expecting a top-up well above the LHA rate was simply regarded as poor business practice 
in some markets.  
 
On-going expenditure on repairs and maintenance was – again – regarded as a primary 
strategy to minimise turnover. There could be a ‘quid pro quo’ understanding that a lower 
rent and no rent increases meant that the tenant would attend to minor repairs and replace 
fittings. A regional letting agent commented that ‘If a landlord's got a tenant who rarely asks 
for anything, is willing to mend their own washers, and put a carpet strip down, then they're 
worth their weight in gold’ [Regional LA#3].  
 
Landlords could be acutely aware of the need to ensure that property was fit for its 
particular purpose. Where landlords were letting to tenants at the very bottom of the 
market, then properties were refurbished to a minimum standard certainly in terms of 
decoration. A local authority housing options officer working with a landlord who accepted 
tenants with alcohol problems characterised the accommodation as ‘old fashioned’: ‘I 
probably wouldn't want to live there, but it was good enough accommodation for some of our 
clients who had a lifestyle that they chose’ [Local Statutory #3]. Where the landlord 
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expected the tenant to be chaotic, they considered that it made little sense to invest in 
higher-quality refurbishment.  
 
A low level of investment in refurbishment, repairs and maintenance was regarded as a 
poor business model. Many landlords refurbished properties to good quality at the outset, 
to attract a better selection of tenants from which to choose, and to limit the incidence of 
repair issues in the first few years of the tenancy. However, the fact that many landlords 
viewed the end of long tenancies as a good opportunity to refurbish indicates that those 
tenancies may well have been ‘tired’ and in need of an upgrade. The EHS housing stock 
data indicate an association between length of residence and higher levels of non-decency 
for households in receipt of Housing Benefit or Universal Credit. A third of HB tenants who 
were resident for five years or more were living in non-decent homes; this compared with 
just under a quarter for tenants who had been in their property for four years or less (Table 
4.2). Clearly, the exact relationship between poor property condition and tenancy length at 
the bottom of the market requires further exploration. 
 
 
Table 4.2  HB/UC receipt and property conditions in private rented sector 2018 (%) 
 Length of residence Non-decent home 
On Housing Benefit/Universal credit Shorter term (0-4 years) 25.5 
Longer term (5 years or more) 33.0 
Not on housing benefit/universal 
credit 
Shorter term (0-4 years) 22.3 
Longer term (5 years or more) 25.2 
Total HB/UC  28.8 
Total non HB/UC  23.1 
Total All PRS  27.9 
Source: English Housing Survey Housing Stock Data 2018 
 
 
Is supply financially sustainable? 
 
Exploration of landlord financial dealings discloses important factors which address the 
degree to which supply might be regarded as financially sustainable. The landlord 
narratives indicated that a great deal of let property at the lower end of the market was 
accrued during a period of highly benign financial and taxation treatment. There is a clear 
cohort effect, of properties in the rental market that were purchased perhaps twenty or 
thirty years ago, now managed by individuals who are well into pension age. As this 
property slowly exits the market, it is unlikely to be replaced at the same rate. It should be 
noted that these landlords were tending to sell into the owner-occupied market rather than 
to other landlords. 
  
Landlords were asked about whether it was advisable for new landlords to enter the market 
now. Few landlords made adverse comment on the finances of meeting need and letting at 
the bottom of the market. Some landlords indicated that it might take longer now to grow 
a portfolio, and it was necessary to start young. The sector could still be profitable for 




Larger portfolio and business landlords who actively targeted the housing benefit market, 
were generally able to do so because of the characteristics of the local market as will be 
evident in the next chapter. Landlords serving this market were careful to purchase at the 
right price, and with expenditure minimisation strategies in place. For other landlords, 
letting at the bottom of the market took place at considerable personal cost. Smaller 
portfolio landlords did not always factor in their ‘sweat equity’, including time spent on 
repairs and maintenance and working outside standard office hours. Landlords often 
rationalised this burden as something that had to be done to support or build up their 
business. Purchasing these services ‘commercially’ would have meant that the portfolio 
was simply not economically viable since rental income would not have covered labour 
costs.  
 
For landlords who were meeting lower-end need inadvertently, doing so did not necessarily 
make good business sense. The willingness to accept a lower-than-market rent often 
reflected the fact that these landlords were letting an unmortgaged property to a long-
term tenant they did not want to evict. This is not a replicable model: another landlord 
purchasing the same property would not have found the rent economically viable. For 
many investor landlords, a property ‘washing its face’ meant that the rent need only meet 
the cost of servicing an interest-only mortgage payment plus additional for contingency. 
The landlord did not need to derive a ‘salary’ from the letting to meet their day-to-day 
expenses. In both cases, arguably, need was being met because the landlord was choosing 
– consciously or unconsciously – not to seek a market return.   
 
For many landlords, taxation changes had often reduced the attraction of the market and 
as a consequence they were in a static holding position, unable to continue with planned 
expansion. Some had properties in private ownership but were unwilling to pay the capital 
gains tax required to move them into company ownership. Others had simply stopped 
expanding because to do so would propel them into a higher tax bracket. However, it was 
notable that many landlords did not foreground financial reasons for their dissatisfaction 
with being in the market. As will be seen in Chapter 9, landlords often expressed other 





This chapter has presented qualitative data around landlord financial decision-making, and 
this information contributes to an understanding of sustainability of supply to the lower 
end of the market. The bottom of the market is heavily reliant on a cohort of landlords who 
expanded their holdings substantially over twenty years ago when the financial and 
regulatory environment was rather more benign.  
 
The majority of respondent landlords who were letting in the HB market had a clear 
financial strategy in place, and most were satisfied with the level of return delivered by 
their lettings. At the bottom of the market, profitability relied on measures to minimise 
costs rather than maximise income through pushing rent levels upwards. To this end, 
tenancy sustainability and attention paid to repairs and maintenance were major factors in 




Many landlords were letting to HB tenants inadvertently and could be satisfied with a rent 
that was some way below the market rate. In part, this satisfaction rested on the fact that 
these were mostly investor landlords who had employment income to meet their daily 
needs, often had no mortgage commitment, had secured interest-only mortgage finance, 
and the lettings themselves were regarded as being long-term and relatively trouble-free. 
Many landlords expressed themselves satisfied with properties that made little profit, 
providing the rental payment covered the property outgoings. However, many smaller 
investor landlords reported that s24 had a major impact on profitability, and Chapter 9 










Housing benefit supports tenants in different kinds of housing markets. Debate often 
focuses on locations where high prices and limited property availability create affordability 
problems for tenants on lower incomes. However, HB recipients dominate demand for 
private rentals in some parts of England, and the characteristics of that demand shape 
supply opportunities. Almost half the respondent landlords were very firmly ‘in’ the HB 
market: the majority of their tenants received HB or UC, rents were set in relation to LHA 
rates and management practices were often adjusted accordingly. This chapter discusses 
the characteristics of those landlords and the way that place framed their portfolio 




The spatial dimensions of demand from lower-income households 
 
The configuration of the lower end of the PRS varies by geography. There are broad 
differences between the north and south regionally and divergent patterns at the local 
authority level where there is a marked spatial variation in the HB tenants as a proportion of 
the PRS (see Appendix 2). DWP and uprated Census data indicates that the North East 
(42.4 per cent) and the North West (35.3 per cent) had the largest HB demand expressed as 
a proportion of the PRS, compared with the South West which had the lowest proportion of 
all regions (23.4 per cent) (Figure 5.1).17  
 
DWP administrative data shows wide variation within as well as between regions. Table 5.1 
shows the ten local authorities with the largest proportions of HB claimants in the private 
rented sector. Most local authorities on this list are from the North West and North East, 
but the other local authorities are drawn from the East Midlands and the East of England, 




17 Note there is some variation between housing benefit receipt as reported in the Family Resources Survey 
and the DWP data. The data are not collected over exactly same time frame and DWP data reflects 






Source: DWP Stat X-Plore data August 2019, ONS updated 2011 Census data estimates of the size of the local 




Table 5.1:  Top ten local authorities with largest proportions of housing benefit 
 claims in local PRS, August 2019 
Local authority Percentage 
 Redcar and Cleveland 73.4 
 Blackpool 71.0 
 East Northamptonshire 69.2 
 Enfield 67.5 
 Tendring 58.2 
 Knowsley 54.7 
 South Tyneside 54.1 
 Burnley 52.6 
 Kettering 52.2 
 Great Yarmouth 51.4 
Source: DWP Stat X-Plore, ONS updated 2011 Census estimates of size of the PRS 
 
 
Furthermore, there is substantial regional difference in patterns within housing benefit 
claims. Almost all the local authorities with the highest proportion of working PRS HB 
claimants are in London. The lowest proportions are almost exclusively rural areas and 






































Table 5.2:  Local authorities with the highest and lowest proportion of housing benefit 
 claims made by employed PRS tenants (%) (Aug 2019) 
Highest proportion Employed HB claimants Lowest proportion Employed HB claimants 
 Tower Hamlets 68.8  Allerdale 10.1 
 Barking and Dagenham 68.6  North East Lincolnshire 10.1 
 Newham 68.6  Burnley 13.6 
 Slough 67.8  Barrow-in-Furness 14.1 
 Hackney 67.4  Bolsover 14.2 
 Redbridge 65.6  East Lindsey 14.3 
 Harrow 64.6  West Lindsey 14.6 
 Enfield 63.5  North Lincolnshire 14.8 
 Waltham Forest 63.0  Craven 15.2 
 Brent 62.9  Hyndburn 15.3 
Source: DWP Stat Xplore 
 
 
Working status itself is variable. The incidence of HB PRS tenants working full-time is much 
greater in London and regions in the east and south compared with regions in the north 
(see Table A2.1). In the East region 61.1 per cent of HB tenants are working full-time 
compared to only 42.6 per cent in the North East. The rate of HB private tenants in part-
time work is lower but varies in a similar way, with the lowest proportion of part-time 
employees among tenants in London (8.0 per cent) and the North West (12.4 per cent).  
 
There are similar levels of difference in the proportions of PRS HB tenants who are 
accessing housing assistance via other ‘passporting’ benefits (see A2.3): 
 
• Employment Support Allowance (ESA) is the most frequent reason for HB to be paid 
by people who are not working and is paid to people with long-term limiting 
illnesses or conditions. In London, 13.2 per cent of claims were made on the basis of 
ESA compared to 34.2 per cent of claims in the North West.  
• Job Seekers Allowance is made to unemployed people and these claims were 
greatest in the North East (6.5 per cent) but accounted for only 2-3 per cent in 
regions in the south and east.  
• There was a higher proportion of claims from those on Pension Credit in the South 
West (18.9 per cent) compared with the North East (12.2 per cent).  
• Claims from people in receipt of Income Support were greatest in the North East 
(14.8 per cent) compared with the South West (5.6 per cent). 
 
Tables A2.4 (a-d) further indicate the high level of variation in lower-end demand, 
demonstrating the highly localised nature of the mix in HB claims due to unemployment, 
care responsibilities, illness and disability and older age.  
 
The lower end of the market can also be defined in terms of spatial concentrations of 
demand from tenants in receipt of housing benefit. ‘HB-dominant’ markets can be defined 
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as those where more than 40 per cent of tenants are in receipt of benefit. By this 
calculation, 28 per cent of HB tenants are renting in a HB-dominated market (Table 5.3).  
 
 
Table5.3  HB-dominated PRS markets: different calculations of ‘dominant’ 





National percentage of 
LHA/UC households in 
a HB-dominated PRS 
Local authorities where     
50 per cent or more  
PRS tenants claim LHA/UC  
17 122,896 9.1 
Local authorities where     
40 per cent or more  
PRS tenants claim LHA/UC  
47 377,315 28.0 
Source: ONS and DWP Stat X_plore. 
 
 
This level of concentration and localised variations constitute patterns that shape landlord 
perceptions of opportunity in terms of the overall size and dimensions of the lower-end 
market, the kinds of property likely to be in greatest demand, and the ability to distinguish 
and choose between demand groups. 
 
 
Landlords in the housing benefit market 
 
Previous chapters have discussed landlords who tolerated tenants receiving some level of 
housing benefit. At times, tolerance reflected the fact that the property happened to be in 
a less desirable location where investment in upgrading the property was unlikely to attract 
a higher rent. These were also properties that the landlord might have inherited, or where 
the locality had taken an economic downturn. One landlord had invested in properties that 
he thought would suit nurses and other medical staff working at the nearby hospital, but 
over time the neighbourhood had declined. He had lived in one of his own properties for a 
time and had witnessed drug-dealing taking place in the street. He personally associated 
‘DSS areas’ with crime and regarded selling these properties and exiting the HB market as 
the same thing [LL6].  
 
The majority of respondent landlords had actively targeted the HB market. These landlords 
had made a strategic decision to modify their business practices to align with benefit 
payments: they would accept a delay in the first housing benefit payment, accept a 
payment in arrears and generally set their rents at close to or slightly above the local 
housing allowance level. Chapter 6 will discuss landlord management practice in rather 
more detail. Here, the focus will be on the role of geography in deciding HB landlord 
purchasing strategies.   
 
Almost all the landlords who were actively targeting the HB market were portfolio or 
business landlords. Landlords in this grouping tended to have larger holdings: indeed, all 
the landlords with 20 or more holdings had a substantial number of HB lettings in their 
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portfolio. Where holdings were smaller, that tended to reflect a landlord who had 
previously held more property and was in the process of consolidating or exiting the 
market. The respondent landlords were operating in regions across England. Three had 
holdings across more than one region, and of the remainder, half had holdings that were 
very local to where they lived, and half had a portfolio that was spread across a single 
region.  
 
Place played a particular role in framing opportunities for housing benefit landlords. The 
scale of concentrated demand could be important, and landlords targeted tightly defined 
areas where cost savings would follow management efficiencies. Many HB landlords were 
operating in locations where, by their calculations, low property prices and relatively high 
LHA rates resulted in satisfactory yields.18 Further, many landlords were actively targeting 
areas where the LHA rates were higher than open-market rents. This disparity happened 
for one of two reasons. Broad Rental Market Area boundaries include a range of settlement 
types and neighbourhoods and can contain specific locations where the achievable LHA 
rate is actually higher than market rents because of the play of averages. Second, and more 
commonly mentioned by respondent landlords, LHA rates could be higher because of 
stagnation in local market rents. From April 2013, the LHA rates were increased not 
through reference to local rents, but in line with CPI and in the following two years were 
increased by one per cent: the LHA rates increased, but local rents had not.  
 
Almost all the larger-scale HB landlords were operating in locations where the LHA was 
identical to or even slightly higher than the market rate, and this increased the yield 
providing the landlord let to tenants who were reliant on HB. The majority of landlords 
operating in ‘LHA- inflated’ locations were building large portfolios very quickly: indeed, the 
combination of low-priced property in a stagnant market that had slightly inflated LHA 
rates made the ‘tumble-through’ and remortgage model a particularly attractive 





In staking out spatial opportunities, landlords fell into two types: those who were reaching 
into a market from the outside, and landlords who were local to a particular area. There was 
notable disdain for landlords who had simply failed to understand the importance of 
locality in defining their purchase strategy, as one Northern stakeholder commented:  
‘We've got a few London landlords who have… [property in Northern city], and 
they're shocked and horrified that they can't sell it at a profit two years later. The 
rent covers the mortgage, and then they might have to subsidize it if, say, there's a 
big electrical bill or something, you know, for electric works - but they're assuming 
that they'll get the money back on the capital investment, but they don't, because 
the prices just don't go up like that in [Northern city] [Regional Letting Agent #2]. 
 
 
18 In all instances where landlords mentioned rates of return, these were accepted as reported; the accounting 
models that landlords used to calculate returns would have varied substantially.  
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At the bottom of the market, strategic approaches were less likely to be guided by the 
generalized prospect of house price increase, and more likely to be based on sometimes 
intensive local market research to establish the level of opportunity and pinpoint particular 
lower-income groups. 
 
Strategic ‘incoming’ housing benefit landlords  
A small number of respondents were operating with the more specific intention to take 
advantage of an LHA payment that was slightly above market rates. The uplift did not 
apply across all categories of payment. For example, in some locations the single room 
rates and one-bed studios rates were high relative to open market rents, and the nature of 
building stock lent itself to subdivision. These landlords invested after closely reading the 
market to establish exactly where the gains might be made. One landlord began his 
portfolio by purchasing property around a North East city, where his girlfriend was a 
student. At the time of the interview, he was purchasing properties for between £15,000 
and £25,000 with no expectation of capital uplift. He was looking to expand out of the 
North East into his ‘home’ area in a Yorkshire city in places where he knew the LHA rate 
was competitive, house prices were low and the tenants were fairly settled. A key element 
of his strategy was investment in settled communities where tenant turnover would be 
limited, maximizing return through minimizing voids. He reckoned that, across the board, 
his holdings were yielding 28 per cent. 
 
Another business landlord with an established portfolio in the South East also decided that 
he could achieve good returns in Humberside. He researched the rental market to locate 
the ten cheapest towns in terms of property prices and then settled on a likely location. He 
researched that location for an extended period: ‘Walked the streets for a good few months. 
Spoke to people. Spoke to plumbers, spoke to estate agents, people in corner shops. Really 
cheap houses, for what they are’ [LL31]. The location was readily accessible to his existing 
maintenance and lettings team, and by the time of the interview he had purchased over 30 
properties which were a mix of different-sized family homes. His basic model was to 
purchase very poor quality property with cash from his rental income, refurbish and 
remortgage to a higher value. He was letting at the LHA rate and again relied on the 
expectation that tenancies would be retained for a long period. He gave the example of a 
three-bed property he was currently purchasing for £45,000: he was going to invest a 
further £20,000 in refurbishment and expected a revaluation at around £80,000. He was 
intending to charge the LHA rate, which was close to £500, and the repayment on his 
interest-only mortgage was £195 a month. He calculated a return of 16.5 per cent on that 
property. 
 
There was some reliance on a ‘densification’ model. One property business landlord had 
also undertaken extensive research on markets across England to arrive finally at their 
target locations. The respondent ran their own portfolio alongside a scheme which looked 
to lease properties from existing landlords operating at the bottom of the market in two 
Yorkshire cities. Landlords were guaranteed a rent equivalent to the standard LHA rate for 
the property as a single letting, but then the respondent remodeled the property as a HMO 
to achieve multiple Shared Room Rate payments per property. The respondent cited the 
example of a four-bed property of around £600 a month; subdivided into four rooms the 
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same property would achieve a rental of over £1,000 a month. Again, as with all landlords in 
this grouping, there was heavy investment of time in tenancy management to minimize 
voids and arrears.  
 
All the ‘incoming’ landlords were building their portfolios on the understanding that there 
would be minimal or no capital uplift, and that rents would generally be stagnant. 
According to one letting agent with knowledge of HB markets in the North East, ‘landlords 
are not greedy [in place]…they’re not greedy because they have to be realistic’. However, the 
returns that could be made in these key locations was common market knowledge. The 
same agent commented on buyers coming from outside the area, and ‘spotting vans with 
“we buy any house” type thing sprayed on the side’ [Regional Letting Agent #2]. A couple of 
the investor landlords had worked with property investment firms that had secured 
properties in the same area. Landlords commented that there was increasing competition 
in these key locations. This was not necessarily driving up prices but was reducing 
opportunities to buy at the right price for the model to work.  
 
Finally, these larger portfolio and business landlords operating from outside the location of 
their holdings often employed staff to manage their lettings. Business landlords who might 
themselves live some distance from their holdings employed lettings managers and 
maintenance teams that were located close by or within reasonable travel distance. One 
larger business landlord with two principal areas of operation had scouted possible 
locations along a particular motorway route. Another business landlord took an alternative 
approach and outsourced all the bureaucratic elements of the job to virtual assistants in 
Asia so they could spend more time visiting properties and meeting prospective tenants. 
Most landlords in this group felt that they were operating at the right scale, in the right 
location and with the right financial model. They all preferred concentrated growth in 
particular locations.  
 
‘Local’ housing benefit landlords 
Landlords who were letting to tenants receiving housing benefit were not necessarily doing 
so as a consequence of a broader strategic approach: being local was often intrinsic to a 
landlord’s ability to serve the bottom end of the market. It was most common for portfolio 
housing benefit landlords to operating in their ‘home’ area. Indeed, it was sometimes 
regarded as risky to operate in other markets, without that local knowledge. Furthermore, 
operating locally minimized costs where landlords themselves could handle repairs and 
more effectively self-manage.  
 
Local landlords who were letting at the bottom of the market benefitted substantially from 
having in-depth local knowledge of a particular location. This knowledge might well flow 
from having a business in the local area and being aware of which streets and 
neighbourhoods were more or less desirable to tenants; having word-of-mouth knowledge 
of purchase opportunities; and being keyed in to networks of local tradespeople who could 
be called on at short notice and could be trusted to deliver value for money. Indeed, access 
to reliable trades was noted by many landlords as an essential component of their working 
practices: one small investor ‘out of area’ landlord had floundered when renovations plans 
were entirely undermined by his inability to secure trades at a reasonable price. Expanding 
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too far from a main base was deemed to be a struggle even for a larger mediation 
organization: ‘finding a gas engineer in Cornwall is hard work!’ [National Mediation #1].  
Market knowledge could include an understanding of some very specific local conditions. 
One local authority stakeholder respondent, working in the SE region, said that their local 
BRMA covered multiple settlements including one town that had seen a level of de-
industrialisation. In that area, the BRMA rates were high: market rates for a one-bed studio 
property were generally around £550 pcm but the LHA rate was £693. There were 
opportunities there, but they were generally only known to local landlords: the stakeholder 
commented: ‘a lot of investors I talk to in [place] are from [place]. They know it really well’. 
Even landlords operating in nearby towns had not extended into the area’ [Local Statutory 
#1].  
 
Some of the ‘local’ housing benefit landlords were letting at the bottom of the market 
because they had little alternative. One North West portfolio landlord couple had built their 
portfolio with a substantial input of sweat equity and was in some ways trapped in that 
location. They were unable to purchase elsewhere because their business model relied on 
their labour: ‘but because we do everything, so we do all the repairs and everything and source 
the tenants, it would involve using an estate agent or a letting agent elsewhere and then we'd 
have to pay for repairs and things’ [LL21].  
 
There was a noticeable ‘drift’, particularly amongst the portfolio housing benefit landlords, 
to move out of that market where circumstances allowed. One larger property business 
landlord with 30+ properties had started letting in a South Eastern town in 1999. He stayed 
local: ‘I know all my streets in my area and where I was. So when something came up I 
networked with the agents. I knew my stuff, really, and it kind of built and built’ [LL18]. When 
he started, the LHA rates were slightly above the market rates for the area, but since that 
time have fallen back. His HB lettings have reduced from around 75 per cent of his holdings, 
down to 20 per cent. It was notable that that the ‘local’ portfolio housing benefit landlords 
were more likely to be selling down or consolidating their portfolios, and this trend will be 




Property type played a role in defining investment opportunity. Some professional 
informants commented on a trend towards densification, but property subdivision was only 
feasible in locations with the right kinds of property. One SE local authority said that they 
had a very limited number of HMOs in their area because many of the properties were 
newer-build and only suitable for single-household letting. It is notable that a handful of 
respondent landlords were located in seaside towns and were typically dealing in the 
purchase and refurbishment of small blocks of flats. One landlord operating in the North 
West indicated that they were able to purchase blocks of five flats for around £250,000 with 
each self-contained studio flat achieving a rent of around £100 a week. This was regarded 
as a preferable investment to a three-bedroomed house costing £90,000 and achieving a 
rent of £140 a week. Subdivision could create self-contained one-bed studios which attract 
a higher level of LHA than a room in a shared property. Individuals over the age of 35 are 
entitled to the one-bed rate and constitute a more settled demand group. One stakeholder 
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commented on a trend for some landlords to seek the one-bed rate from all over-35s even if 
the room was shared [National Charity #1]. This strategy was not mentioned by any of the 
respondent landlords, although one did say that they were pushing at the boundaries of the 
regulations around allowable studio sizes.  
 
Landlord respondents dealing with HMOs often commented on the higher level of 
management investment required in dealing with shared property. This was a part of the 
market where success rested on experience. One letting agent chain representative 
commented:  
‘You wouldn't want to be a first-time investor, ploughing all your hard-earned 
savings into your first property investment, into the HMO, unless you absolutely 
knew what that involved. There might be really good returns on it eventually, but 
the hoops you have to jump through in order to get yourself to that position takes a 
lot of work and takes a lot of money.’ [Regional Letting Agent #1]. 
 
There are circumstances in which landlords might configure HMOs to meet demand for 
exempt accommodation and target groups of tenants where the LHA caps do not apply. 
One stakeholder mentioned a weekly rent differential of up to £150 a week. The limited 
nature of regulation in his particular part of the market has been subject to criticism.19 It 
appears that this particular market is strongly spatially concentrated, but none of the 
respondent landlords mentioned it or the prospect of meeting this kind of demand. 
 
 
Factors shaping local opportunities 
 




Some landlords commented on changes in patterns of demand. A handful of landlords 
were living in locations where student demand for ‘street’ property had diminished due to 
rapid growth in purpose-built student accommodation. This meant that some landlords had 
seen their student lettings reduce, and a couple had increased their HB lettings in response. 
Reduced demand was, in some areas, releasing property onto the non-student market and 
this could lead to increased incidence of voids in HMOs.   
 
Local authority intervention 
Local authority intervention in the market could shape landlord behaviours in various ways. 
Market interventions could include the operation of mediation schemes, and these will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 7. One further intervention that shaped the market was local 
authority licensing schemes.  Recent research has indicated that local authorities are 
variable in their commitment to enforcement activity and implement approaches that have 
 
1919 See e.g. T. Raisbeck (2019) Exempt from Responsibility? Ending Social Injustice in the Exempt 
Accommodation Sector, Birmingham: Spring Housing Association. 
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been characterized as ‘light-touch’, ‘hardline’, ‘compliance focused’ and ‘creative’.20 The 
tone set by the local authority frames landlord willingness to be in a particular market. One 
local third sector access scheme mentioned that their work had been made easier by the 
conciliatory approach taken by the local authority on enforcement:  
‘Their general ethos is trying to work in partnership with landlords. So they don't tend 
to come down hard. They will try and work with the landlord or letting agent to 
improve, rather than going after money, and I don't know how that compares to other 
areas. I would imagine that some are very legalistic and are much harder line. Ours 
isn't like that.’ [Local Third Sector Access #1]. 
 
Further research is needed on landlord responses to enforcement activity and licensing. 
Only a handful of the respondent landlords had HMOs, but many were in locations where 
selective licensing was mooted or was in operation at the time of the interview. There were 
variable responses to licensing, in terms of purchase or sale decisions. One business 
landlord who had expanded rapidly in the North East said that he welcomed any measure 
that would push up quality since that would also increase the value of his properties; 
another business landlord, with lettings across the country, had the opposite view, in 
considering that licensing tended to depress areas and prices. Landlords were not unhappy 
with the principle of an enhanced level of scrutiny, and indeed welcomed inspection visits. 
However, some landlords regarded such inspections as unnecessarily nit-picking given 
more egregious contraventions in other parts of the market. A couple of landlords said that 
the mooted introduction of selective licensing was a signal to them to sell their property in 
that location, which they did once the tenancy came to an end.  
 
Short-term letting options 
Some landlords had portfolios that contained holiday homes. These homes were generally 
regarded as self-contained and separate business enterprises that were managed quite 
separately from the longer-term lettings. Many landlord respondents were located in 
coastal areas where it might be expected that holiday letting or short-term rentals would 
be a preferred alternative. However, the location of lettings generally precluded this 
strategy. One local authority respondent commented that holiday lettings along their coast 
tended to be situated in the two smaller and more picturesque towns. Higher rents in those 
locations concentrated lower-rental demand in the area’s bigger city where most landlords 
had their properties. The city looked more obviously deprived, less safe and attracted more 
day-trippers than longer term holiday makers. In the nicer areas of the city, it was admitted 
that a handful of landlords had reconfigured their lettings to meet the short-term letting 




The lower end of the PRS has characteristics that vary substantially across England. The 
creation of LHA rates based on Broad Rental Market Areas creates a ‘guaranteed’ rental 
return. There are locations where particular concentrations of demand create opportunities 
 
20 J. Harris, D. Cowan and A. Marsh (2020) Improving Compliance with Private Rented Regulation, UK 
Collaborative Centre for Housing Evidence: Edinburgh. 
74 
 
for larger portfolio and business landlords to expand into the HB market at scale and to 
operationalize management efficiencies. Opportunities were particularly attractive where 
the LHA rates had drifted above local market rents, in locations where house prices 
remained stagnant. There could be high levels of ‘incoming’ investment to particular 
BRMAs. ‘Local’ HB landlords were also using their local knowledge to ensure efficiencies 
and cost savings. Both sets of landlords were reliant on the existence of properties being 









This chapter focusses on landlord management practices in the housing benefit market. 
This is a part of the market deemed to be most precarious for tenants, who may well be 
negotiating income fluctuation and problems with benefit administration. Private tenants 
in receipt of assistance with housing costs will have been transitioning from LHA to 
Universal Credit which wraps housing assistance other benefits into a single payment, 
administered on-line and through interactions with Jobcentre Plus offices. This sector also 
accommodates highly vulnerable tenants with experience of homelessness and with 
problems relating to mental ill health and addictions. Landlords in the HB market balance 
multiple risks: of rent arrears and tenant default; of tenants causing anti-social behaviour 
and damage to property; and uncertainties around Universal Credit administration. This 
chapter considers how landlord management practices aim to ameliorate those risks. It 
begins by discussing landlord preferences within the HB market, and considers how 
landlords might be reviewing decision-making around those markets.  
 
 
Target housing benefit markets  
 
Investor landlords generally did not target the housing benefit market. This tended to be 
the realm of more experienced portfolio and business landlords. One stakeholder 
commented that landlords at the bottom end of the market ‘will be more professional 
landlords, where they will have multiple units, because dealing with some of the issues that 
come out of that market would take somebody that knows what they’re doing’ [Regional 
Letting Agent #2]. It was clearly the case that landlords who were in the HB market were 
fully conversant with the benefit system: this was a key competency in mitigating risk. 
Business landlords often employed people who had worked in social housing. One landlord 
said that their partner had worked in housing benefit administration. Enhanced knowledge 
of the benefit system meant that landlords did not necessarily view the benefit market as 
homogenous: distinctions were made between different types of tenant.  
 
‘Working’ housing benefit 
Landlords distinguished tenants who were working but receiving some level of benefit to 
top up their earned income: they were ‘benefit supported’ rather than wholly benefit 
dependent. Many of the landlords who were inadvertently letting to benefit claimants were 
generally letting to benefit-supported tenants. For the most part, landlords viewed this 
group favourably since being in work was a signal that a tenant’s life was sufficiently stable 
to sustain a long-term tenancy; this kind of tenant required no support; and they could be 
relied on to resolve their own benefit issues. However, movement in and out of work and 
subsequent changes in benefit amount could contribute to the risk of the tenant falling into 
arrears. One national charity noted: ‘We’re seeing that all the time, that significant challenge 
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A second group was tenants who were wholly dependent on benefits for their income, but 
who were not working. This group might include single-parent families where the children 
were very young; households containing individuals with some kind of physical disability; 
and older households receiving pension credits. Many landlords favoured these groups, 
since combined UC, disability and child benefit income could be high compared with a 
lower-income working tenant, particularly in a low-wage areas. Here, predictability was 
regarded favourably. Further, this group generally comprised settled households seeking 
long-term tenancies, were largely independent, often had a strong local connection and 
needed little in the way of active support.  
 
Vulnerable tenants 
A third group was tenants who had some level of vulnerability. This might include 
experience of homelessness, problems with addictions and mental ill health. This group 
was regarded as being highly unstable, more likely to fall into arrears and more likely to 
cause anti-social behaviour and damage property. This kind of tenant required landlords to 
have appropriate management practices in place to support tenants and manage the 
associated risk. At the same time, it was thought appropriate that tenants in this group 
would be satisfied with quite basic and functional accommodation, which limited the costs 
of refurbishing at the end of each tenancy.  
 
Nominated tenants 
A final, cross-cutting group was tenants who were nominated by councils or by third sector 
access schemes either as a discharge of homelessness duty or through a temporary 
accommodation arrangement. In this latter case, the nomination might well be an out-of-
borough placement. This kind of tenant may well present with multiple challenges and risks 
but those risks to the landlord were mediated by the nominating agency. Passing reference 
will be made to these kinds of arrangement here, but they will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 7. 
 
 
Letting to housing benefit recipients 
 
In discussing their HB lettings, landlords tended to comment on three areas of practice: 
setting the rent, the payment of shortfalls and arrears; managing claims; and tenant 
support. Practices varied according to the target tenant group within the housing benefit 
market. All these accounts indicated the play of a distinctive dynamic in the HB market: 
that is, the value placed by landlords on good tenants in areas where property might be in 
oversupply. Landlords with lower-value properties were not necessarily in a position to 
market those properties to alternative higher-paying renters, which meant there was a 
greater emphasis on creating tenancies that were sustainable and with limited turnover.  
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Rent setting, shortfalls and arrears 
Universal Credit is paid after a period of delay, and always in arrears. Tenants are paid the 
LHA rate defined by their household size. Rates have been frozen since April 2016.21 In 
areas where the landlord may be charging a rent above the LHA rate, tenants are required 
to pay the shortfall. These features of housing benefit mean that landlords who are 
routinely letting in the benefit market are obliged to modify their management practices 
accordingly.  
 
Some landlords who were operating in less heavily benefit-dominated markets sometimes 
indicated that their rents for HB tenants had increased as – over time – the LHA rates fell 
some way behind market rents. These increases were generally pegged at a sum slightly 
above the LHA rate, leaving a shortfall of £10 or £20 a month.  
 
Most of the respondent landlords were operating in locations where the market rents and 
the LHA levels were very close. In these circumstances landlords usually charged tenants 
the LHA rate with no requirement to pay any shortfall since there was little point: ‘it’s a bit 
of a hiding to nothing, because they didn’t have it’ [LL18]. Another portfolio landlord, 
operating in Humberside, was equally blunt: ‘it’s easier that the rent is the housing benefit 
because if you want an extra £5 a week, my god, you’d spent that in phone calls alone getting 
it. It’s just easier not to, frankly’ [LL82]. Landlords operating in depressed areas had not 
experienced rent increases for many years: one portfolio landlord couple, operating in the 
North West said they had to be pragmatic:  
‘I think landlords are trying to push up the rent a little bit, maybe say £50 a month or 
something like that, or even £100 a month, but we have found that people just can't 
afford it. You can ask what you want, really, can't you? You can say it's, I don't know, 
a £700-a-month-house, but if somebody is only getting that £530, they can't afford 
£170 top up. So we're quite realistic and we haven't changed our rents, have we, for 
years?’ [LL21]. 
 
There was also a reluctance to increase the rents because doing so might provoke a tenant 
having to reapply for UC: it was not worth jeopardising the tenancy for the sake of a small 
incremental gain.  
 
For some landlords, matching the rent to the LHA payment could undermine tenants’ 
understanding of their responsibility to pay the rent. One property business landlord 
arranged a payment schedule with tenants from the start of the tenancy, ensuring that the 
initial period of delay was repaid. This measure was rather more about setting a tone than 
achieving the payment: ‘I’m not really bothered about them paying it off. It’s more that 
there’s that commitment that they accept that it’s their responsibility to pay the rent’ [LL6]. 
Another landlord was similarly forthright, in offering shared rooms £10 a week above the 
LHA rate. In his view, this tactic helped to define the tenants who were more likely to take 
the property seriously since the payment constituted their investment in the tenancy. 
 
Larger business landlords often directly employed lettings managers who dealt with rent 
payments and arrears in a proactive fashion. The approach tended to combine a limited 
 
21 The recent Covid-related revision to LHA rates is discussed in Chapter 8. 
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tolerance for unscheduled missed payments but a high degree of flexibility where tenants 
were upfront about difficulties they might be having. Landlords who had long-standing 
tenants were often very aware of a tenants’ financial circumstances and the degree to 
which they might be trusted to make up arrears following a missed payment. One large 
property business landlord commented that he had a tenant who was short with her rent by 
£100 every December, and every year they agreed that she could make up the difference 
with an additional payment over the following four months. Where landlords were letting 
to vulnerable tenants, this degree of loyalty could extend to tolerance of inconsistent 
payments, again where the tenant was well-known to the landlord.  One portfolio landlord, 
with several HMO lettings, said that his letting agent had been unhappy with his decision to 
let one of his more chaotic tenants fall four months behind with the rent: 
‘I said I know he’s all right. He’ll pay it. He’ll pay it. I quite like [name]. He’s a bit 
bonkers but, you know, I know what he’s like, he’s been there years. It’ll be all right 
and it was, he’s now back up to date. He’s back up to being two weeks behind again’ 
[LL52]. 
 
Landlord experience of arrears was variable, as was their attitude towards tenants falling 
behind with the rent. It was felt to be particularly difficult to resolve arrears issues 
satisfactorily where the tenant was in receipt of benefit. One letting agent characterised 
recovering arrears from a benefit tenant as ‘a world of pain’ [Regional Letting Agent #1], 
since their income was so low. One small portfolio landlord commented: ‘it was unlikely 
that costs in the thousands would ever be recouped from an ex-tenant paying £5 a week. You 
can’t get blood out of a stone’ [LL11].  
 
Where arrears did arise, the more experienced housing benefit landlords were likely to 
write them off. However, all landlords aimed to counter arrears building by putting 
prevention measures in place. It was felt that the most effective measure was to ensure 
that the tenant prioritised the rent payment because they knew they would be unlikely to 
find alternative accommodation that had a similarly sympathetic landlord or property in 
reasonable condition. Landlords and tenants both knew that ‘the alternative is temporary 
accommodation or a B&B with lots of drunks and druggies’ [LL94]. Larger portfolio and 
business landlords instituted quite active tenancy management which included swift 
intervention when a tenant missed a rent payment, with the objective of resolving the 
problem before the arrears mounted.  
 
Another risk-mitigating strategy in place across all landlord types was requiring tenants to 
provide a working and/or home-owning guarantor who would agree to repay any owed rent 
at the end of a tenancy. In one landlord’s view, it was more effective to have a parent as a 
guarantor than to ask for a deposit even: ‘It’s much better to say, I’m going to ring your mum’ 
[LL31]. Some landlords mentioned taking guarantors to court, commenting that this 
offered a greater degree of certainty that arrears would be repaid and repaid more quickly.  
 
Managing LHA/UC claims 
Managing the transition from LHA to UC was deemed to be remarkably problematic. One 
experienced social lettings agency commented: ‘We know the language and we know what 
we’re doing, and it’s still difficult’. In their view, there were many landlords and tenants with 
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‘no idea’, and where the landlord had no understanding of how to support the tenant 
financially [Local Third Sector Access#1]. Most respondent landlords had rather more 
experience of dealing with this part of the market and had often been actively involved in 
LHA claims. The introduction of UC brought a change. Landlords generally agreed with the 
principle that tenants should take responsibility but also made the pragmatic assertion that 
some claimants were incapable of managing their own affairs, were confused by the fact 
that rental payments were included with other benefits, and powerless to deal with 
unexpected shortfalls in their payments which made it difficult to budget.  
 
Many landlords had built close working relationships with local authority housing benefit 
staff and found it remarkably difficult forge new connections with their local Jobcentre. It 
had become impossible for landlords to offer their tenants any support with their benefit, 
even where the tenant actively wanted that support. Almost all the landlords in the housing 
benefit market cited cases of individuals who had found UC very difficult to understand and 
who were stressed by the transition. One landlord cited his recent experience with a tenant:  
‘He rang me up in a state and he said, “I can't manage it myself”. I said to him, “Have 
you spoken to the council? Have you been to them and spoken to them and said you 
can't do this?” and he said, “Yes. I've been to the Jobcentre and they've turned 
round and said to me that I have to learn how to do it myself”. He was just 
absolutely past himself’ [LL97]. 
 
Many of the landlords discussed the transition from LHA to UC in a largely negative fashion, 
and this was particularly the case where landlords had been used to LHA. Landlords have 
recourse to Alternative Payment Arrangements (APAs) where tenants have fallen behind 
with their rent or were in some way incapable of managing their own financial affairs. APAs 
are payable where tenants are eight weeks in arrears. This extended period was, in itself, 
considered to be highly problematic. One landlord commented that, by the time the APA 
was put in place, tenants might be so far in arrears that they might feel overwhelmed by 
debt and simply abscond. Landlords were generally of the view that this level of arrears was 
unrecoverable.  
 
Landlords could be positive about the possibility of arranging direct payments to 
themselves. In one landlord’s view it was ‘a little safety net’ which was not available in the 
case of working tenants [LL13]. Where landlords had actually applied for APAs, their views 
were less positive. In one investor landlord’s experience, the UC47 form had proved difficult 
to work through: ‘nobody from Universal Credit will speak to you even if the tenants has just 
phoned up and said “Please speak to my landlord, it’s too much for me”. They just won’t do it, 
it’s just awful’ [LL26]. There was general agreement that there was little support available 
to landlords seeking APAs. Landlords who only occasionally let to a tenant receiving UC 
were unlikely to ‘learn’ the system: some who were tolerant of benefit claimants admitted 
that they simply did not understand how the benefit worked.  
 
Larger portfolio and business landlords were more likely to see APAs as central to their 
business plan. One landlord made it a requirement for tenants themselves to set up APAs at 
the start of the tenancy. He would tell them: ‘why complicate it? Send it direct to me. The 
accommodation is secure then, isn’t it?’ [LL94]. Other landlords were rather less coercive and 
put support measures in place. One property business landlord, operating in the North East, 
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had established relationships with job coaches at the Jobcentre Plus offices. Indeed, this 
measure was deemed central to success in working with more vulnerable tenants on UC: 
having job coaches ‘on side’ meant that it was possible to expedite claims and deal with 
queries relating to individual tenants. It might then also become possible to establish from 
the outset that a particular tenant had support needs or addictions that might justify a 
UC47 application to set up an APA. Where landlords had positive experiences of APAs, it 
was more likely that they would seek tenants where an APA was guaranteed. Here, a 
balance was being struck between the higher support need of the tenant and the certainty 
of a direct payment. 
  
Other landlords distrusted APAs as a means of reducing risk associated with a problematic 
tenant. Some landlords mentioned that tenants were simply able to revert the payment 
back to themselves at any juncture and with no notice. One small portfolio landlord, with 
properties in Humberside, said that tenants found it easy to cancel an APA: ‘It’s dangerous 
for us now because if we do step on them [i.e. the tenant] firmly they can go straight to 
Universal Credit and say “I don’t want it paid directly to the landlord any more”’ [LL82]. 
 
Tenant support 
Landlord investment of time in tenant support depended very much on tenant need. One 
stakeholder commented that ‘there are more buy-to-let landlords who are good social 
workers than there are rogue ones actually. But I don't have the numbers for that’ [Lender 
#4]. Landlords themselves often commented on the level of support they offered: ‘I’ve been 
involved with the police, sorting out their benefit claims, helping them fill out the forms, 
putting them in, keeping them right on the payments, all that kind of stuff. The council doesn’t 
help their tenants to that extent, but we do’ [LL74].  
 
Another landlord concurred, saying that he took ‘a social worker kind of role. You’ve got to 
look after them a bit more and do above and beyond what most landlords are prepared to do 
[LL6]. Many landlords who were familiar with the benefit system helped their tenants with 
the initial application and in sorting out glitches that might arise as the tenancy progressed. 
There was often a conscious decision to draw a line regarding more vulnerable tenants with 
mental health problems. One property business landlord said they were simply ‘not trained 
for that’, and such tenants were likely to prove disruptive and difficult in a HMO context, 
which made up the bulk of their lettings.  
 
Other landlords actively chose to work with tenants with more challenging behaviours. One 
investor landlord was a retired policeman who, at the time of the interview, had wound 
down his lettings to just two properties. Over his lettings career he had tended to work with 
tenants who had problems:  
‘I don't want to use the word 'lower', but their end of the rental scale, and they tend 
to be the ones with problems. They drink too much, they take drugs. You might not 
think so at the beginning, but you find out they do later. They had a job, they don't 
anymore. They have relationship problems more. They tend to be more 
problematic, more hands on, and these type of people, they're not skilled in the art 
of managing money, it seems to me. As a landlord, I spend a lot of my time doing 




A housing options officer in a Yorkshire & Humberside borough said that they routinely 
worked with a landlord who was tolerant of tenants who drank heavily: ‘They'd drink maybe 
20 cans of beer at day and at some point in the week, he'd have to go in and bail out all the 
rubbish, and he was quite prepared to do that’. The landlord did not charge his tenants 
anything above the LHA rate, and would often sell them electric cards:  
‘He's often saying, 'Well, they haven't got the money this month, but they're giving 
me double next month” and they always do. He's never not had the money back. It's 
an absolutely different way of doing it with tenants, the trust, the relationship, the 
clients, all different’ [Local Statutory #3].  
 
Another business landlord, operating in the North East, also chose to target highly 
vulnerable tenants and worked with local authority homelessness teams. The landlord 
acknowledged that these tenants required intensive support: ‘They’ve come through part of 
the care system, or they’ve just come out of prison, or some of them have, literally, just arrived 
in the country. It’s full-time, it’s not something you can just sit back on’ [LL6]. He placed 
tenants with addition problems in a ‘probationary’ HMO, which they could move out from if 
they took their methadone and caused no problems. This landlord employed a tenancy 
manager who had worked in social housing, whose role was very much angled towards 
tenant support rather than rent collection and whose approach to rent arrears was to seek a 
resolution:  
‘He’s not a debt collector. He doesn’t go banging on the door. He goes in to discuss 
it, and it’s usually a mistake that Universal Credit have made. So he’ll sit there for an 
hour or so, phone Universal Credit with them and see what the issue is to try and 
resolve it’ [LL6]. 
 
 
Changing the target HB market 
 
Many landlords with HB lettings were reviewing their target market within the wider group 
of claimants and altering their letting preferences accordingly. This movement within the 
HB market reflected landlords’ early experiences of UC and their ability to negotiate the 
risks attached to letting to particular tenant groups. Some landlords were moving out of 
the housing benefit market altogether, and they will be discussed in Chapter 9. Other 
landlords had property in locations where it was difficult to identify an alternative demand 
group. In these cases, five strategies were in evidence. 
 
Reducing lettings to unemployed tenants 
One approach was to reduce lettings to tenants who might be benefit dependent but still 
accept benefit-supported applicants. In these cases, landlords continued to let at LHA 
rates, but only accept working tenants, those who could provide a landlord reference 
and/or a guarantor or insist on rent in advance and a deposit. It was felt that this strategy 
decreased the risk of letting to a tenant who might fall into rent arrears and being in work 
was generally taken as a signal that the tenant would not pose ASB problems. The strategy 
also very definitely transferred all benefit application responsibility to the tenant, with 
landlords expecting to treat the claiming tenant the same as any other tenant. 
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Reducing lets to vulnerable tenants 
In some instances, landlords were reducing the number of lettings to tenants at the more 
vulnerable end of the spectrum. This might include a reduction in lettings to tenants with 
support needs who were nominated by local authorities or third sector agencies. These 
landlords also felt able to shift their preference to ‘benefit supported’ working tenants who 
were able to pay some deposit, a first month’s rent and provide a guarantor. Often, this 
change in approach reflected a landlord’s unwilling to risk losing other tenants in a shared 
property, where the addition of a more vulnerable tenant might prove to be disruptive.  
 
Increasing lets to vulnerable tenants 
By contrast, some of the larger landlords might more actively pursue letting to vulnerable 
tenants, given the guarantee of an APA. This measure was workable where the landlord 
was highly benefit-knowledgeable and operating at sufficient scale to employ support staff.  
 
Seeking to work with intermediaries 
Other landlords had taken the decision only to accept more vulnerable tenants where an 
intermediary agency has nominated the tenant and put a support package in place. This 





The respondent landlords who were letting to tenants in receipt of housing benefit were 
modifying their letting practices accordingly. Many were setting rents at or close to the 
LHA rate, assisting tenants with claims and giving tenant support depending on their level 
of vulnerability. This chapter underlines the time-intensive management challenges which 
can be associated with dealing with tenants in this part of the market. Many of the 
landlords had been fully conversant with the LHA system of HB delivery, and did not 
welcome the introduction of UC; further discussion of landlord portfolio decisions to leave 
the HB market in response to this change is included in Chapter 9. Where landlords were 
choosing to remain within the HB market, there could be a shift in letting preferences away 
from tenants who were deemed to carry the highest levels of risk. However, some landlords 
targeted the more vulnerable groups, as these tenants were more likely to be able to secure 









Continued property supply to the bottom end of the PRS rests on landlords’ ability to 
minimise risk. The preceding chapters have indicated that landlords tend to target different 
parts of the HB market, and adjust their risk mitigation strategies accordingly. This chapter 
focuses on the role of letting agents at the bottom end of the market. Agents play a largely 
unacknowledged role in framing letting behaviours, and either can operate in ways that 
absorb risk and facilitate supply to the bottom end of the market or – conversely – dissuade 
landlords from letting to households receiving benefit. The chapter also considers the 
operation of mediating agencies: statutory or third sector schemes that place tenants with 
landlords and offer varying degrees of tenant support. These schemes also carry the 
potential of ameliorating some of the risks associated with the HB market. Respondent 
landlord experiences of such schemes varied substantially. The development of a distinctive 
market in meeting Temporary Accommodation (TA) and exempt accommodation is also 
touched on this chapter. The chapter ends by considering one additional risk-absorbing 
strategy: landlord use of rent insurance products.    
 
 
Letting agents in the HB market 
 
All letting agents carry the potential to guide landlords towards or away from certain parts 
of the market. Many would argue that they would put information on all prospective 
tenants in front of a landlord and then – in one letting agent’s view – ‘it’s  up to them to 
make the decision’ [National Letting Agent #2], but most will have vetted all the applicants 
down to a handful from which the landlord would choose. The same letting agent argued 
that ‘If we are acting in the landlord’s best interests, we would want to find him [sic] a lower-
risk tenant’ [National Letting Agent #2].  
 
Limited statistical information is available on the overall shape of the letting agent market 
in the UK. The industry includes high-street operators including national and regional 
chains, businesses set up under franchise, independents and lettings undertaken as part of 
estate agency business; on-line agents and letting and management services, and less 
formal agency services that landlords themselves might sell to other landlords.22 The PLS 
included data collected from letting agents but did not provide any information on the type 
of agents that responded. Nevertheless, the aggregated statistics are useful in highlighting 
some bigger trends.  
 
The Private Landlord Survey (PLS) indicated that 44.9 per cent of landlords were currently 
using a letting agent to find tenants, and 13.1 per cent were using agents for a fuller 
management services. Given letting agents’ reach in the rental market, it is appropriate to 
 
22 Covid restrictions severely compromised proposed interviews with letting agents, and so much of this 
chapter reflects on landlord use of letting agents.  
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consider their tenant preferences. Agents were rather less likely than landlords to indicate 
that they were not willing to let to people in receipt of HB or LHA: 31.9 per cent of agents 
expressed this preference compared with 51.1 per cent of landlords. The survey asked all 
respondents ‘why are you not willing to let to people who are receiving HB, LHA or UC’, 
directed at all those who indicated their reluctance in previous questions. Respondents 
were given a range of possible answers, to which they replied ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (Table 7.1). It is 
notable that many of the reasons were expressed by roughly the same proportion of 
landlords and agents, although there were two marked differences. Agents were much 
more likely to say that mortgage or insurance company restrictions were a reason for an 
unwillingness to let to benefit recipients (40.9 per cent of agents compared with 25.9 per 
cent of landlords). For agents, it might be presumed that insurance companies rather than 
mortgage providers were playing a greater role in defining tenant choice.  
 
A second marked difference related to unwillingness to let to people receiving the named 
benefits because of lack of knowledge or experience of those benefits. This was the case for 
18.7 per cent of landlords, but only 6.2 per cent of agents.  
 
 
Table 7.1: Why are you not willing to let to people who are receiving Housing  
 Benefit, Local Housing Allowance or Universal Credit?  
 Respondents agreeing with the 
reason [more than one reason could 
be given] (%) 
 Agents Landlords 
Risk that these benefits will not cover all the 
rent/government cap on the maximum amount that people 





Greater risk of delays in payment or unpaid rent 75.8 69.2 
Benefits are paid directly to the tenant and not to the 
landlord or agent 
64.0 58.5 
Greater risk of disturbance or anti-social behaviour or 
damage to property or furnishings 
47.9 55.0 
Too much paperwork or problems with administration 31.2 32.3 
I have no knowledge or experience of these benefits 6.1 18.7 
Mortgage or insurance company restrictions 40.9 25.9 
Source: MHCLG English Private Landlord Survey 2018 
 
 
Overall, 68.1 per cent of letting agents indicated that they were willing to let to people 
receiving Housing Benefit or Local Housing Allowance, compared with 51.1 per cent of 
landlords. At the time of the survey, a lower proportion was actually letting to Housing 
Benefit or Local Housing Allowance recipients (Table 7.2). A much smaller proportion were 
letting to people in receipt of Universal Credit, but this low figure reflects the limited roll-









Yes No Yes No 
People in receipt of Housing Benefit or Local Housing 
Allowance 
23.6 76.4 56.4 43.6 
People in receipt of Universal Credit 9.7 90.3 36.0 64.0 
Source: MHCLG English Private Landlord Survey 2018 
 
 
Letting agent experiences in the HB market 
The stakeholder interviews included a small handful of agents operating at local, regional 
and national levels, and two social lettings agencies. Covid restrictions created difficulties in 
recruiting agents for this research, and so it has not been possible to frame a wider 
narrative account of this part of the market. Nevertheless, themes did emerge from this 
small group of respondents which indicated that further research would be fruitful and 
necessary in understanding how letting agent practices frame behaviours at the bottom of 
the market.  
 
• All letting agents mentioned that their arrangements included some long-standing 
relationships with particular landlords. Arriving at a satisfactory working 
arrangement with a trusted agent could encourage some landlords to expand their 
holdings. 
• Letting agents commented on the ‘No DSS’ regulations and criticized other agents 
who they knew operated restrictive policies. One national chain with branch offices 
where HB lettings were routine said that ‘you have to look at each individual case, 
you have to look at the landlord, the property, the area and the person’s income’ 
before making a judgment about a particular tenant’s suitability [National Letting 
Agent #1].  
• Agents were not necessarily proactive in seeking property improvement. One 
national agent mentioned ‘disinstructing’ landlords whose properties were below 
standard but said that other agents would be prepared to take those landlords. 
Another independent agent operating in a HB-dominated market admitted that 
they worked for landlords with ‘grotty’ property, including one landlord who had 
been done for ‘dodgy dealing’ [Local Letting Agent #2].  
• Letting agents reported frustration in dealing with the Universal Credit system. 
Agents often had multiple tenants receiving Universal Credit, with multiple 
landlords. It was not always easy to match tenants to payments, and securing 
clarification was remarkably difficult:  
‘I went on to the [web]site. You can’t….it took me about 20 minutes to find 
the telephone number, because they don't want you to find it. I don't have 
access to the portal because I'm not a tenant, but I still have somebody's 
money here. Then when you ring through, there's no one - it's just a general 
number, so you don't really know who you're going to get, and there was like 




These kinds of experience are likely to tip a letting agent against selecting a prospective 
tenant in receipt of Universal Credit, all other things being equal.  
 
Landlord use of letting agents   
The PLS indicated that letting agents are playing a substantial role in relation to benefit-
supported tenancies. Recourse to an agent appears commonplace irrespective of the type 
of landlord although there was differential use depending on the required services. 
Landlords who defined their employment as being ‘self-employed as landlords’ were more 
likely to use letting agents simply to find tenants and set up tenancies. However, landlords 
who were currently letting to people in receipt of HB were more likely to be using letting 
agents to manage property (Table 7.3).  
 
This finding appears to run counter to a presumption that lettings at the bottom of the 
market make insufficient gain to be able to pay a percentage of the rent to an agent, and 
given the financial models outlined in Chapter 4. However, it is highly likely that this 
proportion reflects the practices of HB-tolerant small investor landlords, which was a big 
group amongst the qualitative respondents. Chapter 4 indicated that these landlords were 
not necessarily seeking to maximise their rental return by minimising cost and were happy 
to pay to shift the burden of active management. This was particularly necessary where 
holdings were some distance away from where they lived. 
 
 





All landlords currently 
letting to people in receipt 
of HB or LHA1 





Yes 44.9 42.0 48.3 
No 55.1 58.0 51.7 
For management 
services 
Yes 13.1 16.7 13.5 
No 86.9 83.3 86.5 
1 Lettings will not exclusively be to that group. 
Source: MHCLG English Private Landlord Survey 2018.  
 
 
The qualitative interviews also indicated that portfolio landlords with a background in 
building or other trades often relied on agents to deal with the bureaucracy of letting and 
management. One portfolio landlord who was expanding in the North East said that he was 
happy to pay the agent fees, so as to be sure of regulatory compliance: ‘I can be a bit 
lackadaisical. I know they’re just dotting the ‘i’s and crossing the ‘t’s for me and it’s money well 
spent’ [LL13]; another landlord expressed a similar sentiment: ‘I’m not a gifted administrator 
to be honest. I can’t be bothered to do all that stuff! I’m happy to pay an agent that I know 
who knows the market very well’ [LL4]. 
 
The landlords who were less likely to use agents were those whose personal competencies 
included an aptitude for or understanding of bureaucratic and legal processes. Some 
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landlords started by using letting agents – indeed, one aspiring portfolio landlord worked 
for a letting agent for a short period, in order to understand the job – and then increasingly 
self-managed as their understanding increased. Some of the more experienced landlords 
commented that they generally knew more than the letting agents they had approached 
with property. Use of letting agent might also reflect stages in the life course: busy 
employed investor landlords might lack the time, even if they did have the knowledge, and 
some began to self-manage on retirement from paid work. 
 
Letting agents clearly played a role in absorbing some of the management responsibility for 
landlords who might otherwise lack the time or capability. It is uncertain how far an 
individual landlord’s tolerance for a household receiving benefits translated to their agent 
then letting to someone in that position. Landlords who were unsure about the benefit 
status of their tenants were generally using an agent. The PLS figures indicate that agents, 
as a group, are perhaps rather more attuned to HB processes and have more experience in 
this kind of letting than do landlords as a group. Furthermore, letting agents tended to 
operate at some distance from the core risks which frame landlord behaviour: the PLS 
indicates that just 6.8 per cent of letting agents were worried about financial issues related 
to letting, compared with 36.9 per cent of landlords, and 8.3 per cent were worried about 
legislative change, compared with 57 per cent of landlords. On balance, therefore, it seems 






In addition to letting agents, a range of mediating agencies and initiatives work to secure 
PRS tenancies for households on lower incomes and with variable levels of vulnerability and 
support need. ‘Help to rent’ or access schemes have been in operation since the early 
1990s. Many third sector schemes are in operation across England, and range in scale from 
small, local homelessness charities offering help with deposits up to large-scale operators 
that run social lettings agencies and purchase properties in ways that are very similar to the 
operation of large-scale business property landlords.  
 
In addition, councils often seek to place tenants in the private rented sector, working with a 
range of clients and in different circumstances. These circumstances reflect the level of 
immediate assistance and on-going support required by the tenant and the legal 
framework underpinning the placement. Arrangements include: 
 
• Homelessness prevention strategies that include assistance given to tenants with 
the setting up of a tenancy, including help with rent in advance, deposit guarantees 
or loans; 
• Placement of an individual or family with varying levels of support need, to relieve 
their homelessness under the Homelessness Reduction Act, which often includes 
some on-going tenancy support; 
• Placement of an individual who has experience of street homelessness, and who 
may well have intensive support needs reflecting alcohol and drug addictions; and 
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• London boroughs seeking ‘out of borough’ Temporary Accommodation (TA) 
placements.  
 
Size and reach of the mediated market 
It is appropriate to consider the ‘mediated market’ at a distinctive segment within the 
bottom end of the PRS.23 Data on the size of the mediated market and change over time is 
difficult to establish. The reporting of homelessness statistics changed in April 2018: the 
Homelessness Reduction Act replaced the P1E aggregated data return and introduced the 
new 'H-CLIC' (Homelessness Case Level Information Collection) system.24 Recent H-CLIC 
returns indicate a heavy reliance on the PRS to provide temporary accommodation (TA) in a 
range of guises. Overall, 21 per cent of TA need in the quarter ending June 2019 was met by 
making direct use of LA or HA housing stock, but 26 per cent of need was met through use 
of 'nightly paid' self-contained accommodation which is generally regarded as the most 
lucrative option for private sector providers.  
 
There is a high level of variability across regions: London dominates the TA market in terms 
of overall numbers: 66 per cent of all households in TA live in Greater London. London 
boroughs also make heavy use of the PRS in various forms: 85 per cent of TA households 
are in non-HA/LA stock. In the North East region, this figure is 46 per cent. London is also 
more likely to make heavier use of ‘nightly paid’ arrangements: 32 per cent of TA 
households were in this form of accommodation; in the North East, where reliance on the 
PRS was similarly high, just 3 per cent of households were in nightly paid accommodation. 
A relatively high level for TA in the North West largely reflects the dominating influence of 
the Manchester market. Overall, despite the proportion of TA households in the PRS being 
high and increasing over time, the numbers remain low relative to overall demand for 
accommodation at the bottom of the market. However, the uneven nature of TA demand 
creates 'hot spots', particularly in the capital. 
 
The Localism Act permits local authorities to discharge their statutory duty to house with 
the offer of a 12-month PRS tenancy. Overall, the percentage of households helped in this 
way did not change over the five quarters Q3 2018 to Q3 2019 (around 40 per cent of 
households approaching the authority as homeless) but there is regional difference in this 
percentage. Taking the four quarters from Oct 2018 to Sep 2019, the North East region 
discharged its duty into the PRS for around 30 per cent of households; in London, this 
percentage was close to double, at 59 per cent. Indeed, there is a rough North/South 
regional split. The year Oct 2018 to Sep 2019 saw a total of 31,260 households moving into 
the PRS due to local authority intervention via the Localism Act. 
 
Overall, a rough estimate might indicate that the statutory sector-related mediated market 
constitutes around 10-15 per cent of the HB market overall. This is likely to be an under-
estimate. Statutory routes into a PRS facility are also arranged by social services and by the 
 
23 J. Rugg and D. Rhodes (2018) The Evolving Private Rented Sector: Its Contribution and Potential, York: Centre 
for Housing Policy, 132ff. 





probation services and are not recorded in the H-CLIC data. This data also excludes ‘exempt 
accommodation’, which comprises private sector supported HMOs for vulnerable tenants 
in receipt of housing benefit. The statutory data do not include the range of schemes 
operated by the voluntary sector also operates a range of 'help-to-rent' schemes, again 
with varying levels of coverage across the country.  
 
In addition, there are substantial regional differences and big differences between local 
authorities. Some local authorities make heavier use of the PRS under the Localism Act, 
particularly if the local authority has no access to alternative lettings in the social sector. 
Stakeholder interviews indicated that some local authorities were beginning to bundle all 
their PRS procurement into single, large contracts. One commercial stakeholder worked for 
a company that fulfilled those contracts. The company tended to focus on locations with 
heavy mediated PRS demand and where meeting that demand would secure higher LHA 
rates from TA-related HB, possibly including an incentive with the contract, and also bundle 
together a level of ‘exempt accommodation’ provision. This company tended not to work 
with local landlords and instead met need through the direct purchase of existing and new 
properties, often using ‘patient capital’ provided by large-scale institutional funding.  
 
A second stakeholder had also been part of a larger consortium that had secured a 
procurement contract for PRS tenancies from the local authority, but in this instance was 
working with a range of third-sector charities. Again, the consortium was benefitting from 
the higher LHA rates that were payable under the agreed procurement model although in 
this case the stakeholder was fulfilling the contract by working with local landlords. 
 
Little research has been undertaken on the ways in which the mediated market is 
developing, and the ways in which this market might inflate rents and so trap tenants in 
benefit dependency. 
 
Mediating agencies and the landlord ‘offer’ 
Interviews with professional informants included two social letting agencies and two 
statutory access schemes. In all these cases, the schemes sought to nurture and develop 
their landlord relationships. Schemes mentioned long-standing arrangements lasting ten 
years or more. A good landlord was ‘hoarded’: one interviewee joked that they were 
unwilling to share landlord contact details even with colleagues: 'I found one on Facebook 
and he's mine! I'm not going to tell anybody else about him, because it is like gold dust’ [Local 
third sector access #1]. 
 
Schemes were clearly of the view that they could serve two major functions for the 
landlord: a more ‘bespoke’ tenant-find service; and tenancy support that included setting 
up the Universal Credit application and arranging direct payments to the landlord. One SLA 
working in the south stressed that they worked much more carefully, particularly compared 
with TA providers ‘who are just very keen to move people on without thinking about how 
sustainable it is or if they're ready and stuff, but we try and only move people on that are 
ready’ [Local third sector SLA #1]. In tenant matching, agencies felt for the landlord’s 
tolerances and ensured that the tenant was entirely appropriate for the property that was 
available. There was a clear understanding that getting a placement wrong jeopardised not 
just the tenancy, but the agency’s relationship with the landlord and all potential future 
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lettings. There was some frustration that poorly-functioning mediating agencies were 
‘muddying the waters’ for good mediation schemes, an observation which was borne out in 
the landlord interviews, below. 
 
A second element of the mediating scheme offer is dealing with Universal Credit 
bureaucracy. In some locations, access schemes had been ‘early adopters’ in absorbing the 
niceties of the Universal Credit regulations to arrive at a point where they were fully 
conversant with the complexities of the benefit and its local administration. Schemes were 
able to offer verification that a tenant had a ‘tier 1’ reason for an APA which meant that 
direct payment could be arranged from the outset. Access schemes were also forging 
working protocols with local Vulnerable Customer Leads at their local Jobcentre Plus: one 
SLA mentioned that a colleague had gone down to the JobCentre Plus office to meet with 
work coaches and explain their service and how they were supporting tenant applications 
for APAs.  
 
Mediating schemes were therefore able to sidestep some of the difficulties that landlords 
were encountering with Universal Credit. However, it was also the case that mediating 
agencies might – like letting agents – find themselves working with landlords who had less 
salubrious properties. Schemes that were placing tenants who had addiction difficulties 
sometimes used landlords whose properties were not in the best condition. This created 
opportunities for landlords with poorer quality HMOs and smaller studio flats. Two of the 
larger business landlords were working routinely with mediating schemes. They operated in 
different parts of the country and dealt principally with more vulnerable tenants placed in 
HMOs. These landlords were unusual in being reluctant to talk in detail about their letting 
practices and were rather more cynical about their HB tenants than was unusual across the 
landlords who were interviewed.25  
 
It is not the purpose of this research to offer an independent evaluation of the role of 
mediating agencies in supporting tenancies at the bottom end of the market. Many local 
authorities were delivering this kind of scheme under acute budgetary pressure, which 
might well explain the tenor of some landlord experiences. The following section discusses 
those experiences and how this kind of arrangement influenced landlord letting decisions. 
   
Landlord use of mediating agencies 
Recourse to a mediating scheme is low across all landlords but higher for landlords with HB 
lettings. The PLA asked landlords who did not use an agent which method the used to 
secure their most recent letting, and just 0.9 per cent had contacted the local authority or 
council. However, in the case of landlords who had a HB/UC tenant, this figure was 8.6 per 
cent.  
 
Landlord respondents were usually aware that it might be possible to secure tenants 
nominated by the local council, and a handful also mentioned a local homelessness charity. 
Landlords usually had strong opinions about such schemes. As might be expected, the 
 
25 An unwillingness to discuss finance, business and management practices is no indicator of illegality. 
However, these two landlords did express views indicating that tenant welfare was not a concern and were 
atypical in this regard. 
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landlords who were largely intolerant of lettings to tenants in receipt of housing benefit 
were also very firmly of the view that they would never use the council to source tenants:  
‘Oh God, no. Oh, Jesus no. Oh, my Lord, no. No, no, no […] They have drug abuse 
problems, mental health issues, alcohol, just general issues […]. They have genuine 
need, genuine emotional and mental health needs. The private sector is not the best 
place for them […] I think that only landlord who would do it are either those at the 
bottom, where the properties are really dodgy and horrible, or they don’t know any 
better’ [LL25]. 
 
A great deal of adverse reaction was driven by hearsay and ‘horror stories’ even amongst 
the landlords who generally welcomed housing benefit tenants: 
‘There’s awful stories about housing being trashed, because basically they put in the 
worst tenants they can’t house into one of yours. It’s because they act as a business 
they act, I’m not saying not in good faith but they see it as a number. “I’ve got to 
house such-and-such troubled families”. The more someone troubles them, the 
more they want to house them and they’ll just shove them into anything’ [LL18]. 
 
Other landlords offered less extreme responses and mentioned that they had no need to 
approach the council since they had no difficulty in finding tenants. One landlord operating 
in the South East said that he had approached the council but in the end thought that the 
local authority seemed uninterested: ‘There seemed to be so many obstacles to progressing 
that, just typical bureaucracy that, in the end, I didn’t bother’ [LL4].  
 
A small number of landlords who were ‘anti-HB’ said they would be persuaded if the 
incentive package was right. This was thought to be particularly appropriate where 
landlords felt there might be capital uplift over a long lease period and so would be happy 
to just walk away from the property for a spell. One landlord said that he would be willing 
to hand over all his properties if he could secure a long-term leasing agreement which 
delivered a steady rent – he would have been satisfied with a below-market rate – and 
where properties were returned in the same condition after the lease period. This investor 
landlord sought to achieve ‘hands-off’ portfolio management. Another landlord mentioned 
that they had had this kind of agreement but withdrew the property after the end of the 
lease term because he saw no real incentive to continue.  
 
Engaging with the mediated market 
There was stakeholder acknowledgment of the proliferation of landlords and letting agents 
responding to demand for property to meet need in the mediated market. Local 
stakeholder interviews included comment on the ways in which meeting that need had 
impacted on their local housing market. One SLA indicated that some local landlords had 
shifted their focus to provide TA, achieving a nightly rate rental of £28-30 and a higher TA 
local housing allowance, which could be up to four times the standard amount: ‘people are 
buying specifically to get into this’ [Local third sector SLA #2].  
 
The premiums that were available for landlords meeting TA need had certainly influenced 
one investor landlord. They were working in south east London and had started to develop 
a portfolio of single studio properties where the LHA rate was very close to the market rate. 
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At the time of the interview, the landlord was arranging their fifth tenancy with the 
council’s TA scheme, which paid a substantial incentive. In the landlord’s view it made more 
sense to use the council than to employ a letting agent. The arrangement was to provide a 
two-year tenancy in which cases it was ‘a comparison of I need to pay an agent a four-figure 
sum, or [name] council pay me a four-figure sum, so that’s the big incentive’. The landlords 
were happy that the council was able to provide a tenant almost immediately, which 
reduced the void period to a matter of days, and the council also took responsibility for the 
Universal Credit application. This landlord was actively seeking properties to expand their 
dealing with the council [LL9].  
 
Another business landlord who was expanding their portfolio across the Yorkshire & 
Humberside region said that they had started to work with a procurement agency which 
was sourcing accommodation for London boroughs.  
 
There were examples of positive working experiences. One investor landlord in the 
Yorkshire & Humberside region regularly used the local council to source tenants for their 
lower-value properties. In this instance, the scheme helped with deposits and aimed to 
establish long-term tenancies in the PRS. The landlord said that she had three tenants 
under the scheme who had been in their properties for five years or more, and when 
properties became available she generally approached the council first. Landlords who had 
positive experiences tended to mention that the council did a good job of ‘filtering’ the 
tenants they nominated and offered continued support. Another business landlord also 
worked exclusively with their local homelessness charity to secure nominations for her 
HMOs, since the charity could guarantee arrangement of direct payments. It would seem 
that investor landlords who had some properties suitable for housing benefit lettings could 
be happy to use council schemes to help deal with some of the risks attached to letting to 
that group. 
 
Larger business landlords that routinely worked with more vulnerable tenants could also 
have positive relationships with local mediating agencies. A North East business landlord 
who worked with people who had addiction difficulties said that he worked quite closely 
with the local homelessness charity: ‘They’re fantastic. They hold their hands for the first 
twelve months which is a real benefit to me’ [LL6]. A larger business landlord working in 
Humberside also had an arrangement with a local homelessness charity. He was charged 4 
per cent of the LHA rent for the charity’s services, which guaranteed for the rent for a year 
and also offered a first port of call for any problems with the tenant. He regarded this 
element of the service alone as good value for money. The charity withdrew after that time 
but in the landlord’s view by then they had a good picture of the tenant and were happy to 
continue management themselves. These landlords were generally using schemes to offset 
problems with securing direct payments, and to augment the support resources that more 
vulnerable tenants might need. Landlords also valued the quality of the relationship they 
had with the mediating scheme. 
 
Stepping away from the mediated market  
The number of landlords who had negative experiences with mediating schemes was 
around the same as those with positive experiences. A dozen landlords who were generally 
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willing to let to people in receipt of HB had stepped away from working with the council. In 
a couple of instances, the landlord had been unhappy with that they regarded as being 
over-rigorous compliance visits prior to any nominations taking place.  
 
Issues other than property quality were rather more pressing. Landlords – from around the 
country – tended to tell very similar stories: the local authority had been very eager to work 
with the landlord and had placed a tenant. When problems arose with the tenant, the local 
authority had denied responsibility, leaving the landlord with – often – a tenant who caused 
damage and left owing rent arrears. One large business landlord operating in Humberside 
presented a typical experience:  
‘They [i.e. the council] used to ring us up, “oh yes, I’ve got an absolutely wonderful 
tenant for you, they’re all singing, all dancing. Dump them on our door, there’s a 
problem. The last one we did was actually via social services, into a one-bed. A very 
young girl. Trashed the place. Didn’t pay the rent. We had to evict her. Social 
services were still involved. It cost us an absolute fortune. Never going to see the 
money back. I don’t want that kind of hassle’ [LL31]. 
 
Landlords quite willing to work with problematic tenants talked about councils who 
withdrew support almost immediately once the placement was made. The betrayal of trust 
clearly rankled. One landlord who had specialised in supporting addicted tenants said that 
the council had stood as guarantor for one individual with a heavy drinking problem. The 
arrangement did not work: there was ‘literally, blood on the walls’, and he was never paid 
the promised shortfall between the rent and the LHA. ‘The council basically turned their back 
once they’d got him in there. They didn’t want to know about guaranteeing anything, really’ 
[LL81].  
 
Landlords were most aggrieved when problem tenants placed them in danger of 
prosecution by the environmental health departments of the same council. One landlord 
had accepted a nomination from the housing options team but when that tenant’s children 
were taken into care and her boyfriend started to deal in drugs, the landlord was 
threatened with a fine of £15,000 for failure to deal with anti-social behaviour at his 
property. The tenant was advised by the housing options team that she should stay in the 
property until the bailiffs arrived. The landlord was stuck: ‘So I went back to the council and I 
said, “Look, one branch of you is saying I’ve got to get her out, and the other department says 
she has to stay in”. Following that, and other similar experiences, he said that he would not 
be accepting further nominations’ [LL71]. Landlords in this group no longer trusted that 
councils would provide settled, long-term tenants or make good on promises of continued 
support. 
 
For other landlords, working with the council simply did not make economic sense. One 
North West portfolio landlord said that he had dealt with his local council for many years. 
They had started by developing a deposit guarantee scheme, which was free to the 
landlord. The scheme evolved into a tenant-finding service which charged £350 for 
providing a tenant. The landlord has since withdrawn from the scheme: ‘In all honesty, it 
was getting expensive, £350 a time, especially if […] they're quite transient. This person might 
only stay six months and then you pay another £350 then to source another person. So we've 
tended to put our signs up and do all the checks [ourselves]’ [LL72].  
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Arguably, landlord withdrawal from accepting landlord nominations carried little impact 
where that landlord is already targeting the HB market. However, the common currency of 
‘horror stories’ relating to nominations clearly augmented the views of the anti-HB 
landlords. These stories also affected the decisions made by landlords who might otherwise 
be tolerant of households receiving benefit. It is clearly the case that the mediated market 
is having a major impact on decision-making at the bottom of the market, where flows of 
inflated HB payments may well be creating perverse incentives for landlords to leave ‘open 
market’ HB lettings in favour of more lucrative mediated lets.  
 
 
Rent insurance products 
 
Rent insurance products were one further ‘intermediary’ which mediated risk as far as 
landlords were concerned. Portfolio and business property landlords might choose to 
mediate the risk of rent arrears through the purchase of rent insurance products which 
would guarantee payment of rent lost through arrears. Little research has been undertaken 
on the range of insurance products on offer. One landlord used an on-line rental 
management product which charged two per cent of the rent for collection, irrespective of 
whether the insurance company was paid by the tenant. In this landlord’s view, this made 
him ‘completely bomb-proof’, since his contract was now with the insurance company rather 
than with the tenants [LL30]. However, this meant that tenants had to pass the insurance 
company’s rigorous assessment, and he thought it unlikely that tenants in receipt of 
Universal Credit would pass that assessment. Another landlord operated to a similar model. 
He commented that ‘at the moment, the insurance companies aren’t interested in the benefit 
money’ and was unwilling to pay the higher insurance premiums that were charged for 
tenants receiving benefit [LL1]. At present, the market penetration of rent insurance 
products is not clear. It is certainly the case that some landlords see this kind of product as a 
cost-effective risk-mediation strategy, but which carried the potential of introducing an 





Letting agents and mediation schemes were in many instances ameliorating the risk that 
landlords might see as being endemic to operating at the bottom end of the market. 
Letting agents were less likely to see housing benefit tenancies as problematic and were 
perhaps playing a role in facilitating investor landlords letting in this market. There is 
evidence of mediating agencies entering into close working relationships with portfolio 
landlords, often absorbing some responsibility for that landlord’s lower-value lettings. The 
chapter indicates that landlord experience of mediating agencies could be remarkably poor, 
and many withdrew from arrangements where they felt that the agency had reneged on 
promised levels of support. ‘Horror stories’ clearly had currency amongst landlords and 
tended further to persuade anti-HB landlords that this strategy was right. Procurement 
activity to meet TA and exempt accommodation need was creating new dynamics in the 
lower end of the market, in offering enhanced incentives in certain markets. However, 
mediating agencies – in whatever guise – were not always able to enforce property 
condition standards. The development of the mediated market merits further scrutiny, as 
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does the impact of rent insurance products which might well carry consequences for further 









Soon after the Covid pandemic struck, the Government introduced measures to support 
private tenancies with the objective of reducing the incidence of evictions due to rent 
arrears and landlord mortgage default. Interventions included options for landlords to defer 
BTL mortgage payments and an increase in the LHA rate. The Government also announced 
a moratorium on evictions. This project was conceived and started before the onset of the 
pandemic, but professional informants and landlords were interviewed between April and 
September 2020 and those interviews touched on responses to the interim measures. 
These experiences comprised an unforeseen opportunity to test the resilience of the 
bottom end of the market to a shock which carried impacts on tenant and landlord 
incomes. 
 
This short chapter also sets a context for Chapter 9 which relates to landlord intent in the 
market. The chapter demonstrates that landlord letting intentions have been shaped less 
by experience of rent arrears and other financial difficulties during Covid and more by 
restrictions in eviction procedures. Landlord responses to Covid were largely consumed by 
the prospect of the proposed Renters’ Reform Bill curtailing the ability to use s21 grounds 
for possession.  
 
 
Government measures  
 
The Government has introduced a range of measures that are intended to offer immediate 
support tenants and landlords during the Covid pandemic.26  
 
Welfare changes 
Principal measures to offer financial support to tenants at the bottom end of the PRS – in 
addition to general income support measures through the furlough scheme – have included 
two major changes to Universal Credit. First, the basic element of Working Tax Credit and 
the standard allowance within UC have been increased by £20 a week.  
 
The Government also announced a revision of the LHA rates. From March 2020, the rates 
were reviewed to realign with the 30th percentile of rents within their defined Broad Rental 
Market Areas. This measure was intended to relieve pressure at the bottom end of the 
market by reducing the incidence and/or severity of shortfalls between the rent charged by 
the landlord and the allowance rate.  
 
 
26 W. Wilson (2021) Coronavirus: Support for Landlords and Tenants, House of Commons Library, 08867; 
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Changes to possession proceedings 
In addition, the Government introduced a small suite of changes to the possession 
proceedings. These include an extension of the notice for possession, to six months; a 
suspension (and then restart, in September 2020) of possessions proceedings; and a 
suspension of bailiff action which means that possession orders will not be immediately 
enforceable.  
 
Deferred mortgage payments  
On 20th March 2020 the government announced that ‘repayment holidays’ would be 
available to people unable to meet their mortgage payments. These holidays were in 
actuality a direction to lenders to exercise forbearance for fixed periods if borrowers were 
experiencing repayment difficulties. The sums had to be repaid within a plan agreed with 
the lender. The deferral period could extend over a period of three months, and applicants 
were given up to the end of October 2020 to apply. Deferred payments were also available 
to landlords with buy-to-let mortgages on the understanding that the landlord would pass 
the relief on to tenants.  
 
The following discussion draws on landlord comments relating to their experiences under 
these Covid measures. As will be seen, not all landlords regarded the measures as relevant 





The growing incidence of tenant rent arrears under Covid has been a major cause for 
concern.27 Respondent landlords were asked about their arrears experiences under Covid, 
but few reported levels of rent arrears that they found problematic. All the landlords who 
had tenants in receipt of LHA or Universal Credit indicated that these payments continued.  
Indeed, for some landlords, Covid underlined the value of continuity that might come with 
a long-standing claim: 
‘Various friends of ours have said “How are you doing during the Covid thing, I hope 
you’re getting all your rents and things” and I say “You remember that two years 
ago and more I was cursing Universal Credit and absolutely not knowing how to 
handle it, not knowing how to get hold of people, not knowing how to cope with it 
all and spending hours, and I mean hours, on the telephone trying to find the right 
place? Now, because we now know and we’ve now got most of our tenants’ money 
coming in, than you very much, the day comes round and ping, in it comes’ [LL82]. 
 
Many landlords indicated that they had contacted their working tenants and told them to 
get in touch if they had any financial difficulties, signalling that the landlord was willing to 
discuss ways of dealing with the current crisis. Landlords often said that their working 
tenants were not affected. Many were letting to ‘front line’ service professionals who have 
 
27 See e.g.  L. Judge (2021) Getting Ahead on Falling Behind: Tackling the UK’s Building Arrears Crisis, London: 





continued to work during the pandemic. Where tenants were affected, landlords reported a 
range of solutions. These included temporary rent reductions including reducing the rent 
proportionally, in line with the furlough payment; and negotiating a repayment plan. As 
might be expected, some landlords said that they preferred accepting a slightly reduced 
rent to the possibility of losing a long-standing tenant.  One or two landlords related cases 
where they had agreed to let tenants leave without notice, so that arrears did not stack up. 
In these cases, people had moved to live with other family members. 
 
 
Mortgage deferrals and other financial assistance 
 
Figure 8.1 indicates that owner-occupiers and landlords availed themselves of mortgage 
deferrals although many came off the payment deferral schemes quite quickly during 2020.  
The proportion of deferral in place peaked at around the time of the first lockdown, 
possibly as business was able to resume more quickly with 17.3 per cent of owner-occupiers 
using the deferral scheme in late May 2020, and a peak of 13.3 per cent of landlords opting 
for mortgage payment deferrals by the beginning of June. While owner deferrals fell away 
sharply at the end of June, landlords’ take up of the scheme fell more shallowly. At the end 
of the reporting period in July, 10.0 per cent of landlords had payment deferrals in place and 





Source: UK Finance AP13 
 
 
Interviews with professional informants in the financial sector confirmed the limited take-
up of the mortgage deferral scheme. One medium-sized lender indicated that around 10 





















Figure 8.1: Mortgage deferrals by type of borrower, United 





‘70 per cent of those have already started repaying and 30 per cent have extended 
their payment holiday. […] I think anecdotally, I think a lot of landlords took a 
payment holiday because they could. […] We've heard stories of some landlords not 
really understanding what it was they were doing, and once they'd realised that it 
wasn't free money [laughter] they started paying us again very quickly’ [Finance #3]. 
 
Other professional informants in the financial sector expressed a similar view: that 
landlords may have taken a holiday because it helped cash flow; that holidays were not 
necessarily passed on to tenants; and many landlords taking ‘a holiday’ had simply not 
understood that the measure was simply a deferral. 
 
Given the relatively limited experience of problematic rent arrears amongst the respondent 
landlords, it was not surprising that application for a mortgage deferral was rare. Larger 
landlords tended simply to absorb losses. Long-standing landlords had built their portfolios 
on models that had benefited from the unexpected drop in interest rates following the GFC 
and expressed themselves capable, financially, of dealing with a period of reduced rental 
income. One full-time business landlord said that he had enjoyed a 20-year period of rising 
house prices and falling interest rates: ‘I’ve got a good model, so I can take the hit’ [LL18]. 
Another large business landlord was similarly phlegmatic. He had recently reviewed an 
arrears case, and waived the arrears in that instance: ‘She’s paid me over £60,000 in rent for 
the years she’s been there. I’m not going to worry about a few quid when they’re paying that 
sort of money over a long period of time’ [LL31]. 
 
The landlords who fell into difficulties were those with smaller and less well-developed 
portfolios and whose characteristics for instability matched those outlined in Chapter 4. 
This included an investor landlord with just one property. She was a victim of timing: her 
tenant left just as the lockdown started. At the time of the interview she had had a void 
period stretching for five months and had had to pay the mortgage and council tax on the 
property [LL15]. Another small investor landlord was similarly vulnerable. His tenant was in 
stable employment, but the landlord himself was self-employed. Work had dried up and his 
rental income made him ineligible for Universal Credit. At the time of the interview he was 
largely reliant on his savings [LL63].  
  
The inability to fill voids in a timely way was often regarded as rather more problematic 
than rent arrears. One larger, portfolio landlord with fifteen properties said that he had five 
voids at the time of the interview, with two further voids anticipated. These were properties 
where tenancies were abandoned, or where prospective tenants decided not to turn up.  
The voids left him with a substantial drop in income. He was wholly reliant on rental income 
to meet his mortgage costs and to provide a personal salary, and at the time of the 
interview the interview was arranging to sell a property. He was angry with the government 
advice relating to mortgage deferral, and said that the government ‘don’t have a clue how 
this business works, because it you do that, you know damn well next time you apply for a 
mortgage, they’re going to be asking you, “Oh, have you taken any mortgage holidays?”’ 
[LL58].  
 
The landlords who had taken deferrals, and many landlords besides, often expressed the 
view that a mortgage deferral would indeed be recorded and factored into the decisions 
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that lenders make on remortgaging. It would be a ‘black mark’ against them. This view was 
held despite the fact that the UK Finance stressed that taking a mortgage deferral would 
not be recorded on an individual’s credit file.28 In one landlord’s view: 
‘The government has said the mortgage companies cannot give you a bad credit 
rating for taking a mortgage holiday, you can’t take a mortgage holiday because if 
you take a mortgage holiday, when you apply for a new mortgage there’s a question 
on the mortgage that says “Have you taken any mortgage holidays?” Then that 
rules you out for quite a number of the buy-to-let and the new mortgages’ [LL23]. 
 
One business landlord applied for a ‘bounce back loan’. This landlord was in the early stages 
of developing their business model, which in part comprised a scheme leasing properties 
from landlords and offering a guaranteed rent. The pandemic created difficulties in filling 
their shared houses, and the level of voids meant that she could no longer honour her rent 
guarantees. The bounce back loan helped the landlord meet the shortfall.  
 
Other business landlords mentioned Covid impacts on their commercial property trading, 
and this group included landlords with shops and restaurants that had to close. This 
reduction in earned income increased reliance on rental income, but none described 





Landlord responses to the change in LHA rates depended very much on the proportion of 
their lettings in the HB market and the relationship between the LHA and the local market 
rents. Smaller investment and portfolio landlords who had HB tenants but were not in the 
HB market tended to view the increase as the tenant’s business and did not adjust the rent. 
This was largely because these landlords were not usually setting the rent in relation to the 
LHA rate. It was also the case that some larger landlords, operating in more depressed 
housing markets, also noted the change but did not alter their rents since the payment was 
made directly to the tenant: ‘It doesn’t come to us. That might have had an effect, but I 
wouldn’t have seen that effect directly’ [LL31]. Another smaller investor landlord did not 
want to risk increasing her rents in response to what she regarded as a temporary measure. 
Also, ‘there’s an element of fairness as well  […] it just didn’t seem the right thing to do, so we 
didn’t’ [LL26]. In many of these cases it is likely that tenants did see a positive uplift in their 
income, since the LHA increase would have reduced any shortfall. 
 
The measure had a mixed impact amongst HB landlords. One landlord, letting numerous 
studio flats and HMOs in a South West coastal town said that the measure had indeed 
removed the requirement for many of his tenants to pay a shortfall. He had set his rents at 
the LHA rate initially, but then over the years they had increased slightly: ‘I could see LHA 
wasn’t moving and I couldn’t stay the same’. A typical rent increase might be from £420 to 
£440 a month, and this level of increase was easily accommodated by the LHA change. 
Another landlord operating further along the south coast told a similar story: his rents had 






For many landlords operating almost entirely within the HB market, the LHA change 
provoked an immediate increase in the rent that was charged. One South West landlord 
referred to the change: ‘let’s call it a payday’. He had been letting one-bedroomed flats for 
slightly above the LHA rate of £408, and the new rate had gone up to £445. One North East 
landlord generally charged £425 for his properties, but for HB tenants had accepted the 
LHA rate of £395 and tended not to look for a shortfall payment. The LHA was revised 
upwards, to £425 and he felt entitled to ask his tenants for this amount. In his view, it did 
not affect the tenants at all because they were personally not paying any extra [LL78]. One 
landlord who for many years had been charging around £450 a month for a three-bed 
property in a Midlands city increased the rent to the new rate of £670 a month.  
 
The method used to increase the rent varied. Some landlords took the step of reviewing the 
rents on all their properties but only increasing the rent when the tenancy turned over. One 
landlord with 30+ properties in the North East and with a large proportion of tenants with 
APAs said that without his intervention, his monthly rental income had increased by £4,000 
a month because his rents were all fixed at the LHA rate. In some economically 
disadvantaged areas, the LHA increase had no discernible effect. One landlord reported 
that shifting the LHA rate to the 30th percentile had effected no change at all in his area, 
‘because the rents haven’t changed in ten years’ [LL21].  
 
It would seem, therefore, that a fairly standard response to changes in the LHA rate – 
particularly amongst many portfolio and business landlords – was to increase the rent 
accordingly. Many of the respondent landlords benefitting from the LHA change were 
firmly established in the HB market with reasonably resilient business plans and limited 
problems with rent arrears. However, these landlords were generally located in HB-
dominated markets. It is likely that the LHA rate change did have a more beneficial impact 
where shortfalls were endemic.  
 
 
Change to possession proceedings 
 
One further set of measures to protect tenants at risk from falling into rent arrears during 
the Covid crisis included an extension of the notice period to six months, a temporary 
suspension of possession proceedings and a suspension of bailiff action to enforce 
possession orders. Possession proceedings could only be brought in highly restricted 
circumstances including six months’ arrears and serious anti-social behaviour. For many 
respondent landlords, the moratorium on evictions was simply referred to as ‘suspending 
s21’.This style of notice  - often termed a ‘no fault’ eviction – is preferred by many landlords 
who have experienced difficulties with courts progressing s8 orders that require the 
presentation of evidence regarded by the court as being sufficiently robust in 
demonstrating grounds for possession, or where tenants repaid some of the arrears to 
bring them just below the amount required for mandatory repossession .   
 
Landlords were more vociferous about this element of the Covid-related restrictions than 
any other, and a number of themes emerged from their comments. First, some landlords 
highlighted the problems they were having with current tenants who were subject to 
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eviction proceedings pre-Covid but where those proceedings had been suspended. A 
retired investment landlord with two properties said that one of his tenants had simply 
stopped paying the rent: ‘He said “Well, the landlord doesn’t have to pay his mortgage, so I 
don’t have to pay the rent”’. The tenant was claiming that he had lost his job although the 
landlord suspected that he was still working, and at the time of the interview the tenant 
was £3,200 in arrears. This tenant was also subject to an on-going police investigation and 
as a consequence the landlord was unable to evict on the grounds of ASB. This particular 
landlord was reliant on the rental income from the two properties he owned, and 
anticipated rental arrears totalling £10,000 once the issue was resolved: ‘I feel as though it’s 
unfair that I should be subsidising a tenant to live rent-free in my property when it’s actually 
costing me money as well when I don’t have an income’ [LL3].  
 
Other landlords who had problem tenants said that the moratorium had sent a signal that it 
was permissible to stop paying the rent. One landlord who had also been pursuing an ASB 
case against a tenant, pre-Covid, said that the tenant had reversed the APA and bought a 
flat-screen television. He knew because the tenant had thrown the box out of the window 
[LL96]. Another landlord had also been seeking to evict a tenant and their partner: ‘They 
were both working but they stopped paying just to take advantage of the government’s ban on 
legal action’ [LL58].  
 
Anecdotes about criminal tenants are common currency amongst landlords, who are often 
of the view that this kind of crime is generally unrecognised: ‘If I went into Tesco’s and I took 
a loaf of bread and a pint of milk and walked out, that is theft. But if you don’t pay your rent 
that’s not. Explain that to me. Why is that not theft?’ [LL19]. Another landlord made a 
similar point:  
‘They're allowed to stay there month after month after month and the government 
says, “Well, yes if they still haven't paid you any money after a year, then you could 
go through the process of trying to evict them” […]  If I could go into Sainsbury's and 
buy my shopping for the next year and not pay for it, I'd be quite happy, but I 
suspect I'd be prosecuted.’ [LL77] 
 
Landlords were of the view that Covid measures left them entirely unprotected against this 
kind of behaviour: ‘Although it’s a noble idea to say “Yes, nobody will be evicted during this 
process’, we’re talking about a section of the community that will totally take advantage of 
the situation’ [LL74]. Indeed, many landlords considered that eviction was their only 
defence against criminal ASB, which could often affect whole neighbourhoods.  
 
One common strategy in response to tenants refusing to pay the rent or with ASB was for 
landlords to pay those tenants to leave. This strategy was clearly not unknown pre-Covid, 
but during the pandemic landlords were more likely to see this as a viable solution for 
problem tenants. One local letting agent said that a tenant had been given notice, pre-
Covid, because she had caused a number of disturbances. Following the introduction of 
lockdown, the landlord agreed to pay her removal costs as cheaper than pursuing the issue 
through the courts [Regional Letting Agent #2]. In other instances, landlords mentioned 
simply paying the tenant a lump sum to go. Some professional informants expressed 
concern that landlords paying tenants off could easily slip into regular recourse to illegal 
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eviction: ‘landlords ‘will pay people to go round in the night, because that’s what goes on on a 
regular basis’ [Local third sector SLA #2]. 
 
The suspension of standard eviction procedures meant that landlords tightened their 
vetting procedures for prospective tenants and refused to take risks. ‘Sometimes you do 
wish you could give people a chance but I don’t see how you can when you can’t get people out 
for 18 months [LL1]. One larger portfolio landlord dealing principally with housing benefit 
tenants said that their view was that it was better to leave flats empty:  
‘When we do viewings, if we have a little niggle, if one of us has a niggle, then we 
tend not to take somebody, because it is, especially at the moment, if you were to 
give a Section 21 or a Section 8 now, you are looking a good 12/18 months, aren't 
you? With the current pandemic and nothing's going through. So we've got a couple 
of flats empty at the minute and my nerves are gone, I'm not going to lie to you’ 
[LL72]. 
 
In these circumstances, landlords were also more likely to insist on the use of guarantors. 
Risk-avoidance was marked amongst the smaller landlords who were reliant on rental 
income and it was these respondents who expressed the most reluctance to stay in the 
market. One smaller investor landlord was very definitely of the view that the eviction 
moratorium presented tenants with an opportunity not to pay the rent. He felt he had lost 
control of his properties, and was facing the risk of having to pay the mortgage on three 






This chapter has considered the impact of Covid from a landlord management perspective, 
and with a focus on the bottom end of the market. Rent arrears had not impacted on this 
part of the market to the degree that might have been anticipated, largely because 
households in receipt of benefit were often in a more stable position than tenants in work 
and subject to reduced hours, furlough or redundancy. Where landlords had working 
tenants, those landlords expressed openness to negotiation on reducing the rent and 
sought active dialogue with their tenants. Larger portfolio and business landlords were 
often in a position of financial stability, and able to accommodate some fluctuation in 
rental income. Smaller investor landlords were more vulnerable, particularly if they 
themselves were experiencing a reduction in their earned income. The increase in LHA 
rates benefitted some landlords materially, depending on the location of their holdings.  
 
Landlords did not report ‘across the board’ rent arrears, but a number did mention the fact 
that they had one highly problematic tenant who they felt gamed the system. Landlords 
were particularly aggrieved by the suspension of standard eviction procedures which they 
felt left them vulnerable to bad tenants who had no intention of paying the rent and whose 
behaviours were highly disruptive: removing s21 left the landlord without effective defence. 
As Chapter 9 will demonstrate, the prospect of a permanent removal of s21 ‘no fault’ 









This chapter draws together themes that have been touched on in earlier sections and 
considers landlords’ portfolio intentions. Sustaining supply to the bottom end of the market 
requires landlords to bring properties to the market at the same or greater rate than 
properties are withdrawn. Much of this report has indicated that landlords have their own 
agendas and do not act in concert: ‘Landlords don’t move as a whole, it’s a cottage industry 
and they’ve all got their own programme’ [Finance #1]. Landlords have a variety of reasons 
for their portfolio decisions. This chapter will explore those reasons, with a view to 
understanding how far property supply to the bottom end of the private rented sector is 
robust and sustainable. The chapter will begin with reference to mortgage market data and 
findings from the Private Landlord Survey. The chapter then considers the respondent 
landlord’s portfolio intentions. 
 
 
Reduction in mortgage activity 
 
UK Finance data for the number of property purchase mortgages advanced between 2014 
and 2020 indicate a steep decline in the number of loans to landlords to purchase homes, 
compared with a slight decline in the number of homeowners taking on new loans to buy a 
property, and a significant rise in the number of first-time buyers entering the market using 
mortgages. The combined volume of sales during 2014 and 2015 compared to combined 
sales across 2018 and 2019 shows a 30 per cent fall in the volume of BTL new purchase 
between these two time periods (Table 9.1). 
 
 
Table 9:1  Change in the volume of new property purchase loans by borrower type  
 between 2014/2015 and 2018/19, UK 
 2014 and 2015 2018 and 2019 % change 
Homeowners 598,180  584,800 -2.2 
First-time buyers 503,210 586,340 16.5 
Buy-to-let landlords 192,934 133,335 -30.9 
Source: UK Finance BTL1, RL1R and RL2R 
 
 
Portfolio intentions: the Private Landlord Survey 
 
The Private Landlord Survey asked landlord about their plans over the next two years. 
Questions were asked in March and April 2018 and qualitative landlord responses – 
discussed below – indicate that some of the trends evident in the survey are likely to have 
hardened. Table 9.2 compares the responses across different landlord groups. These three 
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groups have been selected as representing main landlord types, and do not represent all 
landlords. Analysis includes:    
 
• all landlords who agreed that people in receipt of HB or LHA was a type of tenant 
they let to (‘HB landlords’);  
• all landlords with 25+ freehold properties (‘larger landlords’), irrespective of their 
views on letting to HB households; and 
• smaller landlords (owning 1-4 properties) who did not agree that people in receipt of 
HB or LHA was a type of tenant they let to (‘small non-HB landlords’). 
 
 
Table 9.2:  Landlord letting intentions (% agreeing with proposition) 
 HB/LHA 
tenants are a 
group they 
would let to 
Landlords with 25+ 
properties, 
irrespective of HB 
letting preference 
Landlords with 1-4 
properties, not 
letting to HB/LHA 
tenants 
Over the next two years do you plan to… 
Increase the number of 
properties you let out 
15.4 19.1 11.2 
Decrease the number of 
properties you let out 
22.8 27.9 11.0 
Keep the number of 
rental properties the 
same 
43.5 37.9 55.8 
Sell all your rental 
properties and leave the 
business altogether 
5.0 6.0 4.7 
I have not made any plans 13.2 9.4 17.4 
Source: MHCLG Private Landlord Survey 2018 
 
 
Amongst the small non-HB landlords, 55.8 per cent indicated that, over the next two years, 
their portfolio would remain the same, and a further 17.4 per cent said they had made no 
plans. Roughly equal numbers – around 11 per cent – said they would be increasing or 
decreasing their holdings.   
 
The HB landlords and the larger landlords were more similar in intent although plans to 
make some sort of change to the number of holdings tended to be lower amongst HB 
landlords (43.3 per cent) compared with all larger landlords (52.7 per cent). The intention to 
increase the number of properties being let out was higher amongst the larger landlords 
compared with the HB landlords. However, the larger landlords were also more likely to be 
intending to decrease their holdings: 33.9 per cent were planning to decrease the number 
of properties they let out or sell their properties and leave the business altogether. Across 
all landlords, the proportion planning to increase was far outweighed by the proportion 
planning to decrease or exit the market, and this trend was particularly marked amongst 




The remainder of this chapter will consider landlord portfolio decisions from the 
perspective of respondent landlords in the qualitative element of the study.  
 
 
Portfolio intentions: respondent landlords 
 
Respondent landlords discussed their portfolios as dynamic entities: current holdings were 
framed by an on-going strategic plan. Landlords were expanding their lettings, had no 
immediate plans to either sell or to purchase, or were selling down. Almost all the business 
landlords and a handful of investment and portfolio landlords were planning to expand 
their holdings (n=15). Of the remaining landlords, 22 were not intending to make any 
change to their holdings in the short or medium term, and eighteen were selling down. For 
the purposes of this report, it is necessary to distinguish between landlord intent in the 
market generally, and their intent with regard to lettings to tenants in receipt of housing 
benefit more specifically.  
 
 
Landlords who were expanding  
Across all respondent landlords, 15 were looking to expand their holdings. Indeed, some 
were in the process of purchasing property at the time of the interview. Of these landlords, 
five were expanding their holdings to meet need in the HB market. Four of these were 
business landlords: two were dealing in the North East, one was located in Leeds and one 
had property in the South East and in Humberside. These were all landlords whose business 
model was geared towards securing HB lettings in locations where the LHA for their target 
household was around or in excess of the market rate. One additional investor landlord, 
operating in SE London, was expanding their lettings in order to secure incentive payments 
by working with London boroughs to meet TA need.  
 
Almost all the remaining landlords who were expanding their holdings tolerated 
households in receipt of housing benefit. Indeed, for some this group had been their 
principal market. However, none of these landlords were intending to let any of their newly 
acquired property to households receiving UC. One investor landlord with 14 properties 
said that she was likely to continue expanding in the broader market where opportunities 




Landlords who were pausing or ‘static’ 
Landlords who had no immediate plans to sell or to purchase fell into two broad categories. 
Around half of these landlords were happy with their holdings as they currently stood. This 
group tended to be characterised by smaller investor and portfolio landlords who had 
holdings that suited their purpose and had no pressing need either to expand or to divest. 
Some had arrived at a ‘sweet spot’ in terms of an income/tax balance, and others had 
arrived at a similarly pleasing position of having holdings which exactly suited their capacity 
for self-management. Landlords who were consolidating or divesting were often aiming to 
arrive at a similar sweet spot in retirement: holding a comfortable number of properties 




The remaining landlords had plans that were paused or stalled for a variety of reasons. 
Some investor and portfolio landlords had simply stopped purchasing due to taxation and 
other regulatory changes and again these will be discussed below. Others were stalled 
because of difficulties with finances. These included having long-standing mortgages with 
‘zombie banks’ that did not permit landlords to remortgage and release equity for new 
purchase. There could also be difficulty in securing properties at the right price. Landlords 
in this category were often small investor or portfolio landlords who were tolerant of 
housing benefit lettings; five were actively targeting the HB market. It is notable that the 
Covid pandemic in itself played little role in landlord decision-making. 
 
 
Landlords who were selling 
Seventeen landlords were selling down their holdings. Some indicated that this was their 
intention but were waiting for properties to become vacant in order to put them on the 
market. Landlords were generally of the view that it made little sense to sell a property with 
a steady rental return. Others noted that they had already started selling down: one small 
landlord had sold three properties in the last few years and had just one property left; 
another larger business landlord had held in excess of 100 properties, and at the time of the 
interview was down to 38.  
 
Professional informants were of the view that there had been no wholesale sell-off of buy-
to-let properties following the introduction of the tax changes. However, landlord 
respondents evidenced a very slow process of disinvestment. Indeed, where landlords had 
more substantial holdings, the intention was generally to sell just one property a year to 
minimise losses through Capital Gains Tax.  Landlords who had a small number of 
properties – fewer than five, say – were anticipating being out of the market altogether in 
the foreseeable future.  
 
None of the landlords sold their properties tenanted. Where tenanted properties were 
mentioned, this reflected landlords purchasing or inheriting such property rather than 
selling a tenanted letting. There was little confidence that there was a sufficiently robust 
market for tenanted properties. Indeed, selling to other landlords was not necessarily 
viewed favourably since any landlord seeking to buy was looking to make a deal which 
meant a lower price than would be available in the owner-occupied market.  
 
Landlords who were selling were more likely to divest themselves of property that they 
regarded as either difficult to manage or that offered the lowest level of return. Many noted 
the intention to sell their HB lettings because they were regarded as problematic. Many of 
the landlords who were currently intolerant of HB lettings had in the past let to people in 
receipt of benefit and had since sold those properties. One portfolio landlord had started 
their lettings by purchasing blocks of flats in a coastal resort and grew to a total of 32 
tenants in four blocks, aimed at tenants in receipt of benefit. However, they regarded these 
lettings as hugely time consuming: ‘It was like letting to children’. They consolidated their 





Factors underlying a reduction in holdings 
 
Overall, the respondent interviews evidenced expansion amongst business landlords who 
were operating in largely HB-dominated markets; a reduction in HB lettings amongst 
landlords who were otherwise expanding their holdings; a reluctance to expand amongst 
many smaller investor and portfolio landlords; and a larger minority of landlords 
undertaking a strategy of steady selling down.  
 
The PLS indicated some reasons for landlords wanting to reduce their lettings (Table 9.3).   
It is notable that smaller non-HB landlords were more likely to cite financial and personal 
reasons. Legislative change played a bigger role for all HB landlords and the larger 
landlords: amongst HB landlords, 72.1 per cent agreed that this was a reason; this figure 
rose to 82.6 per cent for all larger landlords.   
 
 
Table 9.3:   Reasons for a decrease in holdings (%  respondents indicating ‘yes’ to 
 stated reason)1 
 HB/LHA 
tenants are a 
group they 
would let to 
Landlords with 25+ 
properties, 
irrespective of HB 
letting preference 
Landlords with 1-4 
properties, not 
letting to HB/LHA 
tenants 
Financial reasons e.g. house 
prices, poor yields, success 
in other investments 
26.1 23.3 38.5 
Personal reasons e.g. 
approaching retirement age, 
other commitments etc. 
34.0 28.5 40.6 
Legislative change e.g. to 
benefits, tax relief and 
stamp duty 
72.1 82.6 59.9 
Other 20.6 16.6 20.1 
1 Respondents could answer ‘yes’ to more than one reason 
Source: MHCLG Private Landlord Survey 
 
 
The qualitative interviews suggest that the factors offered by the Private Landlord survey 
questionnaire did not wholly reflect sentiment at the bottom end of the market. It is 
important to unpick and explore these reasons, which reflect six interconnected themes: 
demography; taxation; the introduction of Universal Credit; the ‘regulatory burden’; hassle; 




For many landlords, the decision to sell was a reflection of age. The respondent 
interviewees included several ‘baby boomer’ landlords who had built their portfolios during 
the prime ‘buy to let’ years and were now beyond retirement age. The oldest landlords who 
were interviewed were a couple in their 80s. Many older landlords found it difficult to know 
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what to do with their holdings. One older couple who had inherited a portfolio of over 30 
shared rooms said that were likely to sell: ‘The idea is to arrive at our wooden box with 
nothing left’. They had found it remarkably difficult to square all the tax implications of 
handing on the portfolio to another family member and saw no option but to ‘fritter it away’ 
[LL52]. Other landlords who were well into retirement were also selling property to release 
capital that they used to improve their quality of life. One smaller portfolio landlord who 
self-managed with his wife said: 
‘We want to wash our hands of the whole thing and take the money out. It’ll mean 
that we won’t have an income but we think we might have enough capital to carry 
on to, well, the rest of our lives. We’re 72 now so, being realistic, we might only have 
another few years left’ [LL64].  
 
Another landlord, also in his seventies, had started to sell his properties around ten years 
ago and had reduced down from eight houses to one last block of flats. He had also used 
the cash to improve his quality of life. Older landlords who were selling regarded capital 
held in property as too illiquid for immediate use and were aiming to transfer the money to 




Another reason for withdrawing from the market was change in the ability to offset 
mortgage costs against tax. One working investor landlord who had bought two properties 
to pass on to his children said that, as a consequence of the tax change, he was going to sell 
the properties when they became untenanted and simply gift the money instead [LL25].  
One retired investor, again owning just two properties, claimed that the profitability of his 
holdings had fallen by around £12,000 a year due to the tax change. In his view, the change 
had ‘not just whittled away at the profitability of the sector, it’s actually taken huge chunks 
out of it’ [LL3]. He was intending to sell his properties. Other landlords also cited reductions 
in profitability where the principal response had been to start selling, in some cases to 
arrive at a smaller number of unmortgaged holdings. Many had explored their options and 
concluded that this was the preferable route since it released capital that was more readily 
available as ‘buffer’ finance for higher-cost repairs.  
 
Other – generally younger – landlords felt that the tax change had halted their on-going 
expansion. Investment landlords in full-time employment were often in higher rate tax 
brackets and felt that further expansion in their existing holdings simply added to their tax 
burden. An investor couple who had purchased thirteen properties was now considering a 
programme of consolidation. Work placed them in a higher rate tax bracket: ‘If it hadn’t 
been for the tax, we’d have kept going and who knows, I may be even closer to retiring by now’ 
[LL5]. Others, in a lower tax bracket were, similarly, unwilling to expand because added 
rental income would tip them into the higher tax bracket. Many of the landlords who were 
‘hovering’ felt that they had been forced into a static position and would otherwise have 






Many of the landlords in the survey had extensive working experience of Local Housing 
Allowance and were generally dismayed by the introduction of Universal Credit. In one 
letting agent’s view, the benefit ‘was not working for anybody’ [Regional Letting Agent#1], 
and was the principal reason why many landlords were withdrawing from the HB market. 
The principal issue was the loss of direct payments under LHA, difficulties in securing APAs 
and subsequent problems with arrears.  
 
DWP data indicate that the proportion of payments made directly to landlords has reduced 
substantially, from 29.4 per cent of all claims under LHA, to 6.8 per cent under UC. There 
was a notable level of regional difference. In the North East, 45.0 per cent of claimants 
under the previous LHA system had payments made directly to the landlord, and this had 
fallen to 13.7 per cent. However, the rate under UC was far higher than for other regions. 
The East and South West regions had the lowest rate of payment direct to landlord under 





Source: DWP Stat X Plore 
 
 
Landlords had very firm views about direct payments under UC. There was appreciation of 
the principles underlying the regulations around payments, but the measure had removed 
tenants’ ability to choose to have their landlord paid directly:  
‘You just get, 'Oh, it's for tenant budgeting skills', and all the rest of it. You're like, 
you just live in a different world, mate. This is not about it. You've taken a choice 
away. You're trying to treat tenants as consumers more, and therefore with rights, 
and you've taken a fundamental choice away that doesn't apply to any other 





















Figure 9.1: Proportion of housing allowance claims made direct to 
landlords by region August 2019 
HB LHA paid to landlords
UC LHA paid to landlords
All LHA paid to landlords
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One landlord with 30 properties in Yorkshire and Humberside said that UC was entirely 
unsuitable for the tenant group he was dealing with:  
‘They’ve kept it. They’ve spent it on booze, fags, beer, TV, holiday, food, whatever. 
Then they move out because they get evicted, and then they move to the next 
house, and the council pays the LHA again. Well, that’s theft. […] I don’t want to 
play by those rules’ [LL29]. 
 
For landlords with just a part of their portfolio in the HB market, then the prospect of 
having to run two separate accounting systems was not palatable: one larger landlord in 
the South East region said that when UC tenants started work it became very complicated 
to administer. He cited the example of a tenant where almost all the rental payment came 
via a UC APA, but he had to recover a shortfall of £13 from the tenant: ‘The admin just gets 
crazy […] whereas if we’ve got a private tenant, let’s say the rent is £1,000, the rent is £1,000. 
It’s not complicated’ [LL44]. One landlord summarised his reason for exiting the HB market:  
‘I find it very hard to talk about Universal Credit without swearing. It's a ridiculous 
system in my opinion. It's ridiculous that they should pay the tenants and expect the 
tenants to pay me, and I can only force them to pay me once they get two months' 
arrears, which in effect is more than two months' arrears because you have to wait 
for the two months in arrears to tell Universal Credit. By the time Universal Credit 
get their act together, they'll be four or five months in arrears’ [LL78]. 
 
Landlord dissatisfaction extended beyond problems with arrears, and often focused on the 
loss of a valued working relationship with the local authority and inability to forge similar 
links with a centralised UC system. Private landlords had, simply, been cut out of the loop. 
Landlords with difficult tenants were often dismayed that they had not been involved in a 
tenant’s movement from LHA to UC. In one property business landlord’s view, ‘there’s three 
people in this relationship: the tenant, the council or DWP, and me’. He had a tenant who had 
been with him for a year under LHA and where payment was made directly to him because 
of the tenant’s problems with alcohol. He was exasperated that her benefit had been 
changed without consulting him: ‘Surely you want to pick up with me before you give an 
alcoholic £600?’ The tenancy ended: 
‘The tenant said to me, “Don’t let them give me this money, [name], I don’t want it”. 
They didn’t listen, and they gave it to her. She rang me up once and said, “I’ve just 
had my money in. You’d better come with me to the cashpoint, [name], I’m going to 
spend it”. I said “Yes, I can’t come today” and then she went to the cashpoint and 
spent it and ended up having her stomach pumped. I didn’t get paid for three 
months, so she had to leave’ [LL18]. 
 
Other landlords with vulnerable tenants had similar stories, where tenants had not 
understood that the UC payment included rent:  
‘They weren’t reading what it was for. They didn't care, they were just getting - say 
they got the housing element of £340, oh, like Christmas, you went round, he was 





‘Regulatory burden’  
There have been several changes to regulation relating to the private rented sector, and 
landlords were asked their views on the right to rent, the tenant fees ban, electrical 
compliance, energy efficiency certification and licensing schemes. It is not the intention to 
explore each of these areas in detail. Rather, the requirement to comply with a swathe of 
new regulations added up to what landlords generally regarded as a heavier regulatory 
burden. This was not to say that landlords were unwilling to meet the statutory 
requirements: many regarded property safety as a priority. However, there was a sense in 
which the speed with which new regulations were being introduced was beginning to be 
unmanageable: landlords felt unable to plan future expenditure. For example, a change in 
deadlines relating to energy efficiency compliance created difficulties for smaller landlords 
who needed time to accrue the capital to make the required changes.  
 
One small landlord, reflecting on the required upgrade to her houses to meet the energy 
performance rating, commented that it was the accumulation of requirements that she 
could not manage: ‘It’s everything else that keeps on coming to be honest’ [LL22]’; she was 
considering selling her two properties. Other landlords agreed: ‘It’s a cumulative drip, drip’ 
[LL16]; and 'All of it has an impact of one sort or another. It’s plainly been accumulative as 
these things have come in one at a time, over a period of years, and yes, it all adds up’ [LL17]. 
 
In addition, there was general agreement with the view that penalties for non-compliance 
were disproportionate. More than one landlord mentioned the prospect of a fine for up to 
£30,000 and feared the cost of making a mistake inadvertently. One landlord mentioned 
problems with ensuring that tenants did not remove batteries from smoke alarms, which 
could leave him exposed in court: ‘Who is at fault for that? I don’t want to stand up in court 
and have to defend it, knowing that I’ve done everything right. It’s my head on the block at the 
end of the day’ [LL31]. Another landlord said that he no longer asked the tenant for a 
deposit, ‘because the potential penalty for getting that wrong is enormous’. He preferred the 
potential loss of £400 or £500 against a fine of thousands, ‘then you’ve got no-win, no-fee 




For many landlords, issues relating to UC and to regulation were bound together to 
increase the level of ‘hassle’ attached to the job. Landlords often reflected on the time they 
spent managing their portfolios, but none attached a monetary cost. They were rather 
more likely to dwell on the circumstances which led to what they regarded as unnecessary 
calls on their time. One stakeholder characterised the landlord life:  
‘None of it's glamorous, I can assure you! It's hassle, and when the landlords are 
getting the sob stories, whether they're made up or genuine, because there's stuff 
that goes on in people's lives, then if you are treating that as a nine-to-five job, and 
that is encroaching on your personal time day in and day out, that's a drain. It is a 
drain, because you don't know how to process it, because it's not your profession. 
You're not in that world; it's just you're trying to have dinner with your family of a 
night and the phone's going again, and this is going. I mean, I have quite a lot of 
respect for the bigger landlords who are decent, by and large, because the amount 
of work they put in is…they made a decision in their 20s to go, “I'm going to graft for 
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20, 25 years. I'm going to graft here, I'm going to graft there, and I'm going to do 
this”, but then they see the value of it dwindle, and the hassle of it increase four 
times’ [Local third sector SLA#2]. 
 
In these circumstances, landlords were increasingly looking towards strategies that would 
reduce the likelihood of time-consuming problems. For example, one landlord reflected on 
the impact of right to rent regulations, which he regarded as ‘just another unnecessary 
administrative burden’, which carried ‘a threat of, I don’t know, a massive fine or 
imprisonment or some ridiculous thing like that, totally unnecessary’. He had recently let a 
property and two Romanians had applied: ‘They might have been ok as tenants, but I 
thought, “ah, it’s just another load of blooming hassle”’, and he let to someone more local 
instead [LL58]. Older landlords in particular expressed dissatisfaction with the 24/7 ‘always 
on’ quality of life associated with self-management. Stocks and shares or premium bonds 




Overall, respondents were of the view that the market had become a harsh environment 
for small landlords. Many landlords felt all the factors cited above in combination: the 
financial return on their investment was insufficient to compensate for increasing 
regulatory burden and heightened risk. As landlords aged, their appetite and energy for 
dealing with the hassles of letting diminished. One landlord said that UC was ‘another nail in 
the coffin because the legislation's getting tighter, the mortgage interest rate change was a 
massive thing, the loss of Section 21 that's on its way. It's just, yes, we feel like we're being 
picked on and must be top of the list, someone doesn't like us sort of thing’ [LL72]. 
 
A moratorium on evictions signalled, for many landlords, an end to their ability to control 
their portfolios. There was widespread apprehension that new regulation was likely to 
introduce an end to s21 ‘no fault’ evictions post-Covid, and many landlords expressed 
strong opinions: ‘I don’t remember the government paying for the house, so I don’t 
understand how they are able to commandeer it to some extent and tell the private rented 
sector you can’t evict anybody’ [LL1]. As a consequence, where landlords were staying in the 
market, there was evidence of the introduction of a more vigorous approach to tenant 
vetting which was – in itself – likely to exclude tenants in receipt of Universal Credit:   
‘Nobody’s going to want to take a chance on somebody if they can’t get them out 
within a reasonable period of time if things go wrong, so it means that landlords will 
just be very wary about taking on somebody who hasn’t got…who can’t tick all the 
boxes. So that person will end up being left out’ [LL17]. 
 
Landlords were looking to the use of guarantors to mediate risk, particularly where tenants 
had low incomes and where the guarantor had sufficient assets to recompense the landlord 








There was evidence that newer entrants to the market amongst the respondents were 
simply adapting to the new contexts: they were buying properties as a company and 
seeking to work with UC from the offset. One new landlord – in his 20s and operating in a 
North East Region HB-dominated market – said that he had been purchasing properties 
that were being sold by landlords who simply did not understand or want to work with the 
new system. Landlords exiting some parts of the market were creating opportunities for 
others.  
 
However, there was general commentary across stakeholder interviews and landlords 
themselves that the nature of supply to the market was changing: in the view of one 
national letting agent, ‘the individual buy-to-let landlords are not there like they were, and I 
know that the government is probably quite pleased about that’ [National Letting Agent #2]. 
Interviews with stakeholder respondents in the mortgage sector indicated that demand for 
purchase mortgages had dropped. Indeed, one major mortgage provider indicated that the 
ratio of remortgages to purchases in their business mix had shifted from 55/45 to 70/30 
[Finance#3]. 
 
The PLS also demonstrates an overall reduction in the proportion of newer landlords.  The 
2010 PLS indicated that 22 per cent of landlords had been letting for three years or less; in 
2018 the comparable figure was 9.5 per cent. Furthermore, newer entrants to the market 
were much less likely to agree that households in receipt of housing benefit were a group 
they routinely let to. Just over a quarter (27.6 per cent) of landlords letting for eleven years 
or more were letting to someone in receipt of housing benefit; for landlords who had been 
letting for three years or less, this figure was 8.9 per cent.  
 
 
Table 9.4: Landlord experience and letting preferences 
 Landlord letting experience 
3 years or 
less 
4-10 years 11+ years 
The types of tenant I currently let to include… (%): 
People in receipt of Housing Benefit or 
Local Housing Allowance 
8.9 18.1 27.6 
People in receipt of Universal Credit 4.7 6.9 10.5 
MHCLG: Private Landlord Survey 2018 
 
 
The market is seeing a reduction in newer entrants, and those newer entrants are much less 









This chapter has reviewed data around landlord letting intentions, and in particular their 
willingness to continue letting property and their willingness to let to households in receipt 
of housing benefit. It appears that landlords are withdrawing from the market, and age 
cohort effects are playing a substantial role. ‘Baby boomer’ landlords who built up their 
holdings during the prime ‘buy to let’ years are now beyond retirement age and many are 
simply selling down their holdings in lieu of more strategic decision-making around passing 
property on. Withdrawal from the market reflects broader dissatisfaction with an 
increasingly ‘hostile environment’ for private landlords: diminishing returns are not 
compensating for an increasing regulatory burden and higher level of risk.  
 
There are multiple implications for supply to the bottom end of the market: landlords are 
withdrawing from the market generally, and where they are staying in the market they are 
reducing their HB lettings. Landlords were seeking to counter higher levels of risk by 
introducing vetting practices that were likely to exclude lower-income tenants. Expansion 
in the HB market often reflected the activity of business landlords in markets where 











This concluding chapter draws together the principal findings and themes of the research. 
In undertaking a detailed exploration of demand-side characteristics, market geography 
and landlords’ financial decision making, management practices and portfolio intentions, 
the research contributes a fuller understanding of the bottom end of the PRS. The 
conclusion indicates supply-side features which are concerning, in relation to market 
configuration, supply and the use of risk-mitigation strategies. All these factors point 
towards a reduced supply of properties outside the HB-dominant markets and outside the 





The PRS is the most complex sector of the housing market, and generalisation is rarely 
advisable. Narratives relating to housing benefit and the sector have focussed almost 
exclusively on affordability issues for tenants who need help with paying the rent. Very little 
attention has been given to way that the market has been shaped by housing, where due 
regard is given to both spatial difference and sectoral difference within the HB market. This 
research has contributed a better understanding of the dynamics of HB-dominated market, 
and to the way that the market is shifting – quite rapidly – in response to the fall-out of 
Welfare Reform and the introduction of Universal Credit. 
 
 
The nature of HB-dominant markets 
The research has concentrated attention at the lower end of the PRS, and has distinguished 
between households paying bottom third rents, with bottom third incomes, in poverty or 
receiving HB. These groups intersect but do not fully correlate. Much of the report has 
discussed practices relating to the HB market, which is distinguished by rents set in 
reference to the LHA and where landlord practices are aligned to tenants’ benefit receipt. 
This market has strong degrees of spatial concentration.  
 
A principal feature of these markets is the central role played by housing benefit in defining 
opportunities for landlords. The benefit itself is the key reason why landlords are in the HB 
market, and modes of HB delivery have framed a range of market responses. Landlords are 
attuned to sub-markets within the HB market, and there is particular interest in securing 
tenants whose benefit receipt is steady and uninterrupted, where local authority or 
charitable nomination arrangements augment the support available to more vulnerable 
tenants and/or where it is possible to organise an Alternative Payment Arrangement. 
Figure 9.1 indicated that the proportion of tenancies with APAs was much higher in the 
North East region, and this fact could be interpreted as an indicator of the expertise of HB 
landlords in this locality, where there is a long history of concentrated benefit dependence.  
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Business landlords within the study were particularly focussed on developing holdings in 
the HB market, and many were continuing to expand. Larger portfolios had sufficient rental 
income to be resilient to the micro-shocks of individual tenancies failing due to rent arrears 
or ASB: smaller landlords were more likely to exit the market following major tenancy 
failure. It is likely that, within HB markets, larger landlords will continue to grow and may 
well absorb the portfolios of exiting smaller portfolio and investment landlords as they are 
released back to the market.  
 
However, this market is geographically contained within the specific broad rental market 
area boundaries that define the LHA rates. Landlords were fully aware that their business 
models could not work outside the very particular configuration of relatively high LHA rates 
in a stagnant housing market. LHA is a species of rent control, which to a degree contains 
cost increases in the lower end of more buoyant markets. Conversely, in HB-dominant 
areas, LHA can set the rent at levels higher than would otherwise be achieved. Expansion is 
only taking place within these confines.   
 
 
The mediated market 
The research also explored how the mediated market is developing. Portfolio and investor 
landlords had variable experience of nomination agreements with local authorities, but 
some larger portfolio and business landlords were actively investing in strengthening 
relationships with nominating authorities and charities. From the landlord perspective, a 
good working relationship added considerable value where profit margins could be low 
since the agencies absorbed time-intensive elements of tenancy management including 
dealing with UC bureaucracy and offering active tenant support. These factors increased 
the likelihood of tenancy sustainability and reduced the incidence of tenancy turnover, 
which landlords regard as a major cost element. Growth in the mediated market is also 
taking place at other levels.  
 
Outside the HB-dominant markets, the consequence of welfare reform and poor landlord 
response to UC has increased the incidence of tenancy breakdown and boosted demand for 
TA. Statutorily homeless statistics indicated that the absolute numbers of households in TA 
have increased, as has recourse to placements in the private sector (Chart 10.1). The 
Homelessness Reduction Act has also increased local authority recourse to the PRS to meet 
housing need, and in high-demand areas it is more often that case that landlords require 







Source: HMCLG Statutory Homeless Tables 
 
 
Meeting demand in the mediated market is an activity that, in some locations of very high 
demand, requires procurement at scale which is more readily met through contractual 
arrangements with specialist providers who are ‘volume managers’. Local authorities will be 
negotiating deals based on redeployment of various homelessness grants and TA funding 
to meet the overall scale of procurement demand irrespective of the route to the housing 
need. According to one national mediated market provider commented, with regard to 
their dealings with local authorities: 
‘You see more councils saying “We’d like what you do for temporary housing, but 
can we reconfigure it so it’s discharge of duty?” That’s where you, then, start playing 
games around the LHA level and subsidy levels. Whether it’s money, Temporary 
Social Housing Grant that we can reuse or can we use exempt rules to say “This is a 
discharge of duty” and people can still afford it? It’s more rearranging the deckchairs 
a little bit rather than changing the numbers’ [Stakeholder Mediated Scheme #1].  
 
This level of demand is – like the HB market – geographically concentrated in London 
boroughs and other areas where rental costs are high and the supply of social rented 
accommodation is low. The impact and economics of this part of the market requires a 
higher level of scrutiny than has been possible here, but there is evidence that a highly 


























Chart 10.1: Number of households in TA, by type, at Q4 in stated year
Private sector accommodaton










Reduced property supply  
 
A second set of findings relate to a reduction in property supply to the sector overall, and to 
tenants in receipt of HB more particularly.  
 
Dynamic cohort effects 
The qualitative elements of this research have indicated the need to understand the 
dynamics of landlordism and the broader trajectories of portfolio development. Many 
respondent landlords were in their fifties or older. Larger portfolio and business landlords 
were able to reflect on rapid portfolio expansion in during a very particular period, when 
BTL mortgages were readily available and property prices were depressed in the years 
immediately following the Global Financial Crisis. This ‘baby boom’ cohort brought 
substantial property to the PRS in highly preferential circumstances with regard to tax and 
low interest rates. Landlords themselves often commented on the confluence of 
circumstances which made it remarkably easy to grow a portfolio very rapidly.  
 
However, these landlords are now ageing. Many respondent landlords were in retirement 
and were winding down their holdings often through a very gradual release of properties 
back into the owner-occupied sector. Regulatory and taxation change has created a rather 
less benign context for letting, which will depress levels of new entry to the market. 
Diminished supply of property to the lower end of the market specifically will reflect the 
slow withdrawal of BTL ‘bubble’ properties across the sector more generally.  
 
Non-strategic HB lettings 
Table 5.3 indicates that the majority of HB lettings take place in markets that are not 
dominated by that kind of letting. This report has highlighted the contribution of ‘non-HB’ 
landlords to meeting need amongst lower-income tenants in areas where affordability and 
supply might be problematic. This kind of ‘pepper-pot’ supply reflects the fact that many 
landlords are quite happy to accept a tenant who is in some way reliant on housing benefit, 
depending on the circumstances. This toleration was often rooted in long-standing 
relationships between the landlord and the tenant which engendered a degree of trust. 
Landlords were generally unwilling to risk losing a good tenant whose circumstances 
changed but who could be trusted to make good on the rent over the medium and longer 
term.   
  
The willingness to accept a lower-income tenant also reflected the fact that many small 
investor landlords amongst the respondents were setting rents that reflected the cost of 
meeting an interest-only mortgage payment, plus some additional contingency. They were 
not rent maximisers, did not need the rental income to augment their earned income and 
tended to use property as a location for ‘parking’ surplus capital. To that end, it was better 
to seek a tenant who wanted a long-term, settled home.  However, for many of the smaller 
investment and portfolio landlords, the risks of letting had started to outweigh the 
achievable profits. Taxation changes, the increased regulatory burden and the prospect of 
an end to s21 eviction procedures had – in combination – persuaded many smaller landlords 
to pause any expansion in holdings and consider selling down. The exit of these smaller 
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landlords from the market will reduce ‘pepper pot’ supply to lower-income households, 
particularly in areas with affordability issues.   
 
 
Stepping back from HB lettings 
One clear trend amongst the respondent landlords who were choosing to stay in the 
market was stepping back from letting to tenants in receipt of benefit, and in particular, 
Universal Credit. Amongst the respondents, some larger business landlords had quickly 
reconfigured their management practices to work with UC bureaucracy. Other landlords – 
particularly those with a long history of working with the previous system – regarded UC as 
too problematic. Landlords operating outside HB-dominant markets found it relatively 
straightforward to operationalize a preference for lower-income working tenants. This 
strategy reduces supply to HB-reliant households which – as Chapter 2 indicated – 





One final set of findings relates to landlord responses to risk. The PRS is regarded as part of 
the market that is intrinsically risky for tenants. Many landlords also regard letting property 
as a highly risky endeavour, and more so since the introduction of a raft of changes which 
have altered the regulatory framework. There were two principal elements: risks attached 
to regulatory infringements and to problem tenants.  
 
None of the landlords who were interviewed disagreed with the need for property and 
management standards. However, it was felt that the pace of change made it difficult to 
plan where new requirements were introduced, and the penalties for infringement were 
high. To mitigate risk, landlords sometimes took steps to reduce the risk of inadvertent 
non-compliance. This included perhaps not charging a deposit, so that they would not be 
caught failing to comply with deposit protection regulations or using a letting agent who 
would take responsibility for ensuring that legal requirements were met.  
 
A more pressing matter for all landlords was managing risks around problem tenants. 
These included tenants who entered into tenancy agreements with no intention of paying 
the rent; tenants who were incapable of managing their finances, and who fell into chronic 
arrears; tenant households that changed – the bad ‘new boyfriend’ was a staple in landlord 
horror stories – and where ASB and/or arrears started to occur; tenants who damaged 
property; and tenants who caused problems for neighbours. Almost all landlords had 
experienced one problem tenant, and many talked about problems in repossessing their 
property using s8 routes. Use of s21 was regarded a lifeline in these circumstances, and the 
prospect of losing that option had persuaded some landlords to begin selling down.  
Landlords who were intending to stay in the market were introducing a range of risk 
mitigation measures. These included: 
 
• Not letting to tenants in receipt of HB, where receipt of the benefit was taken as a 
signal that arrears and problem behavior might well occur. 
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• Use of owner-occupied guarantors, and actively pursuing repayment from those 
guarantors where tenants defaulted.  
• Use of rent insurance products, which in themselves might introduce higher 
premiums for lettings to tenants in receipt of benefit. Some landlords said that they 
routinely used on-line letting services where rent insurance was built into tenant 
referencing. 
• Being prepared to pay a problem tenant to leave. 
 
In addition, landlords were much less willing to give a marginal tenant ‘the benefit of the 
doubt’. Covid restrictions had given landlords a strong indicator of the way in which 
permanent changes to possession procedures might play out: responses were 





This study has looked to achieve a more nuanced understanding of demand and supply-
side characteristics of the bottom end of the PRS and identified sub-sectoral and spatial 
difference. It is possible to draw some conclusions about the stability of property supply to 
this part of the market, and which reflect the ways in which the sector is responding to 
policy interventions which have affected landlord finances, management practices and 
tenant choices. Housing benefit has created attractive opportunities for landlords in certain 
parts of the market which means that continued supply is likely to remain in HB-dominated 
markets and in the mediated market where premiums might be charged on top of HB 
payments: there is a ‘HB+ market’. This part of the market is dominated by larger business 
and portfolio landlords, and – increasingly – by much larger investors operating at scale.  
 
The research has also evidenced both a pause and a withdrawal from the market of smaller 
investor landlords and reduced holdings amongst some portfolio landlords operating 
outside the HB-dominant markets. There is a cohort effect, reflecting the aging of a 
generation of baby-boomer BTL investors. There is also a widespread understanding that 
the rental market has become less benign and innately riskier and stepping back from 
letting to lower-income tenants is a principal method for mitigating risk. Most landlords 
were of the view that new entrants to the market could make it ‘stack up’, if they bought 
the right property in the right place. However many more questioned whether – given what 








Table A1.1:  Respondent landlord characteristics 
 Investment Portfolio Business 
Landlord type 20 20 15 
Demographics 
Male 12 14 10 
Female 6 2 3 
Couple 2 4 2 
Age 
20s/30s 2 1 1 
40s 2 3 4 
50s 4 4 8 
60s 5 7 2 
70+ 3 3 0 
Not disclosed 4 2 0 
Income mix    
Rental only 0 7 1 
Rental and employment 7 2 2 
Pension and rental 9 5 0 
Rental and other business 2 5 12 




Table A1.2:  Portfolio and management  
 Investment Portfolio Business 
Properties held  
One property 1 0 0 
2-4 properties 14 1 0 
5-9 properties 3 9 2 
10-24 properties 2 4 4 
25-100 properties 0 5 8 
100+ properties 0 0 1 
Use of an agent 
Self-manage 6 6 7 
Letting only 7 1 1 
Letting and management 6 10 1 
Depends on property 1 3 0 
Landlord owns a letting 
agency 






Table A1.3: Location of holdings and intent  
 Investment Portfolio Business 
Reach of operation 
Local 13 12 6 
Single region 5 5 6 
Two or more regions 2 3 3 
Principal holdings 
North East 1 2 2 
North West 1 1 0 
Yorkshire & Humberside 2 7 5 
East Midlands 2 1 0 
West Midlands 2 1 0 
East 3 2 0 
London 2 1 0 
South East 2 1 2 
South West 3 1 3 









Appendix 2: Additional figures and tables 
 




















Chart A2.1: Separate definitions of the lower end of the PRS by region 
(%)
Bottom third rent















































42.6 46.1 50.8 49.6 53.6 61.1 54.8 59.6 52.9 53.3 
Part-time employee 
12.1 12.4 11.6 11.2 12.1 7.6 8.0 10.0 10.3 10.2 
Full-time self-employed 3.3 4.8 7.1 6.2 9.1 10.0 15.4 8.8 11.9 9.5 
Part-time self-employed 1.5 3.8 0.4 2.1 2.7 1.5 3.3 3.7 3.5 2.8 
Unemployed 4.3 2.7 5.4 2.5 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.2 2.7 2.4 
Retired 11.6 8.8 11.7 7.5 7.3 9.7 2.1 4.8 9.2 7.0 
Student 5.0 5.8 1.7 7.6 3.3 1.0 5.4 4.5 1.6 4.2 
Looking after the family/home 
2.3 3.1 3.2 2.1 2.7 0.3 3.0 1.9 0.8 2.2 
Sick/disabled 9.30 9.10 4.10 5.20 4.20 4.90 3.30 3.00 4.60 4.90 
Other 8.0 3.4 4.0 6.1 3.5 2.3 2.9 2.6 2.5 3.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0









Table A2.2: Type of housing benefit claims by region (%) (Aug 2019) 



















North West 10.4 14.5 3.9 34.2 14.7 22.2 100.0 
North East 14.8 12.2 6.5 32.0 14.3 20.3 100.0 
Yorks & Humber 12.5 13.5 5.3 27.3 18.9 22.5 100.0 
W. Midlands 10.6 16.6 4.5 24.6 19.5 27.2 100.0 
E. Midlands 9.9 15.2 3.7 27.4 18.1 25.6 100.0 
East 7.4 15.7 2.5 20.5 16.9 36.9 100.0 
South West 5.6 18.9 2.0 27.1 18.5 27.9 100.0 
London 4.5 12.6 2.7 13.6 14.1 52.6 100.0 
South East 6.7 17.3 2.5 20.3 14.9 38.3 100.0 
Total 8.3 14.7 3.5 23.7 17.6 32.2 100.0 
Source: DWP Stat Xplore (NB: May not sum to 100 due to rounding) 
 
 
Tables A2.3 (a-d): Passported housing benefit claims: reasons, with highest and lowest 
ranking local authorities, Aug 2019 (%)  
 
 a) Employment Support Allowance    b) Pension credit 
Lowest % Highest %  Lowest % Highest % 
Cotswold 8.2 Hyndburn 44.7 
 Telford & 
Wrekin 






Hackney 6.7 Craven 34.8 
Hounslow 9.4 Bolsover 43.1 






 Newham 9.5 Burnley 41.8  Milton Keynes 7.0 Rutland 32.4 
Basingstoke 
& Deane 






Harrow 10.0 Liverpool 41.1  Tower Hamlets 7.4 Cotswold 31.4 
Barking & 
Dagenham 















 Enfield 8.1 Ashford 28.9 
Slough 10.7 Wirral 39.3  Nottingham 8.1 Eden 28.5 





         
 c) Income Support    d) Job Seekers Allowance 
Lowest % Highest %  Lowest % Highest % 
Cotswold 1.0 Middlesbrough 19.0 
 South 
Somerset 
0.3 City of London 20.7 
Kensington & 
Chelsea 
1.7 Rotherham 17.2 
 
Bracknell Forest 0.5 South Tyneside 11.0 








1.9 Sunderland 16.9 
 
Sutton 0.6 Middlesbrough 9.4 
Stratford-on-Avon 2.3 Ashfield 16.7  Harrogate 0.6 Sunderland 8.5 
Uttlesford 2.4 County Durham 16.5 
 South 
Oxfordshire 





 Somerset West 
& Taunton 
0.6 Darlington 8.0 
Richmond- 
shire 
2.4 Doncaster 16.4 
 
Stroud 0.6  Wolverhampton 7.9 







Hackney 2.7 Sandwell 15.8  North Devon 0.7 Bolton 7.8 
 










Appendix 3: Quantitative landlord data 
 
Table A3.1:  Purchase status of rented properties 
 Number Percentage 
Owned outright 652 39.9 
Being purchased with a mortgage 581 35.5 
Owned fractionally 186 11.4 
Purchased with a commercial loan 216 13.2 
   
Total properties 1,635 100.0 
n.=895 landlords 





Table A3.2:  Purchase status and landlord type (%) 
 All respondents ‘UC landlords’‡ 
All property owned outright 38.2 25.0 
All property being purchased with a mortgage 31.2 26.1 
All property owned fractionally * 3.3 
All property being purchased with a commercial 
loan 
* 0 
Property is mixed in terms of purchase status 29.1 45.7 
May not total 100 due to rounding   
 n=891 n=92 
*Less than 1 per cent. 
‡Landlords indicating: ‘My tenants include people in receipt of Universal Credit and I have changed my 
management practices for those tenants (e.g. accept delayed payments, rent in arrears etc.)’ 
Source: BDRC Q1 2020 
 
 
